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Windows Analysis Report
ttguGDFHUX.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	ttguGDFHUX.exe
Analysis ID:	678405
MD5:	17ea9707608c048bbc933e8fb365d483
SHA1:	430c8d8bcf6d095903ed3c1dcfe70a4a5cda32a1
SHA256:	22eae9c51337fd8dc6d1bb281a6e1ddb9990d906076cb3e1d89887eadbdfd374
Tags:	ArkeiStealerexe
Infos:

Detection

SmokeLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Benign windows process drops PE files

Yara detected SmokeLoader

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Machine Learning detection for sample

Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))

Deletes itself after installation

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)

Uses 32bit PE files

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Contains functionality to call native functions

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)

PE file contains strange resources

Drops PE files

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

ttguGDFHUX.exe (PID: 5172 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe" MD5: 17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483)

ttguGDFHUX.exe (PID: 2084 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe" MD5: 17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483)

explorer.exe (PID: 3968 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

vahfuah (PID: 4680 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah MD5: 17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483)

vahfuah (PID: 1992 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah MD5: 17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: SmokeLoader

{"C2 list": ["http://host-file-host6.com/", "http://host-host-file8.com/"]}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000001.00000002.365673212.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000013.00000002.443651918.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000005.00000000.349492248.00000000044F1000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.365633312.00000000004B0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.25615a0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
18.2.vahfuah.26115a0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
1.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security
19.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2	Yara detected SmokeLoader	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: http://host-host-file8.com/

URL Reputation: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Source: host-file-host6.com	Virustotal: Detection: 25%			Perma Link
Source: host-host-file8.com	Virustotal: Detection: 21%			Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: SmokeLoader {"C2 list": ["http://host-file-host6.com/", "http://host-host-file8.com/"]}

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source:	Binary string: C:\warozopocir.pdb source: ttguGDFHUX.exe, vahfuah.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: k3C:\warozopocir.pdb`ZB source: ttguGDFHUX.exe, vahfuah.5.dr

Networking

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-file-host6.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-host-file8.com

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://host-file-host6.com/
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://host-host-file8.com/

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 34.118.39.10 34.118.39.10

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: POST / HTTP/1.1Connection: Keep-AliveContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedAccept: */*Referer: http://egppg.org/User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like GeckoContent-Length: 324Host: host-file-host6.com

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: host-file-host6.com

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.25615a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.vahfuah.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 19.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365673212.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443651918.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.349492248.00000000044F1000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365633312.00000000004B0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040180C Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401818 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401822 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401826 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401834 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_0040180C Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_00401818 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_00401822 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_00401826 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_00401834 Sleep,NtTerminateProcess,

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: vahfuah.5.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: vahfuah.5.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: taskschd.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: xmllite.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: vahfuah.5.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{0f87369f-a4e5-4cfc-bd3e-73e6154572dd}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/2@4/2

Source: ttguGDFHUX.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: C:\warozopocir.pdb source: ttguGDFHUX.exe, vahfuah.5.dr
Source:	Binary string: k3C:\warozopocir.pdb`ZB source: ttguGDFHUX.exe, vahfuah.5.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011D0 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011D7 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Code function: 1_2_004011EB push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_004011D0 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_004011D7 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Code function: 19_2_004011EB push ebx; iretd

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.414029743857001
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.414029743857001

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Jump to dropped file

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Deletes itself after installation

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File deleted: c:\users\user\desktop\ttgugdfhux.exe

Jump to behavior

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Key enumerated: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1320	Thread sleep count: 575 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1292	Thread sleep count: 266 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 1300	Thread sleep count: 271 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 5472	Thread sleep count: 440 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 5476	Thread sleep count: 114 > 30

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 575
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 440

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe

System information queried: ModuleInformation

Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.356253114.00000000080ED000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\5&1ec51bf7&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.356253114.00000000080ED000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Prod_VMware_SATA
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.316974919.0000000000680000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: _VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317105362.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.307047727.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.307047727.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}t]
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.301543334.00000000062C4000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.307047727.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}+]e
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.319383324.0000000004287000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.307047727.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}}^
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.356923821.000000000820E000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CDROM&VEN_NECVMWAR&PROD_VMWARE_SATA_CD00\5&280B647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.356253114.00000000080ED000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00\5&280b647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.307047727.0000000008223000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00l

Anti Debugging

Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	System information queried: CodeIntegrityInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	System information queried: CodeIntegrityInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Process queried: DebugPort

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Benign windows process drops PE files

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

File created: vahfuah.5.dr

Jump to dropped file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-file-host6.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: host-host-file8.com

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Thread created: C:\Windows\explorer.exe EIP: 44F1930
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Thread created: unknown EIP: 4A01930

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.345762021.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.286557807.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317011550.0000000000688000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: ProgmanEXE^
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.306306342.00000000080ED000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.352465052.0000000005920000.00000004.00000001.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.346490332.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.346490332.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.286913081.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317787883.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.346490332.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.286913081.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317787883.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.345879179.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.286570440.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317105362.000000000069D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd4
Source: explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.346490332.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.286913081.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp, explorer.exe, 00000005.00000000.317787883.0000000000BE0000.00000002.00000001.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WProgram Manager

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041C9B0 GetSystemTimeAsFileTime,GetCurrentProcessId,GetCurrentThreadId,GetTickCount,QueryPerformanceCounter,

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.25615a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.vahfuah.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 19.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365673212.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443651918.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.349492248.00000000044F1000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365633312.00000000004B0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected SmokeLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.25615a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.vahfuah.26115a0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 19.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365673212.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000013.00000002.443651918.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000000.349492248.00000000044F1000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.365633312.00000000004B0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	312 Process Injection	11 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	12 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	211 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	112 Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	312 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	12 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	1 Hidden Files and Directories	NTDS	2 Process Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	1 Application Window Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	2 Software Packing	Cached Domain Credentials	4 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	1 File Deletion	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
ttguGDFHUX.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
1.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
18.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1229097	Download File
19.0.vahfuah.400000.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
19.0.vahfuah.400000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1229097	Download File
18.2.vahfuah.26115a0.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
19.2.vahfuah.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
19.0.vahfuah.400000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.ttguGDFHUX.exe.400000.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.2.ttguGDFHUX.exe.25615a0.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
host-file-host6.com	25%	Virustotal		Browse
host-host-file8.com	22%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://host-file-host6.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://host-host-file8.com/	100%	URL Reputation	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
host-file-host6.com	34.118.39.10	true	true	25%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
host-host-file8.com	unknown	unknown	true	22%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://host-file-host6.com/	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://host-host-file8.com/	true	URL Reputation: malware	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
34.118.39.10	host-file-host6.com	United States		139070	GOOGLE-AS-APGoogleAsiaPacificPteLtdSG	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	35.0.0 Citrine
Analysis ID:	678405
Start date and time: 03/08/202222:31:06	2022-08-03 22:31:06 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 53s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	ttguGDFHUX.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	28
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	1
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/2@4/2
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 66.7%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 98.3% (good quality ratio 80.4%) Quality average: 43.9% Quality standard deviation: 28%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 65% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Adjust boot time Enable AMSI

Warnings

Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information.
Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 184.30.21.144, 20.238.103.94, 20.54.89.106, 52.242.101.226, 20.223.24.244, 52.152.110.14
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): www.bing.com, fs.microsoft.com, asf-ris-prod-neu-azsc.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, rp-consumer-prod-displaycatalog-geomap.trafficmanager.net, login.live.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, sls.update.microsoft.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, glb.sls.prod.dcat.dsp.trafficmanager.net
Execution Graph export aborted for target ttguGDFHUX.exe, PID 5172 because there are no executed function
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
22:33:21	Task Scheduler	Run new task: Firefox Default Browser Agent E0B4A1FA3B630E02 path: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	185344
Entropy (8bit):	7.05526932773082
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:wt9mZrSPd07P4SczpIiDi1QaC5ydjRDMzbh71CL2F0L:wPmZQd0T9w5m1QTMNMzn2e
MD5:	17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483
SHA1:	430C8D8BCF6D095903ED3C1DCFE70A4A5CDA32A1
SHA-256:	22EAE9C51337FD8DC6D1BB281A6E1DDB9990D906076CB3E1D89887EADBDFD374
SHA-512:	D6CA193381314EA8BB4FD423B763B5508B52ABC7BA83C7B3AA2F87C40B4C45E03BC6336A1E506F25A1D354FAF58E9C04FB6D967706FB47C795D98F4CABF619A3
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.........m.K...K...K...$...\...$...8...B...N...K.......$...m...$...J...$...J...RichK...........................PE..L...g&J`....................f.......d.......@....@..........................0......?A.......................................-..<........t...........................................................6..@............................................text...z(......................... ..`.data....a...@...0..................@....rsrc....t.......v...^..............@..@................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah:Zone.Identifier

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.05526932773082
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	ttguGDFHUX.exe
File size:	185344
MD5:	17ea9707608c048bbc933e8fb365d483
SHA1:	430c8d8bcf6d095903ed3c1dcfe70a4a5cda32a1
SHA256:	22eae9c51337fd8dc6d1bb281a6e1ddb9990d906076cb3e1d89887eadbdfd374
SHA512:	d6ca193381314ea8bb4fd423b763b5508b52abc7ba83c7b3aa2f87c40b4c45e03bc6336a1e506f25a1d354faf58e9c04fb6d967706fb47c795d98f4cabf619a3
SSDEEP:	3072:wt9mZrSPd07P4SczpIiDi1QaC5ydjRDMzbh71CL2F0L:wPmZQd0T9w5m1QTMNMzn2e
TLSH:	6204ADE176E0C4F2E1A729304878C6B16AFAB8226774858F3764072E1E617C15E3F75B
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.........m.K...K...K...$...\...$...8...B...N...K.......$...m...$...J...$...J...RichK...........................PE..L...g&J`...........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	8a9099a9ca8ed2f2

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x4164e7
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x604A2667 [Thu Mar 11 14:17:11 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	a8692768e915e3ee244bd5d51d7bedfb

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
call 00007FD5FCBBB439h
jmp 00007FD5FCBB4DFEh
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
call 00007FD5FCBB4FACh
xchg cl, ch
jmp 00007FD5FCBB4F94h
call 00007FD5FCBB4FA3h
fxch st(0), st(1)
jmp 00007FD5FCBB4F8Bh
fabs
fld1
mov ch, cl
xor cl, cl
jmp 00007FD5FCBB4F81h
mov byte ptr [ebp-00000090h], FFFFFFFEh
fabs
fxch st(0), st(1)
fabs
fxch st(0), st(1)
fpatan
or cl, cl
je 00007FD5FCBB4F76h
fldpi
fsubrp st(1), st(0)
or ch, ch
je 00007FD5FCBB4F74h
fchs
ret
fabs
fld st(0), st(0)
fld st(0), st(0)
fld1
fsubrp st(1), st(0)
fxch st(0), st(1)
fld1
faddp st(1), st(0)
fmulp st(1), st(0)
ftst
wait
fstsw word ptr [ebp-000000A0h]
wait
test byte ptr [ebp-0000009Fh], 00000001h
jne 00007FD5FCBB4F77h
xor ch, ch
fsqrt
ret
pop eax
jmp 00007FD5FCBBB5FFh
fstp st(0)
fld tbyte ptr [0040252Ah]
ret
fstp st(0)
or cl, cl
je 00007FD5FCBB4F7Dh
fstp st(0)
fldpi
or ch, ch
je 00007FD5FCBB4F74h
fchs
ret
fstp st(0)
fldz
or ch, ch
je 00007FD5FCBB4F69h
fchs
ret
fstp st(0)
jmp 00007FD5FCBBB5D5h
fstp st(0)
mov cl, ch
jmp 00007FD5FCBB4F72h
call 00007FD5FCBB4F3Eh
jmp 00007FD5FCBBB5E0h
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[ASM] VS2010 build 30319
[ C ] VS2010 build 30319
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[C++] VS2010 build 30319
[RES] VS2010 build 30319
[LNK] VS2010 build 30319

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x22dec	0x3c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x20ab000	0x74d8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x1210	0x1c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x36e0	0x40	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1c8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x2287a	0x22a00	False	0.756768953068592	SysEx File - ELKA	7.414029743857001	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x24000	0x20861d0	0x3000	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x20ab000	0x74d8	0x7600	False	0.6840572033898306	data	6.300595751060591	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x20ab300	0xea8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20ac1a8	0x8a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20aca50	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20acfb8	0x25a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20af560	0x10a8	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20b0608	0x988	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_ICON	0x20b0f90	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST	Kannada	Kanada
RT_STRING	0x20b1608	0x67a	data	French	Switzerland
RT_STRING	0x20b1c88	0x4ce	data	French	Switzerland
RT_STRING	0x20b2158	0x380	data	French	Switzerland
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x20b13f8	0x68	data	Kannada	Kanada
RT_VERSION	0x20b1470	0x194	data
None	0x20b1460	0xa	data

Imports

DLL

Import

KERNEL32.dll

FoldStringA, GetLocalTime, InterlockedDecrement, GetLocaleInfoA, InterlockedCompareExchange, _hwrite, CancelWaitableTimer, GetSystemDirectoryA, CreateEventW, ReadConsoleA, VerifyVersionInfoW, BuildCommDCBA, GetConsoleAliasExesLengthA, SetSystemTimeAdjustment, PeekConsoleInputW, EnumDateFormatsA, CreateFileW, RegisterWaitForSingleObjectEx, LoadLibraryA, WaitNamedPipeA, GetEnvironmentStrings, FindResourceExW, VirtualProtect, GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableW, GetModuleFileNameW, BeginUpdateResourceW, DeleteFileW, WriteConsoleA, EnumCalendarInfoExA, LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, GetModuleHandleW, GetUserDefaultLCID, FindFirstChangeNotificationW, GetFileAttributesExA, GetCalendarInfoW, SetConsoleTitleA, GetBinaryTypeW, GlobalAlloc, GetComputerNameExA, FindNextFileA, OpenJobObjectA, HeapSize, _lclose, GetComputerNameW, TlsGetValue, SetCalendarInfoW, SetComputerNameW, CreateDirectoryExA, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, FindFirstChangeNotificationA, GetVolumePathNameW, GetProcessHandleCount, GetThreadLocale, GetSystemDefaultLangID, GetCurrentProcess, ReadFile, GetStringTypeW, HeapFree, GetDiskFreeSpaceA, HeapReAlloc, RaiseException, RtlUnwind, MultiByteToWideChar, GetCommandLineW, HeapSetInformation, GetStartupInfoW, EncodePointer, HeapAlloc, GetLastError, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, SetFilePointer, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, IsDebuggerPresent, DecodePointer, TerminateProcess, TlsAlloc, TlsSetValue, TlsFree, InterlockedIncrement, SetLastError, GetCurrentThreadId, ExitProcess, GetCPInfo, GetACP, GetOEMCP, IsValidCodePage, CloseHandle, WriteFile, GetStdHandle, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, GetEnvironmentStringsW, SetHandleCount, GetFileType, DeleteCriticalSection, HeapCreate, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetTickCount, GetCurrentProcessId, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, SetStdHandle, WideCharToMultiByte, GetConsoleCP, GetConsoleMode, FlushFileBuffers, Sleep, LCMapStringW, WriteConsoleW

USER32.dll

ClientToScreen

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Kannada	Kanada
French	Switzerland

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.399979115 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.436131001 CEST	80	49757	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.436232090 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.436357975 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.436373949 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.472544909 CEST	80	49757	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.560153961 CEST	80	49757	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.686485052 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:51.560550928 CEST	80	49757	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:51.562321901 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:51.563257933 CEST	49757	80	192.168.2.3	34.118.39.10
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:51.600137949 CEST	80	49757	34.118.39.10	192.168.2.3

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.291105986 CEST	57421	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.396584988 CEST	53	57421	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.571379900 CEST	65358	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:22.611423969 CEST	65358	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:23.655666113 CEST	65358	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:25.596666098 CEST	53	65358	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:26.648030043 CEST	53	65358	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:27.725409985 CEST	53	65358	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

ICMP Packets

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Checksum	Code	Type
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:26.648212910 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	cff6	(Port unreachable)	Destination Unreachable
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:27.725569010 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	cff6	(Port unreachable)	Destination Unreachable

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.291105986 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xbe9f	Standard query (0)	host-file-host6.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.571379900 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x54a2	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:22.611423969 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x54a2	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:23.655666113 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x54a2	Standard query (0)	host-host-file8.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.396584988 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xbe9f	No error (0)	host-file-host6.com		34.118.39.10	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:25.596666098 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x54a2	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:26.648030043 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x54a2	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:27.725409985 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x54a2	Server failure (2)	host-host-file8.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

egppg.org

host-file-host6.com

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.3	49757	34.118.39.10	80	C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.436357975 CEST	1202	OUT	POST / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept: / Referer: http://egppg.org/ User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko Content-Length: 324 Host: host-file-host6.com
Aug 3, 2022 22:33:21.560153961 CEST	1203	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK server: nginx/1.20.1 date: Wed, 03 Aug 2022 20:33:21 GMT content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 transfer-encoding: chunked Data Raw: 46 0d 0a 59 6f 75 72 20 49 50 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 65 64 0d 0a 30 0d 0a 0d 0a Data Ascii: FYour IP blocked0

Target ID:	0
Start time:	22:32:15
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	185344 bytes
MD5 hash:	17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: ttguGDFHUX.exePID: 2084, Parent PID: 5172

General

Target ID:	1
Start time:	22:32:19
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\ttguGDFHUX.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	185344 bytes
MD5 hash:	17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.365673212.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.365633312.00000000004B0000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: explorer.exePID: 3968, Parent PID: 2084

General

Target ID:	5
Start time:	22:32:27
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
Imagebase:	0x7ff6b8cf0000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000005.00000000.349492248.00000000044F1000.00000020.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vahfuahPID: 4680, Parent PID: 848

General

Target ID:	18
Start time:	22:33:22
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	185344 bytes
MD5 hash:	17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: vahfuahPID: 1992, Parent PID: 4680

General

Target ID:	19
Start time:	22:33:31
Start date:	03/08/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	185344 bytes
MD5 hash:	17EA9707608C048BBC933E8FB365D483
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000013.00000002.443589368.0000000000460000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2, Description: Yara detected SmokeLoader, Source: 00000013.00000002.443651918.00000000004D1000.00000004.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report ttguGDFHUX.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: SmokeLoader

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

Private

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\vahfuah:Zone.Identifier

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Windows Analysis Report
ttguGDFHUX.exe