Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report
CraHZCrkGP.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	CraHZCrkGP.exe
Analysis ID:	678052
MD5:	a8ef2558341a5ca8ac58ee543e260ee4
SHA1:	5585cc5f17f424639dae06d6feba403c78232f6a
SHA256:	19e29cc8b874c3dd5fa4b724fb6d5d51db0b7c2fd4e954bb7b1dda228b2225fb
Tags:	ArkeiStealerexe
Infos:

Detection

SmokeLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Benign windows process drops PE files

Yara detected SmokeLoader

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Machine Learning detection for sample

Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))

Deletes itself after installation

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)

Uses 32bit PE files

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Contains functionality to call native functions

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)

PE file contains strange resources

Drops PE files

Tries to load missing DLLs

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

CraHZCrkGP.exe (PID: 980 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe" MD5: A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4)

CraHZCrkGP.exe (PID: 5728 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe" MD5: A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4)

explorer.exe (PID: 3968 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

drsdbad (PID: 1252 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad MD5: A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4)

drsdbad (PID: 4412 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad MD5: A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: SmokeLoader

{"C2 list": ["http://host-file-host6.com/", "http://host-host-file8.com/"]}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000005.00000000.292819935.0000000002631000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000015.00000002.374142486.00000000005A1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000015.00000002.374095976.0000000000580000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.315051537.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
21.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
20.2.drsdbad.25a15a0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
1.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.26115a0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: http://host-host-file8.com/

URL Reputation: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Source: host-file-host6.com	Virustotal: Detection: 25%			Perma Link
Source: host-host-file8.com	Virustotal: Detection: 21%			Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: SmokeLoader {"C2 list": ["http://host-file-host6.com/", "http://host-host-file8.com/"]}

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source:	Binary string: D#c'C:\cigawazelaxij\62-tuyibuw\vajuvami\cadafitibeges79-payipu.pdb`ZBP7@ source: CraHZCrkGP.exe, drsdbad.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: C:\cigawazelaxij\62-tuyibuw\vajuvami\cadafitibeges79-payipu.pdb source: CraHZCrkGP.exe, drsdbad.5.dr

Networking

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-file-host6.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-host-file8.com

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://host-file-host6.com/
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://host-host-file8.com/

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: POST / HTTP/1.1Connection: Keep-AliveContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedAccept: */*Referer: http://qxhuehga.com/User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like GeckoContent-Length: 360Host: host-file-host6.com

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: host-file-host6.com

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 21.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 20.2.drsdbad.25a15a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.292819935.0000000002631000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374142486.00000000005A1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374095976.0000000000580000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.315051537.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe, 00000000.00000002.247210114.000000000279A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040180C Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401818 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401822 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401826 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401834 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_0040180C Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_00401818 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_00401822 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_00401826 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_00401834 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: drsdbad.5.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: drsdbad.5.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: taskschd.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: xmllite.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: drsdbad.5.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{0f87369f-a4e5-4cfc-bd3e-73e6154572dd}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/2@4/1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

Code function: 0_2_027AB26D CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Module32First,

Source: CraHZCrkGP.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: D#c'C:\cigawazelaxij\62-tuyibuw\vajuvami\cadafitibeges79-payipu.pdb`ZBP7@ source: CraHZCrkGP.exe, drsdbad.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: C:\cigawazelaxij\62-tuyibuw\vajuvami\cadafitibeges79-payipu.pdb source: CraHZCrkGP.exe, drsdbad.5.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A607B push edx; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027AC16B push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A6035 push edi; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A601C push ecx; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A6514 push 000073CAh; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027B100C pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A60DC push edx; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027A60DC pushad ; retf 0073h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 0_2_027AC180 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011D0 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011D7 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011EB push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_004011D0 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_004011D7 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Code function: 21_2_004011EB push ebx; iretd

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.43093136075961
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.43093136075961

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Jump to dropped file

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Deletes itself after installation

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File deleted: c:\users\user\desktop\crahzcrkgp.exe

Jump to behavior

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1912	Thread sleep count: 586 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 4860	Thread sleep count: 393 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 4860	Thread sleep time: -39300s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1220	Thread sleep count: 411 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1220	Thread sleep time: -41100s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 2168	Thread sleep count: 399 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 2536	Thread sleep count: 284 > 30

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 586
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 393
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 411
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 399

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

System information queried: ModuleInformation

Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.271658717.0000000008142000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\5&1ec51bf7&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.271658717.0000000008142000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Prod_VMware_SATA
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.303278194.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}m&ven_n
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258357036.0000000000680000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: _VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.291787671.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.280302190.0000000004287000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: -98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.303278194.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.272179570.0000000008290000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.282454352.00000000062C4000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.303278194.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}+]e
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.280302190.0000000004287000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.303278194.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}}^
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.271968277.000000000820E000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CDROM&VEN_NECVMWAR&PROD_VMWARE_SATA_CD00\5&280B647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.272560042.000000000832B000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: #{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f$:s
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.271658717.0000000008142000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00\5&280b647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.303278194.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00l

Anti Debugging

Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	System information queried: CodeIntegrityInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	System information queried: CodeIntegrityInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

Code function: 0_2_027AAB4A push dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Process queried: DebugPort

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Benign windows process drops PE files

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: drsdbad.5.dr

Jump to dropped file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-file-host6.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-host-file8.com

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Thread created: C:\Windows\explorer.exe EIP: 2631930
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Thread created: unknown EIP: 4A01930

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.278658295.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.291768185.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258363464.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: ProgmanEXE^
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.292399231.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.302629679.0000000008142000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.262213793.0000000005920000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.292399231.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258555866.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.279081042.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.292399231.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258555866.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.279081042.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.278681639.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258377155.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.291787671.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd4
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.292399231.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.258555866.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.279081042.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WProgram Manager

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041CC60 GetSystemTimeAsFileTime,GetCurrentProcessId,GetCurrentThreadId,GetTickCount,QueryPerformanceCounter,

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 21.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 20.2.drsdbad.25a15a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.292819935.0000000002631000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374142486.00000000005A1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374095976.0000000000580000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.315051537.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 21.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 20.2.drsdbad.25a15a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.292819935.0000000002631000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374142486.00000000005A1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000015.00000002.374095976.0000000000580000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.315051537.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	312 Process Injection	11 Masquerading	1 Input Capture	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	1 Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	12 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	211 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	112 Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	312 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	12 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	1 Hidden Files and Directories	NTDS	3 Process Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	1 Application Window Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	2 Software Packing	Cached Domain Credentials	4 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	1 File Deletion	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
CraHZCrkGP.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
21.0.drsdbad.400000.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
21.0.drsdbad.400000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
21.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.26115a0.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
20.2.drsdbad.25a15a0.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.2.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1229097	Download File
1.0.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.CraHZCrkGP.exe.400000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
20.2.drsdbad.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1229097	Download File
21.0.drsdbad.400000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
host-file-host6.com	25%	Virustotal		Browse
host-host-file8.com	22%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://host-file-host6.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://host-host-file8.com/	100%	URL Reputation	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
host-file-host6.com	34.118.39.10	true	true	25%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
host-host-file8.com	unknown	unknown	true	22%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://host-file-host6.com/	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://host-host-file8.com/	true	URL Reputation: malware	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
34.118.39.10	host-file-host6.com	United States		139070	GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	35.0.0 Citrine
Analysis ID:	678052
Start date and time: 03/08/202213:56:05	2022-08-03 13:56:05 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 47s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	CraHZCrkGP.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	29
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	1
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/2@4/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 55.2% (good quality ratio 46.8%) Quality average: 45.5% Quality standard deviation: 27.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 70% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Adjust boot time Enable AMSI

Warnings

Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information.
Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.211.6.115
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): www.bing.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, fs.microsoft.com, login.live.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, sls.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
13:57:53	Task Scheduler	Run new task: Firefox Default Browser Agent B0A448B5506B203E path: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	186368
Entropy (8bit):	7.065209688203469
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:8xxxgL2AzyQ6w1x7O7SDpJspsrqdzd99r/wKPWKfJUY:8hMbzyY1x7O7SDp+iW399TPWKfJ
MD5:	A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4
SHA1:	5585CC5F17F424639DAE06D6FEBA403C78232F6A
SHA-256:	19E29CC8B874C3DD5FA4B724FB6D5D51DB0B7C2FD4E954BB7B1DDA228B2225FB
SHA-512:	BE08F6166668CF30BD6817DDA34A9184C36DCC446AD0B60DA4C6426157071AF97A57C99A233CF27DF4627135916F082637671E36CA6381A4CF99C5CB12374D6A
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.........m.K...K...K...$...\...$...8...B...N...K.......$...m...$...J...$...J...RichK...................PE..L....T.a.................,...B.......g.......@....@..................................q.......................................0..<........v.......................... ................................6..@............................................text....+.......,.................. ..`.data....:...@...0...0..............@....rsrc....v.......x...`..............@..@........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad:Zone.Identifier

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.065209688203469
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	CraHZCrkGP.exe
File size:	186368
MD5:	a8ef2558341a5ca8ac58ee543e260ee4
SHA1:	5585cc5f17f424639dae06d6feba403c78232f6a
SHA256:	19e29cc8b874c3dd5fa4b724fb6d5d51db0b7c2fd4e954bb7b1dda228b2225fb
SHA512:	be08f6166668cf30bd6817dda34a9184c36dcc446ad0b60da4c6426157071af97a57c99a233cf27df4627135916f082637671e36ca6381a4cf99c5cb12374d6a
SSDEEP:	3072:8xxxgL2AzyQ6w1x7O7SDpJspsrqdzd99r/wKPWKfJUY:8hMbzyY1x7O7SDp+iW399TPWKfJ
TLSH:	DF04BEE137E0C072D1B32A3058B787612A7FB9226BB415BFE364172E0E6D6C09A35757
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.........m.K...K...K...$...\...$...8...B...N...K.......$...m...$...J...$...J...RichK...................PE..L....T.a.................,.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	8a9099a9ca8ed2f2

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x416797
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x61D5541F [Wed Jan 5 08:17:35 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	4cfbd807e4155075766f9f516fa9a7f3

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
call 00007F699C97AAA9h
jmp 00007F699C97446Eh
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
call 00007F699C97461Ch
xchg cl, ch
jmp 00007F699C974604h
call 00007F699C974613h
fxch st(0), st(1)
jmp 00007F699C9745FBh
fabs
fld1
mov ch, cl
xor cl, cl
jmp 00007F699C9745F1h
mov byte ptr [ebp-00000090h], FFFFFFFEh
fabs
fxch st(0), st(1)
fabs
fxch st(0), st(1)
fpatan
or cl, cl
je 00007F699C9745E6h
fldpi
fsubrp st(1), st(0)
or ch, ch
je 00007F699C9745E4h
fchs
ret
fabs
fld st(0), st(0)
fld st(0), st(0)
fld1
fsubrp st(1), st(0)
fxch st(0), st(1)
fld1
faddp st(1), st(0)
fmulp st(1), st(0)
ftst
wait
fstsw word ptr [ebp-000000A0h]
wait
test byte ptr [ebp-0000009Fh], 00000001h
jne 00007F699C9745E7h
xor ch, ch
fsqrt
ret
pop eax
jmp 00007F699C97AC6Fh
fstp st(0)
fld tbyte ptr [004024CAh]
ret
fstp st(0)
or cl, cl
je 00007F699C9745EDh
fstp st(0)
fldpi
or ch, ch
je 00007F699C9745E4h
fchs
ret
fstp st(0)
fldz
or ch, ch
je 00007F699C9745D9h
fchs
ret
fstp st(0)
jmp 00007F699C97AC45h
fstp st(0)
mov cl, ch
jmp 00007F699C9745E2h
call 00007F699C9745AEh
jmp 00007F699C97AC50h
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[ASM] VS2010 build 30319
[ C ] VS2010 build 30319
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[C++] VS2010 build 30319
[RES] VS2010 build 30319
[LNK] VS2010 build 30319

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x2309c	0x3c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x20a8000	0x76d8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x1220	0x1c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x3680	0x40	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1dc	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x22ba8	0x22c00	False	0.7598920863309353	data	7.43093136075961	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x24000	0x2083ad0	0x3000	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x20a8000	0x76d8	0x7800	False	0.6808268229166666	data	6.283303010391939	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
AFX_DIALOG_LAYOUT	0x20ae4e0	0xe	data
RT_ICON	0x20a8370	0xea8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20a9218	0x8a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20a9ac0	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20aa028	0x25a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20ac5d0	0x10a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20ad678	0x988	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20ae000	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST	Kannada	Kanada
RT_STRING	0x20ae688	0x67a	data	French	Switzerland
RT_STRING	0x20aed08	0x566	data	French	Switzerland
RT_STRING	0x20af270	0x468	data	French	Switzerland
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x20ae468	0x68	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_VERSION	0x20ae4f0	0x194	data
None	0x20ae4d0	0xa	data

Imports

DLL

Import

KERNEL32.dll

FoldStringA, GetSystemTime, GetLocalTime, InterlockedDecrement, GetLocaleInfoW, InterlockedCompareExchange, _hwrite, CancelWaitableTimer, GetSystemDirectoryA, CreateEventW, ReadConsoleA, VerifyVersionInfoA, BuildCommDCBA, GetConsoleAliasExesLengthA, SetSystemTimeAdjustment, PeekConsoleInputA, EnumDateFormatsA, CreateFileW, RegisterWaitForSingleObjectEx, LoadLibraryA, WaitNamedPipeA, GetEnvironmentStrings, FindResourceExA, VirtualProtect, GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableW, GetModuleFileNameW, BeginUpdateResourceW, EnumCalendarInfoExW, WriteConsoleOutputCharacterA, WriteConsoleA, LoadLibraryW, DeleteFileW, LocalAlloc, GetProcAddress, GetUserDefaultLCID, FindFirstChangeNotificationW, HeapUnlock, GetCalendarInfoW, SetConsoleTitleA, GetBinaryTypeW, GetComputerNameExA, FindNextFileA, OpenJobObjectA, HeapValidate, _lclose, GetComputerNameW, SetFileShortNameW, WriteConsoleOutputCharacterW, TlsSetValue, SetCalendarInfoW, SetComputerNameW, CreateDirectoryExA, DeleteCriticalSection, FindFirstChangeNotificationA, GetVolumePathNameW, GetProcessHandleCount, GetCurrentProcess, GetThreadLocale, GetSystemDefaultLangID, ReadFile, GetStringTypeW, HeapSize, GetDiskFreeSpaceA, RaiseException, RtlUnwind, MultiByteToWideChar, GetCommandLineW, HeapSetInformation, GetStartupInfoW, EncodePointer, HeapAlloc, GetLastError, HeapFree, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, SetFilePointer, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, IsDebuggerPresent, DecodePointer, TerminateProcess, TlsAlloc, TlsGetValue, TlsFree, InterlockedIncrement, GetModuleHandleW, SetLastError, GetCurrentThreadId, ExitProcess, GetCPInfo, GetACP, GetOEMCP, IsValidCodePage, CloseHandle, WriteFile, GetStdHandle, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, GetEnvironmentStringsW, SetHandleCount, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, GetFileType, HeapCreate, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetTickCount, GetCurrentProcessId, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, SetStdHandle, WideCharToMultiByte, GetConsoleCP, GetConsoleMode, FlushFileBuffers, Sleep, LCMapStringW, WriteConsoleW, HeapReAlloc

USER32.dll

ClientToScreen

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Kannada	Kanada
French	Switzerland

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.268593073 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.305408001 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.305846930 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.306128979 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.306200981 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.342859983 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.342914104 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.432102919 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.486897945 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:58:22.433693886 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:58:22.433825970 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:58:22.433887959 CEST	49755	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 13:58:22.470546007 CEST	80	49755	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.245481968 CEST	58116	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.265495062 CEST	53	58116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.468521118 CEST	57421	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:53.495250940 CEST	57421	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:54.545146942 CEST	57421	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:56.501238108 CEST	53	57421	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:57.543694019 CEST	53	57421	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:58.582483053 CEST	53	57421	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

ICMP Packets

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Checksum	Code	Type
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:57.543801069 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	cff6	(Port unreachable)	Destination Unreachable
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:58.582587004 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	cff6	(Port unreachable)	Destination Unreachable

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.245481968 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x8ad3	Standard query (0)	host-file-host6.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.468521118 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xb532	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:53.495250940 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xb532	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:54.545146942 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xb532	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.265495062 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x8ad3	No error (0)	host-file-host6.com		34.118.39.10	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:56.501238108 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xb532	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:57.543694019 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xb532	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:58.582483053 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xb532	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

qxhuehga.com

host-file-host6.com

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.3	49755	34.118.39.10	80	C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.306128979 CEST	1205	OUT	POST / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept: / Referer: http://qxhuehga.com/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko Content-Length: 360 Host: host-file-host6.com
Aug 3, 2022 13:57:52.432102919 CEST	1206	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK server: nginx/1.20.1 date: Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:57:52 GMT content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 transfer-encoding: chunked Data Raw: 46 0d 0a 59 6f 75 72 20 49 50 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 65 64 0d 0a 30 0d 0a 0d 0a Data Ascii: FYour IP blocked0

Target ID:	0
Start time:	13:57:02
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	186368 bytes
MD5 hash:	A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: CraHZCrkGP.exePID: 5728, Parent PID: 980

General

Target ID:	1
Start time:	13:57:05
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\CraHZCrkGP.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	186368 bytes
MD5 hash:	A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.314917602.00000000004A0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.315051537.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: explorer.exePID: 3968, Parent PID: 5728

General

Target ID:	5
Start time:	13:57:13
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
Imagebase:	0x7ff6b8cf0000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000005.00000000.292819935.0000000002631000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: drsdbadPID: 1252, Parent PID: 848

General

Target ID:	20
Start time:	13:57:53
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	186368 bytes
MD5 hash:	A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: drsdbadPID: 4412, Parent PID: 1252

General

Target ID:	21
Start time:	13:57:59
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	186368 bytes
MD5 hash:	A8EF2558341A5CA8AC58EE543E260EE4
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000015.00000002.374142486.00000000005A1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000015.00000002.374095976.0000000000580000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report CraHZCrkGP.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: SmokeLoader

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\drsdbad:Zone.Identifier

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

Windows Analysis Report
CraHZCrkGP.exe