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Windows Analysis Report
Rd1Kf1A4cB.bin

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Rd1Kf1A4cB.bin (renamed file extension from bin to exe)
Analysis ID:	660113
MD5:	0ad89e86b34a226ff2a3042103afc7f1
SHA1:	91a27477c847ebf9ef3e2cb34e0bc93e323f449d
SHA256:	f831d088c3a64b06843d970337f1c8877c9c1988d56720a7dee9d67efeaf78f0
Tags:	exezitmo
Infos:

Detection

Score:	84
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Uses 32bit PE files

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Found evasive API chain checking for process token information

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Detected potential crypto function

May initialize a security null descriptor

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe (PID: 6516 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe" MD5: 0AD89E86B34A226FF2A3042103AFC7F1)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 78%			Perma Link
Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 96%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00411780 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,

Compliance

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Unpacked PE file: 0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405838 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415B2D FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415BE8 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260107317.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260107317.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbcsocksGlobal

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040CC5C InternetReadFile,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260413898.000000000077A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040BB78 EnterCriticalSection,GetTickCount,LeaveCriticalSection,GetKeyboardState,ToUnicode,TranslateMessage,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040BCEA GetClipboardData,GlobalLock,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GlobalUnlock,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040F964 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404191 ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404392 CreateMutexW,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,CloseHandle,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,OpenMutexW,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041168D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00412FBB

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00411D38 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404984 NtQueryInformationProcess,CloseHandle,NtCreateThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404A40 NtCreateUserProcess,GetProcessId,GetThreadContext,SetThreadContext,VirtualFreeEx,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004063F7 NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,TranslateMessage,GetClipboardData,PFXImportCertStore,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 78%
Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 96%

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00404D06 CloseHandle,CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Process32FirstW,OpenProcess,CloseHandle,GetLengthSid,CloseHandle,Process32NextW,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00411ADE GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040A15D CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409FE2 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal84.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00416937 CoCreateInstance,

Data Obfuscation

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Unpacked PE file: 0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack .text:ER;.rdata:W;.rsrc:R; vs .text:ER;.data:W;.reloc:R;

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Unpacked PE file: 0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040FE5C LoadLibraryA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadImageW,GetIconInfo,GetCursorPos,DrawIcon,lstrcmpiW,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetPEB, DecisionNodes, ExitProcess

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Evasive API call chain: CreateMutex,DecisionNodes,Sleep
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Evasive API call chain: CreateMutex,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Check user administrative privileges: GetTokenInformation,DecisionNodes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,Sleep

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

API coverage: 2.0 %

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415B2D FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415BE8 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260413898.000000000077A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll+

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00414C0D mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00403A5D HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,GetLengthSid,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00404B6E LdrLoadDll,LdrGetDllHandle,LdrLoadDll,EnterCriticalSection,lstrcmpiW,LeaveCriticalSection,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00413873 InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00410542 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040F48A GetVersionExW,GetNativeSystemInfo,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_00406940 RegOpenKeyExW,GetLocalTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040CEC4 GetTickCount,GetUserDefaultUILanguage,GetModuleFileNameW,GetUserNameExW,

Source: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041369C HeapAlloc,socket,bind,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004133AC socket,bind,listen,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
1 Valid Accounts	23 Native API	1 Valid Accounts	1 Valid Accounts	1 Valid Accounts	21 Input Capture	1 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	21 Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	2 Encrypted Channel	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	1 System Shutdown/Reboot
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	11 Access Token Manipulation	11 Access Token Manipulation	LSASS Memory	2 System Time Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	1 Archive Collected Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	1 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Install Root Certificate	Security Account Manager	11 Security Software Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	1 Clipboard Data	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	21 Software Packing	NTDS	1 Process Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	1 Account Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	1 System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	1 File and Directory Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	3 System Information Discovery	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	78%	Virustotal		Browse
Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	96%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen	Download File
0.2.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.590000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.0.Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.google.com/webhpbcsocksGlobal	Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260107317.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	false		high
http://www.google.com/webhp	Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe, 00000000.00000002.260107317.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	35.0.0 Citrine
Analysis ID:	660113
Start date and time: 09/07/202204:01:11	2022-07-09 04:01:11 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 14s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Rd1Kf1A4cB.bin (renamed file extension from bin to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	27
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal84.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 99.3% (good quality ratio 91.3%) Quality average: 83.3% Quality standard deviation: 29.6%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 88% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, UpdateNotificationMgr.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): www.bing.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, fs.microsoft.com, go.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, login.live.com, sls.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, settings-win.data.microsoft.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.50978452876486
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe
File size:	96256
MD5:	0ad89e86b34a226ff2a3042103afc7f1
SHA1:	91a27477c847ebf9ef3e2cb34e0bc93e323f449d
SHA256:	f831d088c3a64b06843d970337f1c8877c9c1988d56720a7dee9d67efeaf78f0
SHA512:	66149bae72c2c2cff1ce25b03c7f109ab64f8bc80fa22712836bf08843df37cf6e282e4a4776a33bf8c864f0dacb1b928ab44191cb49b65e1c3bad3e53b9d2f4
SSDEEP:	1536:uxDWt8Z1R4ayClVUbHTcM7Y62lO+5FZyoaGSMCDjTyF1ac9OtRHhmV:+Wt8ZIalVQzccKO+5FqBIItRAV
TLSH:	8693021941C6B4ABEAA44BF71BB5F117302413A14FB246E259A76E3FCF793CE0294349
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...................................\|...........!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$...PE..L...%..L.....................d............... ....@.........................................................................dz.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x401cd0
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	true
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH
Time Stamp:	0x4CAF0C25 [Fri Oct 8 12:18:45 2010 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	6ef02dd1adb61f4fee262f301b547fa3

Authenticode Signature

Signature Valid:
Signature Issuer:
Signature Validation Error:
Error Number:
Not Before, Not After
Subject Chain
Version:
Thumbprint MD5:
Thumbprint SHA-1:
Thumbprint SHA-256:
Serial:

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 000002A0h
push ebx
push esi
push edi
push ecx
sub eax, ecx
add dword ptr [ebp-000000B8h], eax
sub dword ptr [ebp-000000BBh], eax
mov edi, dword ptr [00402034h]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
push eax
mov byte ptr [ebp-0Ch], 00000000h
call edi
xor eax, dword ptr [ebp-1Dh]
mov dword ptr [ebp-1Fh], eax
or dword ptr [ebp-1Fh], eax
mov ebx, dword ptr [0040200Ch]
call ebx
test eax, eax
jne 00007F03A4A2EA54h
call ecx
and dword ptr [ebp-00000171h], eax
and dword ptr [ebp-000001D1h], eax
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-6Ch]
push ecx
push FFFFFDF1h
call dword ptr [00402030h]
add esi, dword ptr [ebp-00000220h]
or dword ptr [ebp-0000010Dh], eax
call ebx
test eax, eax
jne 00007F03A4A2EA54h
call esp
or ebx, edi
xor ebx, dword ptr [ebp-00000295h]
push 0000000Fh
push 00000000h
call dword ptr [00402024h]
test eax, eax
jne 00007F03A4A2EA54h
mov edx, dword ptr [edx]
lea edx, dword ptr [ebp-01h]
push edx
mov byte ptr [ebp-01h], 00000000h
call edi
call 00007F03A4A2E14Dh
test eax, eax
je 00007F03A4A2EAA6h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
call dword ptr [00402020h]
or ecx, dword ptr [ebp-2Bh]
sub dword ptr [ebp-2Ch], eax
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-00000268h]
push eax
push FFFFFF23h
call dword ptr [00402030h]
sub edi, dword ptr [ebp+00000000h]

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x17a64	0x50	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x18000	0x280	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x2000	0x20	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x2048	0xac	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xe38	0x1000	False	0.58837890625	data	5.938180207293575	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x2000	0x15c16	0x15e00	False	0.9077901785714285	data	7.598976363385786	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x18000	0x6000	0x400	False	0.3388671875	data	3.245150535902098	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_DIALOG	0x180a0	0x6a	data	English	United States
RT_MANIFEST	0x18110	0x16a	XML 1.0 document, ISO-8859 text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32	GetProcAddress, GetCurrentThread, LoadLibraryA, LocalFree, GetSystemInfo, GetModuleHandleA, CompareStringA, LocalAlloc, CloseHandle
USER32.dll	BeginPaint, CharNextA, DispatchMessageA, GetMessageA, TranslateMessage
ADVAPI32.dll	RegCloseKey

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Target ID:	0
Start time:	04:02:18
Start date:	09/07/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\Rd1Kf1A4cB.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	96256 bytes
MD5 hash:	0AD89E86B34A226FF2A3042103AFC7F1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Rd1Kf1A4cB.bin

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Cryptography

Compliance

Spreading

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Authenticode Signature

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Rd1Kf1A4cB.exePID: 6516, Parent PID: 576

General

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
Rd1Kf1A4cB.bin