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Windows Analysis Report
receipt.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:receipt.exe
Analysis ID:712166
MD5:220925c99e482fd480dedb37ca1b59d3
SHA1:828278c1467af367892469cbced139533ecce7e1
SHA256:e2340403396069b5ca3a235a66889abf2540c8e382bff1cb704ef2cdb13dade9
Tags:exeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:

Detection

Nanocore, BitRAT
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Yara detected BitRAT
Icon mismatch, binary includes an icon from a different legit application in order to fool users
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Detected Nanocore Rat
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Machine Learning detection for sample
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Uses dynamic DNS services
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Detected potential crypto function
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Drops PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • receipt.exe (PID: 4184 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\receipt.exe" MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 3680 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBTAGUAYwBvAG4AZABzACAAMgAwAA== MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 4820 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
    • receipt.exe (PID: 5792 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\receipt.exe MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
    • receipt.exe (PID: 5804 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\receipt.exe MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 6052 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBTAGUAYwBvAG4AZABzACAANQAwAA== MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10)
        • conhost.exe (PID: 6060 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
      • Rzqhcgbd1time.exe (PID: 4204 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\Rzqhcgbd1time.exe" MD5: 75C8427471203E42A905F099D986BAE4)
      • receipt.exe (PID: 1840 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\receipt.exe MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
  • Uewizrlgm.exe (PID: 5880 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Zyfrlcamp\Uewizrlgm.exe" MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 3920 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBTAGUAYwBvAG4AZABzACAAMgAwAA== MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 3596 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
    • Uewizrlgm.exe (PID: 5140 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Zyfrlcamp\Uewizrlgm.exe MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
  • Uewizrlgm.exe (PID: 5988 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Zyfrlcamp\Uewizrlgm.exe" MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 5444 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBTAGUAYwBvAG4AZABzACAAMgAwAA== MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 5432 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
    • Uewizrlgm.exe (PID: 1800 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Zyfrlcamp\Uewizrlgm.exe MD5: 220925C99E482FD480DEDB37CA1B59D3)
  • cleanup
No configs have been found
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\uIyibZtq20fMk9Yx.exeJoeSecurity_BitRATYara detected BitRATJoe Security
    C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\uIyibZtq20fMk9Yx.exeMALWARE_Win_BitRATDetects BitRAT RATditekSHen
    • 0x339ffc:$s1: \plg\
    • 0x33a170:$s3: files_delete
    • 0x338f8c:$s9: ddos_stop
    • 0x339fdc:$s10: socks5_srv_start
    • 0x33a1bc:$s16: klg|
    • 0x338fbc:$s17: Slowloris
    • 0x33a064:$s18: Bot ID:
    • 0x33a5a4:$t1: <sz>N/A</sz>
    C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\WJ8I2OL4\time[1].exeJoeSecurity_BitRATYara detected BitRATJoe Security
      C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\WJ8I2OL4\time[1].exeMALWARE_Win_BitRATDetects BitRAT RATditekSHen
      • 0x339ffc:$s1: \plg\
      • 0x33a170:$s3: files_delete
      • 0x338f8c:$s9: ddos_stop
      • 0x339fdc:$s10: socks5_srv_start
      • 0x33a1bc:$s16: klg|
      • 0x338fbc:$s17: Slowloris
      • 0x33a064:$s18: Bot ID:
      • 0x33a5a4:$t1: <sz>N/A</sz>
      SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
      0000000C.00000003.354725575.0000000004133000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoaderYara detected Costura Assembly LoaderJoe Security
        0000000E.00000002.514450713.0000000002B9F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoaderYara detected Costura Assembly LoaderJoe Security
          0000000C.00000002.552831356.0000000002F63000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
          • 0x33a2d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
          • 0x33a6a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
          • 0x3759d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
          0000000C.00000002.552831356.0000000002F63000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
          • 0x33795:$a: NanoCore
          • 0x337a5:$a: NanoCore
          • 0x339d9:$a: NanoCore
          • 0x339ed:$a: NanoCore
          • 0x33a2d:$a: NanoCore
          • 0x337f4:$b: ClientPlugin
          • 0x339f6:$b: ClientPlugin
          • 0x33a36:$b: ClientPlugin
          • 0x3391b:$c: ProjectData
          • 0x34322:$d: DESCrypto
          • 0x35ed7:$i: get_Connected
          • 0x34658:$j: #=q
          • 0x34688:$j: #=q
          • 0x346a4:$j: #=q
          • 0x346d4:$j: #=q
          • 0x346f0:$j: #=q
          • 0x3470c:$j: #=q
          • 0x3473c:$j: #=q
          • 0x34758:$j: #=q
          • 0x3479c:$j: #=q
          • 0x347b8:$j: #=q
          0000000C.00000002.552831356.0000000002F63000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpWindows_Trojan_Nanocore_d8c4e3c5unknownunknown
          • 0x33a2d:$a1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
          • 0x339ed:$a2: NanoCore.ClientPlugin
          • 0x35946:$b1: get_BuilderSettings
          • 0x33849:$b2: ClientLoaderForm.resources
          • 0x35066:$b3: PluginCommand
          • 0x33a1e:$b4: IClientAppHost
          • 0x35f9e:$b6: AddHostEntry
          • 0x35f0b:$b8: PipeExists
          • 0x33a57:$b9: IClientLoggingHost
          Click to see the 47 entries
          SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
          12.2.receipt.exe.3f72bc0.3.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
          • 0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
          • 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
          • 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
          12.2.receipt.exe.3f72bc0.3.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
          • 0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe
          • 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
          • 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand
          • 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand
          • 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists
          • 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated
          • 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
          12.2.receipt.exe.3f72bc0.3.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
            12.2.receipt.exe.3f72bc0.3.raw.unpackMALWARE_Win_NanoCoreDetects NanoCoreditekSHen
            • 0xfef5:$x1: NanoCore Client
            • 0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client
            • 0x1014d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPlugin
            • 0x1018d:$x3: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
            • 0x10142:$i1: IClientApp
            • 0x10163:$i2: IClientData
            • 0x1016f:$i3: IClientNetwork
            • 0x1017e:$i4: IClientAppHost
            • 0x101a7:$i5: IClientDataHost
            • 0x101b7:$i6: IClientLoggingHost
            • 0x101ca:$i7: IClientNetworkHost
            • 0x101dd:$i8: IClientUIHost
            • 0x101eb:$i9: IClientNameObjectCollection
            • 0x10207:$i10: IClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollection
            • 0xff54:$s1: ClientPlugin
            • 0x10156:$s1: ClientPlugin
            • 0x1064a:$s2: EndPoint
            • 0x10653:$s3: IPAddress
            • 0x1065d:$s4: IPEndPoint
            • 0x12093:$s6: get_ClientSettings
            • 0x12637:$s7: get_Connected
            12.2.receipt.exe.3f72bc0.3.raw.unpackNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
            • 0xfef5:$a: NanoCore
            • 0xff05:$a: NanoCore
            • 0x10139:$a: NanoCore
            • 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore
            • 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore
            • 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin
            • 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin
            • 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin
            • 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData
            • 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto
            • 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive
            • 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage
            • 0x12637:$i: get_Connected
            • 0x10db8:$j: #=q
            • 0x10de8:$j: #=q
            • 0x10e04:$j: #=q
            • 0x10e34:$j: #=q
            • 0x10e50:$j: #=q
            • 0x10e6c:$j: #=q
            • 0x10e9c:$j: #=q
            • 0x10eb8:$j: #=q