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Windows Analysis Report
D009780.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	D009780.exe
Analysis ID:	755926
MD5:	649e0964d04ac89667c1f59fe99c7799
SHA1:	5debabb563c0c457670b925c4c8f4830484a0067
SHA256:	2b5120f2d732c6b78ddac5ac679cbbf279d96108d50cc02e569be1e07813b604
Tags:	exe
Infos:

Detection

Score:	52
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Uses 32bit PE files

Drops PE files

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Stores files to the Windows start menu directory

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

D009780.exe (PID: 3772 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe MD5: 649E0964D04AC89667C1F59FE99C7799)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: D009780.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 21%

Source: D009780.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Registry value created: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Fivefoldness\Endosseringerne\Fouragen

Jump to behavior

Source: D009780.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_004065C5 FindFirstFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405990 GetTempPathW,DeleteFileW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrlenW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402862 FindFirstFileW,

Source: D009780.exe

String found in binary or memory: http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405425 GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetClientRect,GetSystemMetrics,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,GetDlgItem,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,GetDlgItem,CreateThread,CloseHandle,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,SendMessageW,CreatePopupMenu,AppendMenuW,GetWindowRect,TrackPopupMenu,SendMessageW,OpenClipboard,EmptyClipboard,GlobalAlloc,GlobalLock,SendMessageW,GlobalUnlock,SetClipboardData,CloseClipboard,

Source: D009780.exe

Static PE information: RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_00403373 EntryPoint,SetErrorMode,GetVersion,lstrlenA,#17,OleInitialize,SHGetFileInfoW,GetCommandLineW,GetModuleHandleW,CharNextW,GetTempPathW,GetTempPathW,GetWindowsDirectoryW,lstrcatW,GetTempPathW,lstrcatW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,DeleteFileW,OleUninitialize,ExitProcess,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrcmpiW,SetCurrentDirectoryW,DeleteFileW,CopyFileW,CloseHandle,GetCurrentProcess,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,ExitWindowsEx,ExitProcess,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404C62
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406ADD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_004072B4

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: D009780.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 21%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: D009780.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nst86C1.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal52.evad.winEXE@1/6@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_004020FE CoCreateInstance,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_004046E6 GetDlgItem,SetWindowTextW,SHBrowseForFolderW,CoTaskMemFree,lstrcmpiW,lstrcatW,SetDlgItemTextW,GetDiskFreeSpaceW,MulDiv,SetDlgItemTextW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Registry value created: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Fivefoldness\Endosseringerne\Fouragen

Jump to behavior

Source: D009780.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_10002DE0 push eax; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_10001B18 GlobalAlloc,lstrcpyW,lstrcpyW,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,lstrcpyW,GetModuleHandleW,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,lstrlenW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsn8FFA.tmp\System.dll

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Anhydridizes.Imi121	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\libxml2-2.0.typelib	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\Psammologist.Pan	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\memstat.c	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\selection-end-symbolic.symbolic.png	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B12174 second address: 0000000002B12174 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 test ecx, 68A7FE31h 0x00000008 cmp ebx, ecx 0x0000000a jc 00007FC9C0DD810Eh 0x0000000c test ecx, ecx 0x0000000e test al, A2h 0x00000010 inc ebp 0x00000011 cmp bl, al 0x00000013 inc ebx 0x00000014 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_004065C5 FindFirstFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405990 GetTempPathW,DeleteFileW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrlenW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402862 FindFirstFileW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Code function: 0_2_10001B18 GlobalAlloc,lstrcpyW,lstrcpyW,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,GlobalFree,lstrcpyW,GetModuleHandleW,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,lstrlenW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	1 Native API	1 Windows Service	1 Access Token Manipulation	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Encrypted Channel	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	1 System Shutdown/Reboot
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Windows Service	1 Access Token Manipulation	LSASS Memory	2 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	1 Clipboard Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	13 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
D009780.exe	22%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Guloader

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsn8FFA.tmp\System.dll	0%	ReversingLabs

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError	D009780.exe	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	36.0.0 Rainbow Opal
Analysis ID:	755926
Start date and time:	2022-11-29 10:24:07 +01:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 29s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	D009780.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 104, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	15
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal52.evad.winEXE@1/6@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 86% (good quality ratio 84.6%) Quality average: 87% Quality standard deviation: 21.1%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 93.184.221.240
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fs.microsoft.com, wu.ec.azureedge.net, bg.apr-52dd2-0503.edgecastdns.net, cs11.wpc.v0cdn.net, hlb.apr-52dd2-0.edgecastdns.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, wu-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, wu.azureedge.net
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtSetInformationFile calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: D009780.exe

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	11776
Entropy (8bit):	5.659384359264642
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:ex24sihno00Wfl97nH6BenXwWobpWBTtvShJ5omi7dJWjOlESlS:h8QIl972eXqlWBFSt273YOlEz
MD5:	8B3830B9DBF87F84DDD3B26645FED3A0
SHA1:	223BEF1F19E644A610A0877D01EADC9E28299509
SHA-256:	F004C568D305CD95EDBD704166FCD2849D395B595DFF814BCC2012693527AC37
SHA-512:	D13CFD98DB5CA8DC9C15723EEE0E7454975078A776BCE26247228BE4603A0217E166058EBADC68090AFE988862B7514CB8CB84DE13B3DE35737412A6F0A8AC03
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......1...u.u.u...s.u.a....r.!..q....t....t.Richu.........................PE..L.....uY...........!..... ...........'.......0...............................`.......................................2.......0..P............................P.......................................................0..X............................text............ .................. ..`.rdata..S....0.......$..............@..@.data...x....@.......(..............@....reloc..`....P.......*..............@..B................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Anhydridizes.Imi121

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	166213
Entropy (8bit):	6.7188897468610635
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:yyKNH91XkciA5V8SsuXEkWtJbVKrUp+3Rdtt03z2pXy5gMRKhKcfhby09qVLDerk:8rXEA5V2mPa+XVHpXE3RKLwLcppDa
MD5:	8F8B455423728EC3F56CC534165292C8
SHA1:	B7BC0FBD5826D73287D66560C7D0DA6738B5AFD8
SHA-256:	38583A88A0AD9F6B776B25BEFF612F21A8AD8289F1FC5E75AD0D411BF5FED52F
SHA-512:	0906AFFD2078F6DB365EBFCB89EB052F9C343976B851ACCB9FA91299414F33632F8F52A59C9E1BAC49D83A34335302E747285DB5AA34C133FB51F444FA5BB529
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\Psammologist.Pan

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	41040
Entropy (8bit):	7.995359137976442
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	768:wNhagjlZc4ExPMbCVVsT62u53N+qUy22/aJKHBO2jj5dJQ:LeZcpeEVsTp03Nu2CJK5jj5dy
MD5:	14E3BC546122A6AABCBAA4FD77EB0DF9
SHA1:	6D6F937F85083A6B7D3CD784FD7FD2F9D602B8A0
SHA-256:	E3DBEFBAE9D754C328269CF29CDDC926ECE497029B763FCC322B431AE03D940D
SHA-512:	8BD0F74C31573CEF3B68B8CCD575822C22197D880CA331F884669316C17047DB3AE49BD79DCFC4EC21257399EA7E238226956BF681130D5263BC5BDFFB84D284
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..@.....6..R...Ev.Rt.E...}WR.h.+..c.N...8.......7V.}!..I0#.....pS....i..=d........e..+h.M. .../;...(.\|...S.I....#.2A\|...W..E..........+.A.!o..n0O%...^.,......I.R..4..4d.Oj..f....>.4..#.qh.\|.....J?............&.5.....&..cz...N.BA......~..:~$....9...#..$w..o.h...G1....R.C:F...juFe..`_...J.7'..\.#.r.:vp............n...B.I..@L...V....4x..I.......z.....l7..y........T.}.r....c.._.....4H.....e...Q<..k...Sh....../..O...... [.^.s...t........r..S........_.5.v..s.+n.t.g=/.}3...._:da@...r.Jd..............]W...k_..W.E...}.e....c....8y.>.L..3i..x.?...+.2..^.X...........f.{.~I.x.u..R..1.j^p..K(........&.Z.R2..D.n... .C\|i.m.....d=..`....N..[...t......D.......{..2zk..".......S.A...s.5......*.x.a.XSL....1,Z.W.......(m...V.~.....Q..=......\|"/..\|@rp+.o..!..r!../..!6T....e.y.3.u.J...}.X$...\..fJ.K..K.[zZZ....0&.ZX.c4..;.v...._.;a...:iI&G................u....{....d1....X......N..\!..M...\|.../6.....v..!....Z...H.@..C...X/ ?...........o.........g:0b.....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\libxml2-2.0.typelib

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	HTML document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1245
Entropy (8bit):	5.462849750105637
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:hM0mIAvy4Wvsqs1Ra7JZRGNeHX+AYcvP2wk1RjdEF3qpMk5:lmIAq1UqsziJZ+eHX+AdP2TvpMk5
MD5:	5343C1A8B203C162A3BF3870D9F50FD4
SHA1:	04B5B886C20D88B57EEA6D8FF882624A4AC1E51D
SHA-256:	DC1D54DAB6EC8C00F70137927504E4F222C8395F10760B6BEECFCFA94E08249F
SHA-512:	E0F50ACB6061744E825A4051765CEBF23E8C489B55B190739409D8A79BB08DAC8F919247A4E5F65A015EA9C57D326BBEF7EA045163915129E01F316C4958D949
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">..<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">..<head>..<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"/>..<title>404 - File or directory not found.</title>..<style type="text/css">.. ..body{margin:0;font-size:.7em;font-family:Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;background:#EEEEEE;}..fieldset{padding:0 15px 10px 15px;} ..h1{font-size:2.4em;margin:0;color:#FFF;}..h2{font-size:1.7em;margin:0;color:#CC0000;} ..h3{font-size:1.2em;margin:10px 0 0 0;color:#000000;} ..#header{width:96%;margin:0 0 0 0;padding:6px 2% 6px 2%;font-family:"trebuchet MS", Verdana, sans-serif;color:#FFF;..background-color:#555555;}..#content{margin:0 0 0 2%;position:relative;}...content-container{background:#FFF;width:96%;margin-top:8px;padding:10px;position:relative;}..-->..</style>..</head>..<body>..<div id="header"><h1>Server Error</h1></div>..<div id="content">.. <div class="co

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\memstat.c

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	C source, ASCII text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	13484
Entropy (8bit):	5.15716859322729
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:B3tdgdRmAMgyWkSctse3XX6ZjuguOixHRYqx0NzZW+08e:B3tuPdjJ0TCzZWv
MD5:	BD46EB22C1A1B4EA40373E8F57BFF4E3
SHA1:	CC2943E660BBB1697B7561F2776A7BCE2F36718A
SHA-256:	8361836BCB172722E5F2EE90AF31834B9B08B828A90E80E0BB930C336001B4CE
SHA-512:	5994643BCDFDF59B7EBF8FE36BC30CF0A454966FA95741D80AC81E9C42126A66ACDD782F6D7852A35CAE171FCC0DE1218EC1CD951829F7EC1C72B35EE7487D74
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	/.* 2018-09-27.. The author disclaims copyright to this source code. In place of. a legal notice, here is a blessing:.. May you do good and not evil.. May you find forgiveness for yourself and forgive others.. May you share freely, never taking more than you give...***********************************************************************.. This file demonstrates an eponymous virtual table that returns information. from sqlite3_status64() and sqlite3_db_status()... Usage example:.. .load ./memstat. .mode quote. .header on.** SELECT * FROM memstat;./.#if !defined(SQLITE_CORE) \|\| defined(SQLITE_ENABLE_MEMSTATVTAB).#if !defined(SQLITEINT_H).#include "sqlite3ext.h".#endif.SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT1.#include <assert.h>.#include <string.h>..#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_VIRTUALTABLE../ memstat_vtab is a subclass of sqlite3_vtab which will.** serve as the underlying representation of a memstat virtual table.*/.typedef struct memstat_vtab memsta

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\selection-end-symbolic.symbolic.png

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
File Type:	PNG image data, 16 x 16, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	138
Entropy (8bit):	5.559646592748364
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:yionv//thPl9vt3lAnsrtxBllO9p2hkq8PQ1/kbcw1w9lDk7kup:6v/lhPys8pQt8PQ2cw1IlDXup
MD5:	9863709F8F136F0F38A5D9CF2740143A
SHA1:	0EC6AA74A3FED4719B1B8D2E8468239489D84427
SHA-256:	2C86B3EDF2A397608FE0C12A634F175DE1E3C4E5C4610B8457578B549069A7B0
SHA-512:	B1D8DC9CAFF35264E117201C0DB2112F4C07BAB9235188D32F90B9D00DC2E7AC27ECC1FC9753C5F50949C95D91EEA0C5F318D6D1C8D7587CA0A68AD2CC1C4EB5
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.PNG........IHDR................a....sBIT....\|.d....AIDAT8.c`........X..X......C...u..(&.%.. ..t.H6...$......S.F.....a/..&I......IEND.B`.

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive
Entropy (8bit):	7.727040003614326
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	D009780.exe
File size:	296621
MD5:	649e0964d04ac89667c1f59fe99c7799
SHA1:	5debabb563c0c457670b925c4c8f4830484a0067
SHA256:	2b5120f2d732c6b78ddac5ac679cbbf279d96108d50cc02e569be1e07813b604
SHA512:	5fb49e4d8199e28f018f21d7d5eff3eafeade9c4f72c2bf5dabb6476c84a7945a5f67681de6df40a95a47412dc89586497bd4a7cb0ad2934d962db8b376d80ea
SSDEEP:	6144:nQ606xDpoDTOfHQerv77Um8RHZ9USC/U3zP9wnZwC2djTTv/o:FpoPOfQqvHUmIkS53zPunZwd7Ho
TLSH:	1854122063A0C433D6AA0A30DD1386F79FB59C69EE096F87D3507E9C7C72246D52E35A
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........1...Pf..Pf..Pf._9..Pf..Pg.LPf._;..Pf..sV..Pf..V`..Pf.Rich.Pf.........................PE..L...6.uY.................f.........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	c60ccd1616164e46

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x403373
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	RELOCS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x59759536 [Mon Jul 24 06:35:34 2017 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b34f154ec913d2d2c435cbd644e91687

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
sub esp, 000002D4h
push ebx
push esi
push edi
push 00000020h
pop edi
xor ebx, ebx
push 00008001h
mov dword ptr [esp+14h], ebx
mov dword ptr [esp+10h], 0040A2E0h
mov dword ptr [esp+1Ch], ebx
call dword ptr [004080A8h]
call dword ptr [004080A4h]
and eax, BFFFFFFFh
cmp ax, 00000006h
mov dword ptr [00434EECh], eax
je 00007FC9C0A66683h
push ebx
call 00007FC9C0A69919h
cmp eax, ebx
je 00007FC9C0A66679h
push 00000C00h
call eax
mov esi, 004082B0h
push esi
call 00007FC9C0A69893h
push esi
call dword ptr [00408150h]
lea esi, dword ptr [esi+eax+01h]
cmp byte ptr [esi], 00000000h
jne 00007FC9C0A6665Ch
push 0000000Ah
call 00007FC9C0A698ECh
push 00000008h
call 00007FC9C0A698E5h
push 00000006h
mov dword ptr [00434EE4h], eax
call 00007FC9C0A698D9h
cmp eax, ebx
je 00007FC9C0A66681h
push 0000001Eh
call eax
test eax, eax
je 00007FC9C0A66679h
or byte ptr [00434EEFh], 00000040h
push ebp
call dword ptr [00408044h]
push ebx
call dword ptr [004082A0h]
mov dword ptr [00434FB8h], eax
push ebx
lea eax, dword ptr [esp+34h]
push 000002B4h
push eax
push ebx
push 0042B208h
call dword ptr [00408188h]
push 0040A2C8h

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[EXP] VC++ 6.0 SP5 build 8804

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x8608	0xa0	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x76000	0x16898	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x8000	0x2b0	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x65ef	0x6600	False	0.6750919117647058	data	6.514810500836391	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x8000	0x149a	0x1600	False	0.43803267045454547	data	5.007075185851696	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xa000	0x2aff8	0x600	False	0.5162760416666666	data	4.036693470004838	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.ndata	0x35000	0x41000	0x0	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.rsrc	0x76000	0x16898	0x16a00	False	0.7946089433701657	data	7.153289056271752	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_BITMAP	0x76478	0x368	Device independent bitmap graphic, 96 x 16 x 4, image size 768	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x767e0	0x9d19	PNG image data, 256 x 256, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x80500	0x4102	PNG image data, 256 x 256, 8-bit colormap, non-interlaced	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x84608	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9600	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x86bb0	0x16e8	PNG image data, 256 x 256, 4-bit colormap, non-interlaced	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x88298	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4224	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x89340	0xea8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 8, image size 2304	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8a1e8	0x8a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 8, image size 1024	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8aa90	0x668	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 4, image size 1152	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8b0f8	0x568	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 8, image size 256	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8b660	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1088	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8bac8	0x2e8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 4, image size 512	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x8bdb0	0x128	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 4, image size 128	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8bed8	0x144	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8c020	0x13c	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8c160	0x100	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8c260	0x11c	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8c380	0xc4	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x8c448	0x60	data	English	United States
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x8c4a8	0xae	data	English	United States
RT_MANIFEST	0x8c558	0x33e	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with very long lines (830), with no line terminators	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	SetEnvironmentVariableW, SetFileAttributesW, Sleep, GetTickCount, GetFileSize, GetModuleFileNameW, GetCurrentProcess, CopyFileW, SetCurrentDirectoryW, GetFileAttributesW, GetWindowsDirectoryW, GetTempPathW, GetCommandLineW, GetVersion, SetErrorMode, lstrlenW, lstrcpynW, GetDiskFreeSpaceW, ExitProcess, GetShortPathNameW, CreateThread, GetLastError, CreateDirectoryW, CreateProcessW, RemoveDirectoryW, lstrcmpiA, CreateFileW, GetTempFileNameW, WriteFile, lstrcpyA, MoveFileExW, lstrcatW, GetSystemDirectoryW, GetProcAddress, GetModuleHandleA, GetExitCodeProcess, WaitForSingleObject, lstrcmpiW, MoveFileW, GetFullPathNameW, SetFileTime, SearchPathW, CompareFileTime, lstrcmpW, CloseHandle, ExpandEnvironmentStringsW, GlobalFree, GlobalLock, GlobalUnlock, GlobalAlloc, FindFirstFileW, FindNextFileW, DeleteFileW, SetFilePointer, ReadFile, FindClose, lstrlenA, MulDiv, MultiByteToWideChar, WideCharToMultiByte, GetPrivateProfileStringW, WritePrivateProfileStringW, FreeLibrary, LoadLibraryExW, GetModuleHandleW
USER32.dll	GetSystemMenu, SetClassLongW, EnableMenuItem, IsWindowEnabled, SetWindowPos, GetSysColor, GetWindowLongW, SetCursor, LoadCursorW, CheckDlgButton, GetMessagePos, LoadBitmapW, CallWindowProcW, IsWindowVisible, CloseClipboard, SetClipboardData, EmptyClipboard, OpenClipboard, ScreenToClient, GetWindowRect, GetDlgItem, GetSystemMetrics, SetDlgItemTextW, GetDlgItemTextW, MessageBoxIndirectW, CharPrevW, CharNextA, wsprintfA, DispatchMessageW, PeekMessageW, ReleaseDC, EnableWindow, InvalidateRect, SendMessageW, DefWindowProcW, BeginPaint, GetClientRect, FillRect, DrawTextW, EndDialog, RegisterClassW, SystemParametersInfoW, CreateWindowExW, GetClassInfoW, DialogBoxParamW, CharNextW, ExitWindowsEx, DestroyWindow, GetDC, SetTimer, SetWindowTextW, LoadImageW, SetForegroundWindow, ShowWindow, IsWindow, SetWindowLongW, FindWindowExW, TrackPopupMenu, AppendMenuW, CreatePopupMenu, EndPaint, CreateDialogParamW, SendMessageTimeoutW, wsprintfW, PostQuitMessage
GDI32.dll	SelectObject, SetBkMode, CreateFontIndirectW, SetTextColor, DeleteObject, GetDeviceCaps, CreateBrushIndirect, SetBkColor
SHELL32.dll	SHGetSpecialFolderLocation, ShellExecuteExW, SHGetPathFromIDListW, SHBrowseForFolderW, SHGetFileInfoW, SHFileOperationW
ADVAPI32.dll	AdjustTokenPrivileges, RegCreateKeyExW, RegOpenKeyExW, SetFileSecurityW, OpenProcessToken, LookupPrivilegeValueW, RegEnumValueW, RegDeleteKeyW, RegDeleteValueW, RegCloseKey, RegSetValueExW, RegQueryValueExW, RegEnumKeyW
COMCTL32.dll	ImageList_Create, ImageList_AddMasked, ImageList_Destroy
ole32.dll	OleUninitialize, OleInitialize, CoTaskMemFree, CoCreateInstance

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Target ID:	0
Start time:	10:24:59
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\D009780.exe
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	296621 bytes
MD5 hash:	649E0964D04AC89667C1F59FE99C7799
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg .
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report D009780.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Spreading

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsn8FFA.tmp\System.dll

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Anhydridizes.Imi121

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\Psammologist.Pan

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\libxml2-2.0.typelib

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\memstat.c

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Ydervgg\Superassume\dodecaheddra\Staveren\Kolkhozy\Fatalists\Cassythaceae\selection-end-symbolic.symbolic.png

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: D009780.exePID: 3772, Parent PID: 3452

General

Windows Analysis Report
D009780.exe