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Windows Analysis Report
67AzzNNioP.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	67AzzNNioP.exe
Analysis ID:	708239
MD5:	f44d0bd72d14338b655a6d4457419493
SHA1:	dbe1773340912698515f76885f07d6faacbce09c
SHA256:	8f8cb5930100e80159502fd6d224909606f47ff17614f89b41b650afc3a91b6d
Tags:	185-25-204-244ServereasySrlexemorpheus
Infos:

Detection

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)

Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Found evasive API chain (date check)

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path

Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)

Drops PE files

Tries to load missing DLLs

Contains functionality to read the PEB

File is packed with WinRar

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

PE file contains more sections than normal

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

67AzzNNioP.exe (PID: 3932 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe" MD5: F44D0BD72D14338B655A6D4457419493)

AIO.exe (PID: 5576 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe" MD5: 9C1181704C48D62DE14C5F682C4F5D5E)

conhost.exe (PID: 3776 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 27%
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 22%			Perma Link

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 7%

Perma Link

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:

Binary string: D:\Projects\WinRAR\sfx\build\sfxrar32\Release\sfxrar.pdb source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EA69B FindFirstFileW,FindFirstFileW,GetLastError,FindNextFileW,GetLastError,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FC220 SendDlgItemMessageW,EndDialog,GetDlgItem,SetFocus,SetDlgItemTextW,SendDlgItemMessageW,FindFirstFileW,FileTimeToLocalFileTime,FileTimeToSystemTime,GetTimeFormatW,GetDateFormatW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,FindClose,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,SendDlgItemMessageW,FileTimeToLocalFileTime,FileTimeToSystemTime,GetTimeFormatW,GetDateFormatW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_0020B348 FindFirstFileExA,

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.3:49702 -> 185.25.204.244:9090

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.25.204.244
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.25.204.244
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 185.25.204.244

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe, 00000000.00000003.264138468.000000000C2CE000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: ,M3.2.0,M11.1.0476837158203125: cannot parse <invalid Value>ASCII_Hex_DigitCallWindowProcWCreateHardLinkWCreatePopupMenuCreateWindowExWDefSubclassProcDeviceIoControlDialogBoxParamWDragAcceptFilesDuplicateHandleFailed to find Failed to load FindNextStreamWFlushViewOfFileGdiplusShutdownGetActiveWindowGetAdaptersInfoGetClassInfoExWGetCommandLineWGetEnhMetaFileWGetMenuItemRectGetMonitorInfoWGetProcessTimesGetRawInputDataGetStartupInfoWGetTextMetricsWHanifi_RohingyaImpersonateSelfInsertMenuItemWIsWindowEnabledIsWindowVisibleMonitorFromRectOpenThreadTokenOther_LowercaseOther_UppercasePlayEnhMetaFilePostQuitMessageProcess32FirstWPsalter_PahlaviRegCreateKeyExWRegDeleteValueWSetDCBrushColorShowWindowAsyncSwapMouseButtonUnmapViewOfFile]

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001E848E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F6CDC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F4088
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F00B7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001E40FE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F7153
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_002051C9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F62CA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001E32F7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F43BF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EC426
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_0020D440
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EF461
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F77EF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001E286B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_0020D8EE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EE9B7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_002119F4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001F3E0B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_00204F9A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EEFE2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: String function: 001FEB78 appears 39 times
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: String function: 001FEC50 appears 56 times
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: String function: 001FF5F0 appears 31 times

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FA070 SetWindowLongW,GetWindowLongW,NtdllDefWindowProc_W,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001E6FAA: __EH_prolog,_wcslen,_wcslen,CreateFileW,CloseHandle,CreateDirectoryW,CreateFileW,DeviceIoControl,CloseHandle,GetLastError,RemoveDirectoryW,DeleteFileW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\OUTLOOK.EXE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: <pi-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: <pi-ms-win-core-fibers-l1-1-1.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: <pi-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: <pi-ms-win-core-fibers-l1-1-1.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: <pi-ms-win-core-localization-l1-2-1.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Section loaded: dxgidebug.dll

Source: AIO.exe.0.dr

Static PE information: Number of sections : 14 > 10

Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: /19 ZLIB complexity 0.9970344753440367
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: /32 ZLIB complexity 0.9973810369318182
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: /65 ZLIB complexity 0.9984575565403423

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 27%
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 22%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe"

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\__tmp_rar_sfx_access_check_6961296

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.winEXE@4/2@0/1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

File read: C:\Windows\win.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001E6C74 GetLastError,FormatMessageW,

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:3776:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FA6C2 FindResourceW,SizeofResource,LoadResource,LockResource,GlobalAlloc,GlobalLock,GdipCreateHBITMAPFromBitmap,GlobalUnlock,GlobalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Command line argument: sfxname
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Command line argument: sfxstime
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Command line argument: STARTDLG
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Command line argument: xz#

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static file information: File size 2543411 > 1048576

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:

Binary string: D:\Projects\WinRAR\sfx\build\sfxrar32\Release\sfxrar.pdb source: 67AzzNNioP.exe

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT is in: .rdata
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE is in: .rsrc
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC is in: .reloc
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG is in: .rdata
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT is in: .rdata

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FF640 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FEB78 push eax; ret

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe	Static PE information: section name: .didat
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /4
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /19
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /32
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /46
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /65
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /78
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: /90
Source: AIO.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: section name: .symtab

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\__tmp_rar_sfx_access_check_6961296

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe	Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS \| NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetLocalTime,DecisionNodes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Memory allocated: 74C0000 memory reserve | memory write watch

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FE6A3 VirtualQuery,GetSystemInfo,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001EA69B FindFirstFileW,FindFirstFileW,GetLastError,FindNextFileW,GetLastError,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FC220 SendDlgItemMessageW,EndDialog,GetDlgItem,SetFocus,SetDlgItemTextW,SendDlgItemMessageW,FindFirstFileW,FileTimeToLocalFileTime,FileTimeToSystemTime,GetTimeFormatW,GetDateFormatW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,FindClose,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,SendDlgItemMessageW,FileTimeToLocalFileTime,FileTimeToSystemTime,GetTimeFormatW,GetDateFormatW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,_swprintf,SetDlgItemTextW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_0020B348 FindFirstFileExA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node

Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe, 00000000.00000002.273055151.0000000002E8D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dllHO
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe, 00000000.00000002.272694925.0000000002E08000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: 100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: 67AzzNNioP.exe, 00000000.00000002.272889878.0000000002E6D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \??\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\
Source: AIO.exe, 00000001.00000002.277458799.0000022F98FBF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FF838 IsProcessorFeaturePresent,IsDebuggerPresent,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_0020C030 GetProcessHeap,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_00207DEE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FF9D5 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FF838 IsProcessorFeaturePresent,IsDebuggerPresent,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_001FFBCA SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,GetCurrentProcess,TerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Code function: 0_2_00208EBD IsDebuggerPresent,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe"

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\times.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: GetLocaleInfoW,GetNumberFormatW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FF654 cpuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001FDF1E GetCommandLineW,OpenFileMappingW,MapViewOfFile,UnmapViewOfFile,CloseHandle,GetModuleFileNameW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,GetLocalTime,_swprintf,SetEnvironmentVariableW,GetModuleHandleW,LoadIconW,DialogBoxParamW,Sleep,DeleteObject,DeleteObject,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe

Code function: 0_2_001EB146 GetVersionExW,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	2 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	11 Input Capture	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	1 Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Encrypted Channel	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	1 Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	121 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	11 Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	1 Non-Standard Port	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	1 Archive Collected Data	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	NTDS	2 File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	34 System Information Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	2 Software Packing	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
67AzzNNioP.exe	28%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Generic
67AzzNNioP.exe	23%	Virustotal		Browse

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.25.204.244	unknown	Italy		60798	ASSERVEREASYIT	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	36.0.0 Rainbow Opal
Analysis ID:	708239
Start date and time:	2022-09-23 07:55:46 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 32s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	67AzzNNioP.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 104, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	14
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.winEXE@4/2@0/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 50%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 99.7% (good quality ratio 93.3%) Quality average: 79.8% Quality standard deviation: 28.5%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 98% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fs.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com
Execution Graph export aborted for target AIO.exe, PID 5576 because there are no executed function
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe
File Type:	PE32+ executable (console) x86-64 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4077056
Entropy (8bit):	6.745466282178942
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	49152:g8CBJF3V3kt1rb/TLvO90d7HjmAFd4A64nsfJr3J66/XUg/UljSVZgxxkq1QarAU:U3WeIAnba7tKtzQ
MD5:	9C1181704C48D62DE14C5F682C4F5D5E
SHA1:	ADA9921624F3225054745643B0D4504939EFD1AA
SHA-256:	44EA8AE385D7D95D4F0B9C6969C0D0CA55ACFD996E97236C0AE04EB2B4B2D623
SHA-512:	42756AD205C3E99B3A9C0EDA1DBAA80923B714AB56E9AB987917E6A41B52571F6965254EE9DC486C2E444D080554956AD4059CA5695D36DE53D92201583E4F05
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..d.........7......."..................Y........@...............................D...........`... ...............................................=.\|....@A.p1....................=..U...................................................!&.@............................text............................... ..`.rdata..............................@..@.data....w... &.......&.............@.../4......'.....-.......'.............@..B/19.....Gg....-..h....'.............@..B/32......... 1.......+.............@..B/46.....0.....1.......+.............@..B/65......c....1..d....+.............@..B/78......0...P8..2...D2.............@..B/90......"....<..$...v6.............@..B.idata..\|.....=.......7.............@....reloc...U....=..V....7.............@..B.symtab......0>.......7................B.rsrc...p1...@A..2....;.............@..@................................................

C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.jpg

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe
File Type:	JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01, aspect ratio, density 1x1, segment length 16, baseline, precision 8, 236x213, frames 3
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	906
Entropy (8bit):	6.259833359660227
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:baXYMFrUiV6ine/30TA4MJ8hJG1XzWFSXvEjHT7t5ct+pbV8H2b1/VgsKojP4tQ2:MFrFc/30Tg8h81WEMjHTpGkGH2ZVgIj+
MD5:	F6E32B18FEB903C735501B2B188B9310
SHA1:	A3F87DC9655C91FA406BFB6346288FB3A0FCCDE7
SHA-256:	71DFD33F3C6E255DBAFED40878452AFE3248F86382588F10F85D31A0BC4BB481
SHA-512:	F662C58F4426AD698762E0793407305854C6BFE5242397E6D136116678EADBFD4E327A2EA499E4AAC6DDFFC5288D0F3AE43D0D5475832C7D0B4112EE0D509F88
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......JFIF...................................................( ..%...!1!%)7.....383,7(-:+...........-...++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++...........".........................................................Aa.!1.........................................................?...o.$........(....E> ...b(.....R.LE.. -^YPZ...`...#Q.5....y ..... ..Q` .4....C.].h .."..At..5.. .(-.U..."j...,@Z...^YX."B.TX..{.BB.K...l@..AjZ ).."....A...M].....R.R.."`. ..*E..,..E@.(h..A.$%...A....,.h.$.....$@TYSAj5Y.B..b...........H.VT..)....]C... ........CJ.!.0._....Z( ......B......"......Ap......M@.H.)iZ..Q.b.4.1R.1R...$4.....@...a...j.Q1bPF.H....@......P."..H..5(......(....J...j,..PYP.YQ.QL.IH.b......i.."......(.....h.RR.0.A.J.(."..........d...h R..P.Y. ......f....`")...`.....P.@TX...................j.,B.S@.S@..@.......E..`....J.JP4......%PM%:..Za.....Z ,5......eP.....T...@.M@...........-....@...

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.655406020704828
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	67AzzNNioP.exe
File size:	2543411
MD5:	f44d0bd72d14338b655a6d4457419493
SHA1:	dbe1773340912698515f76885f07d6faacbce09c
SHA256:	8f8cb5930100e80159502fd6d224909606f47ff17614f89b41b650afc3a91b6d
SHA512:	c4d67a8772ef2a7325566ec9ccc8d20a4c66cef4069a52994671c21102d58ac0135998ace178a60717b52b51f08e9a2683dc888acfb2a5ff804060b0e9c2ab9e
SSDEEP:	49152:tB/LNGrXDbdqRlwYDHMbYz9FUa+gXe9GeNCZpI4tUk1T:nxGrDbSTII9FUa+Ee9XN+I4tU6T
TLSH:	2BC5230DB8C194F2C162D9364A616764A57879101B67CEDFE3ED4A3FCB624C1EE307A2
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......x_c.<>..<>..<>......1>.......>......$>...I..>>...I../>...I..+>...I...>..5F..7>..5F..;>..<>..)?...I...>...I..=>...I..=>...I..=>.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	008039c4c4384000

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x41f530
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x6220BF8D [Thu Mar 3 13:15:57 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	12e12319f1029ec4f8fcbed7e82df162

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
call 00007F9BACB06F8Bh
jmp 00007F9BACB0689Dh
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
push dword ptr [ebp+08h]
mov esi, ecx
call 00007F9BACAF96E7h
mov dword ptr [esi], 004356D0h
mov eax, esi
pop esi
pop ebp
retn 0004h
and dword ptr [ecx+04h], 00000000h
mov eax, ecx
and dword ptr [ecx+08h], 00000000h
mov dword ptr [ecx+04h], 004356D8h
mov dword ptr [ecx], 004356D0h
ret
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
mov esi, ecx
lea eax, dword ptr [esi+04h]
mov dword ptr [esi], 004356B8h
push eax
call 00007F9BACB09D2Fh
test byte ptr [ebp+08h], 00000001h
pop ecx
je 00007F9BACB06A2Ch
push 0000000Ch
push esi
call 00007F9BACB05FE9h
pop ecx
pop ecx
mov eax, esi
pop esi
pop ebp
retn 0004h
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 0Ch
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
call 00007F9BACAF9662h
push 0043BEF0h
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
push eax
call 00007F9BACB097E9h
int3
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 0Ch
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
call 00007F9BACB069A8h
push 0043C0F4h
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
push eax
call 00007F9BACB097CCh
int3
jmp 00007F9BACB0B267h
int3
int3
int3
int3
push 00422900h
push dword ptr fs:[00000000h]

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[ C ] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x3d070	0x34	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x3d0a4	0x50	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x64000	0x4698c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xab000	0x233c	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x3b11c	0x54	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x355f8	0x40	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x33000	0x278	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x3c5ec	0x120	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x31bdc	0x31c00	False	0.5909380888819096	data	6.712962136932442	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x33000	0xaec0	0xb000	False	0.4579190340909091	data	5.261605615899847	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x3e000	0x24720	0x1000	False	0.451416015625	data	4.387459135575936	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.didat	0x63000	0x190	0x200	False	0.4453125	data	3.3327310103022305	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x64000	0x4698c	0x46a00	False	0.07180586283185841	data	2.00213285276512	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xab000	0x233c	0x2400	False	0.7749565972222222	data	6.623012966548067	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
PNG	0x64524	0xb45	PNG image data, 93 x 302, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced	English	United States
PNG	0x6506c	0x15a9	PNG image data, 186 x 604, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x66618	0x42028	data
RT_DIALOG	0xa8640	0x286	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0xa88c8	0x13a	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0xa8a04	0xec	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0xa8af0	0x12e	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0xa8c20	0x338	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0xa8f58	0x252	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa91ac	0x1e2	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa9390	0x1cc	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa955c	0x1b8	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa9714	0x146	Hitachi SH big-endian COFF object file, not stripped, 17152 sections, symbol offset=0x73006500	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa985c	0x46c	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa9cc8	0x166	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa9e30	0x152	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xa9f84	0x10a	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xaa090	0xbc	data	English	United States
RT_STRING	0xaa14c	0xd6	data	English	United States
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xaa224	0x14	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xaa238	0x753	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	GetLastError, SetLastError, FormatMessageW, GetCurrentProcess, DeviceIoControl, SetFileTime, CloseHandle, CreateDirectoryW, RemoveDirectoryW, CreateFileW, DeleteFileW, CreateHardLinkW, GetShortPathNameW, GetLongPathNameW, MoveFileW, GetFileType, GetStdHandle, WriteFile, ReadFile, FlushFileBuffers, SetEndOfFile, SetFilePointer, SetFileAttributesW, GetFileAttributesW, FindClose, FindFirstFileW, FindNextFileW, InterlockedDecrement, GetVersionExW, GetCurrentDirectoryW, GetFullPathNameW, FoldStringW, GetModuleFileNameW, GetModuleHandleW, FindResourceW, FreeLibrary, GetProcAddress, GetCurrentProcessId, ExitProcess, SetThreadExecutionState, Sleep, LoadLibraryW, GetSystemDirectoryW, CompareStringW, AllocConsole, FreeConsole, AttachConsole, WriteConsoleW, GetProcessAffinityMask, CreateThread, SetThreadPriority, InitializeCriticalSection, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, DeleteCriticalSection, SetEvent, ResetEvent, ReleaseSemaphore, WaitForSingleObject, CreateEventW, CreateSemaphoreW, GetSystemTime, SystemTimeToTzSpecificLocalTime, TzSpecificLocalTimeToSystemTime, SystemTimeToFileTime, FileTimeToLocalFileTime, LocalFileTimeToFileTime, FileTimeToSystemTime, GetCPInfo, IsDBCSLeadByte, MultiByteToWideChar, WideCharToMultiByte, GlobalAlloc, LockResource, GlobalLock, GlobalUnlock, GlobalFree, LoadResource, SizeofResource, SetCurrentDirectoryW, GetExitCodeProcess, GetLocalTime, GetTickCount, MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile, CreateFileMappingW, OpenFileMappingW, GetCommandLineW, SetEnvironmentVariableW, ExpandEnvironmentStringsW, GetTempPathW, MoveFileExW, GetLocaleInfoW, GetTimeFormatW, GetDateFormatW, GetNumberFormatW, DecodePointer, SetFilePointerEx, GetConsoleMode, GetConsoleCP, HeapSize, SetStdHandle, GetProcessHeap, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, GetEnvironmentStringsW, GetCommandLineA, GetOEMCP, RaiseException, GetSystemInfo, VirtualProtect, VirtualQuery, LoadLibraryExA, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, IsDebuggerPresent, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, GetStartupInfoW, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetCurrentThreadId, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, InitializeSListHead, TerminateProcess, LocalFree, RtlUnwind, EncodePointer, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, TlsAlloc, TlsGetValue, TlsSetValue, TlsFree, LoadLibraryExW, QueryPerformanceFrequency, GetModuleHandleExW, GetModuleFileNameA, GetACP, HeapFree, HeapAlloc, HeapReAlloc, GetStringTypeW, LCMapStringW, FindFirstFileExA, FindNextFileA, IsValidCodePage
OLEAUT32.dll	SysAllocString, SysFreeString, VariantClear
gdiplus.dll	GdipAlloc, GdipDisposeImage, GdipCloneImage, GdipCreateBitmapFromStream, GdipCreateBitmapFromStreamICM, GdipCreateHBITMAPFromBitmap, GdiplusStartup, GdiplusShutdown, GdipFree

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:52.887993097 CEST	49702	9090	192.168.2.3	185.25.204.244
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:52.913883924 CEST	9090	49702	185.25.204.244	192.168.2.3
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:53.419513941 CEST	49702	9090	192.168.2.3	185.25.204.244
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:53.445174932 CEST	9090	49702	185.25.204.244	192.168.2.3
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:53.950766087 CEST	49702	9090	192.168.2.3	185.25.204.244
Sep 23, 2022 07:56:53.976298094 CEST	9090	49702	185.25.204.244	192.168.2.3

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:56:40
Start date:	23/09/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\67AzzNNioP.exe"
Imagebase:	0x1e0000
File size:	2543411 bytes
MD5 hash:	F44D0BD72D14338B655A6D4457419493
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: AIO.exePID: 5576, Parent PID: 3932

General

Target ID:	1
Start time:	07:56:50
Start date:	23/09/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe"
Imagebase:	0xf30000
File size:	4077056 bytes
MD5 hash:	9C1181704C48D62DE14C5F682C4F5D5E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 3776, Parent PID: 5576

General

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:56:51
Start date:	23/09/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff745070000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report 67AzzNNioP.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Spreading

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\Desktop\AIO.exe

C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.jpg

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 67AzzNNioP.exePID: 3932, Parent PID: 5644

General

Analysis Process: AIO.exePID: 5576, Parent PID: 3932

Windows Analysis Report
67AzzNNioP.exe