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Windows Analysis Report
WinLock.bin

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	WinLock.bin (renamed file extension from bin to exe)
Analysis ID:	633960
MD5:	5e5043a0455e8652d0a58c8611e47903
SHA1:	8c277a2c32d211b5faa0dd65a8872c903e1ed429
SHA256:	b25818cfa65b13e2be6358f5c28dfae35578d72fea8d0120486d8ec6629a1bf4
Tags:	exeRansomwareRUScreenLock
Infos:

Detection

Score:	60
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Machine Learning detection for sample

Creates an undocumented autostart registry key

Disables the Windows task manager (taskmgr)

Uses 32bit PE files

Changes image file execution options

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Hides icons from the desktop

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

WinLock.exe (PID: 5636 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe" MD5: 5E5043A0455E8652D0A58C8611E47903)

explorer.exe (PID: 5784 cmdline: explorer.exe MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: WinLock.exe

Avira: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: WinLock.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 0.0.WinLock.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: DR/Delphi.Gen

Source: WinLock.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: WinLock.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: WinLock.exe

Static PE information: Section: UPX1 ZLIB complexity 0.992122882204

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Borland\Delphi\4.0	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Borland\Delphi\5.0	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Borland\Delphi\6.0	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Borland\Delphi\7.0	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Borland\Delphi\Locales	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

File written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Time.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal60.evad.winEXE@2/2@0/0

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe"
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\explorer.exe explorer.exe

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{20D04FE0-3AEA-1069-A2D8-08002B30309D}\InProcServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\lksjfhglkjfsdg131

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Time.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX0
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX1

Boot Survival

Creates an undocumented autostart registry key

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Key value created or modified: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\explorer.exe Debugger

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key value created or modified: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\explorer.exe Debugger			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe	Key value created or modified: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\taskmgr.exe Debugger			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Registry key created or modified: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer NoDesktop

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS | NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings

Disables the Windows task manager (taskmgr)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe

Registry key created or modified: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\system DisableTaskMgr

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Process Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 Image File Execution Options Injection	1 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Disable or Modify Tools	LSASS Memory	2 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Image File Execution Options Injection	21 Software Packing	Security Account Manager	1 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	1 Process Injection	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
WinLock.exe	100%	Avira	W32/Induc.ciw
WinLock.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.0.WinLock.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	DR/Delphi.Gen		Download File

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	633960
Start date and time: 25/05/202212:16:07	2022-05-25 12:16:07 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 36s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	WinLock.bin (renamed file extension from bin to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	25
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal60.evad.winEXE@2/2@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI

Warnings

Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information.
Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, fs.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, login.live.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com
Execution Graph export aborted for target WinLock.exe, PID 5636 because there are no executed function
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	18
Entropy (8bit):	3.3921472236645345
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:zSn:zS
MD5:	0E28E5A1D1A07BDF23D9A9C7EEC8F365
SHA1:	293893C3C9AC12C410493180B7B0DD3CF359025F
SHA-256:	BA469C29CE2BE61150FCC404AA05D29D47E66E85D70B50B89DB00D79DB63E9AC
SHA-512:	DF729850229BD7370403972EB8FF50D0BA5BF49FD0C0972D2EA57C63300D45FDA7E63F7D500F1982D0CDEDCD39BE2C37F6E3CDD1F240C6D01A143DC699B68FA8
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	[Time]..Time=101..

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Time2.ini

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	21
Entropy (8bit):	3.6304126608739984
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:XTzVsn:DzVs
MD5:	A0368CBFFB159B4F62A8A9C9FEFC66B8
SHA1:	B70134A786195E48BC1B065D68E898F180631E7E
SHA-256:	77E5260759F88CCC1A8D4C72FC7B6636497CD7140D81B55579FF010D7E0B4854
SHA-512:	5582DE2614BF4EA5B512B7DB2DB0908FFF8788252884E6A566D36EB1FB091C65551F52FD834ECDB7A9BEF9C87ACE76B78D6FF24D3FBF7357A63FE09B48252DF1
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	[Time2]..Time2=3500..

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed
Entropy (8bit):	7.905186421158123
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.63% UPX compressed Win32 Executable (30571/9) 0.30% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.02% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02%
File name:	WinLock.exe
File size:	492544
MD5:	5e5043a0455e8652d0a58c8611e47903
SHA1:	8c277a2c32d211b5faa0dd65a8872c903e1ed429
SHA256:	b25818cfa65b13e2be6358f5c28dfae35578d72fea8d0120486d8ec6629a1bf4
SHA512:	f694e0ac611ce214bb8615f7453933cdb94cf83d220bb0c42896f88289506e0cd281d5a51f91c15c09a67a2fcaa607f4ee1e6420bdd94bb12dbfe954955ce719
SSDEEP:	12288:Lp/PKhWltltmVU/BvHLts2kBrHVJ0cjdUMBsXj95RN:EhWlPtr/BvHJsLHiYBsXj9nN
TLSH:	9FA42383F743BD13C526AEF11291C7149F1048F91A9A7FBB9E1DF85ABAFE4025940352
File Content Preview:	MZP.....................@...............................................!..L.!..This program must be run under Win32..$7.......................................................................................................................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	b24dc6030fcc4db2

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x552f60
Entrypoint Section:	UPX1
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x2A425E19 [Fri Jun 19 22:22:17 1992 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	32a3b7658be85c7c43fe36e3e5b0f5a3

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
pushad
mov esi, 004DE000h
lea edi, dword ptr [esi-000DD000h]
mov dword ptr [edi+0011A0A0h], 20FD7E2Ch
push edi
or ebp, FFFFFFFFh
jmp 00007F1790947D70h
nop
nop
nop
nop
mov al, byte ptr [esi]
inc esi
mov byte ptr [edi], al
inc edi
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F1790947D4Fh
mov eax, 00000001h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc eax, eax
add ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F1790947D6Dh
jne 00007F1790947D8Ah
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F1790947D81h
dec eax
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc eax, eax
jmp 00007F1790947D36h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc ecx, ecx
jmp 00007F1790947DB4h
xor ecx, ecx
sub eax, 03h
jc 00007F1790947D73h
shl eax, 08h
mov al, byte ptr [esi]
inc esi
xor eax, FFFFFFFFh
je 00007F1790947DD7h
sar eax, 1
mov ebp, eax
jmp 00007F1790947D6Dh
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F1790947D2Eh
inc ecx
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F1790947D20h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F1790947D69h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc ecx, ecx
add ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F1790947D51h
jne 00007F1790947D6Bh
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F1790947D46h
add ecx, 02h
cmp ebp, 00000000h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x156ad8	0x2a4	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x154000	0x2ad8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x153118	0x18	UPX1
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
UPX0	0x1000	0xdd000	0x0	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
UPX1	0xde000	0x76000	0x75200	False	0.992122882204	data	7.92981825597	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x154000	0x3000	0x2e00	False	0.279466711957	data	4.48965207385	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_CURSOR	0x1365f0	0x134	data	English	United States
RT_CURSOR	0x136724	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x136858	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x13698c	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x136ac0	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x136bf4	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x136d28	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x136e5c	0x134	data
RT_BITMAP	0x136f90	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137160	0x1e4	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137344	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137514	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1376e4	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1378b4	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137a84	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137c54	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137e24	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x137ff4	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1381c4	0x488	data	Russian	Russia
RT_BITMAP	0x13864c	0xc0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x13870c	0xe0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1387ec	0xe0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1388cc	0xe0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x1389ac	0xc0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x138a6c	0xc0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x138b2c	0xe0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x138c0c	0xc58	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x139864	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x139b8c	0xc0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x139c4c	0xe0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x139d2c	0xe8	data	Russian	Russia
RT_BITMAP	0x139e14	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x13a13c	0xc0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x13a1fc	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x13a524	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x13a84c	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_BITMAP	0x13ab74	0xe0	data
RT_ICON	0x1555f4	0xea8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40	Russian	Russia
RT_DIALOG	0x13bafc	0x52	data
RT_STRING	0x13bb50	0x4c	data
RT_STRING	0x13bb9c	0xaa	data
RT_STRING	0x13bc48	0x186	data
RT_STRING	0x13bdd0	0x1ce	data
RT_STRING	0x13bfa0	0x144	data
RT_STRING	0x13c0e4	0x7e	data
RT_STRING	0x13c164	0x24	data
RT_STRING	0x13c188	0x228	data
RT_STRING	0x13c3b0	0x1e0	data
RT_STRING	0x13c590	0x198	data
RT_STRING	0x13c728	0x158	data
RT_STRING	0x13c880	0x2ec	data
RT_STRING	0x13cb6c	0xd8	data
RT_STRING	0x13cc44	0x118	data
RT_STRING	0x13cd5c	0x268	data
RT_STRING	0x13cfc4	0x3fc	data
RT_STRING	0x13d3c0	0x390	data
RT_STRING	0x13d750	0x378	data
RT_STRING	0x13dac8	0x408	data
RT_STRING	0x13ded0	0xec	data
RT_STRING	0x13dfbc	0xd0	data
RT_STRING	0x13e08c	0x29c	data
RT_STRING	0x13e328	0x40c	data
RT_STRING	0x13e734	0x330	data
RT_STRING	0x13ea64	0x314	SysEx File - AdamsSmith
RT_RCDATA	0x13ed78	0x4	data
RT_RCDATA	0x13ed7c	0xcbf	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x13fa3c	0x3a5	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x13fde4	0xd58	data	Russian	Russia
RT_RCDATA	0x140b3c	0xd0d	data	Russian	Russia
RT_RCDATA	0x14184c	0x10	data
RT_RCDATA	0x14185c	0x4	ISO-8859 text, with no line terminators
RT_RCDATA	0x141860	0x618	data
RT_RCDATA	0x141e78	0x434	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x1422ac	0x4b1	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x142760	0x1a1	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x142904	0x671	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x142f78	0x7b1	data	English	United States
RT_RCDATA	0x14372c	0x8	data
RT_RCDATA	0x143734	0x2a7d	data
RT_RCDATA	0x1461b4	0x640	data
RT_RCDATA	0x1467f4	0x1bdb	data
RT_RCDATA	0x1483d0	0x2545	data
RT_RCDATA	0x14a918	0x2f3	data
RT_RCDATA	0x14ac0c	0x1adc	data
RT_RCDATA	0x14c6e8	0x1adc	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e1c4	0x14	data	English	United States
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e1d8	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e1ec	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e200	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e214	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e228	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e23c	0x14	Non-ISO extended-ASCII text, with escape sequences
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x14e250	0x14	Non-ISO extended-ASCII text, with no line terminators
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x1564a0	0x14	data	Russian	Russia
RT_MANIFEST	0x1564b8	0x32c	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	French	France
RT_MANIFEST	0x1567e8	0x2f0	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	Russian	Russia

Imports

DLL	Import
advapi32.dll	RegCloseKey
comctl32.dll	ImageList_Add
gdi32.dll	SaveDC
KERNEL32.DLL	LoadLibraryA, ExitProcess, GetProcAddress, VirtualProtect
ntdll	RtlAdjustPrivilege
ntdll.dll	RtlSetProcessIsCritical
ole32.dll	CoInitialize
oleaut32.dll	VariantCopy
shell32.dll	SHGetMalloc
user32.dll	GetDC
version.dll	VerQueryValueA

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States
Russian	Russia
French	France

Target ID:	0
Start time:	12:17:12
Start date:	25/05/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinLock.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	492544 bytes
MD5 hash:	5E5043A0455E8652D0A58C8611E47903
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Borland Delphi
Reputation:	low

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	12:17:13
Start date:	25/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	explorer.exe
Imagebase:	0x7ff6f3b00000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IEFO) debuggers. IEFOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., `C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe` ).
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report WinLock.bin

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Time.ini

C:\Users\user\Desktop\Time2.ini

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

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Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: WinLock.exePID: 5636, Parent PID: 4656

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: explorer.exePID: 5784, Parent PID: 572

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
WinLock.bin