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Windows Analysis Report
Copie a bonului de plata.exe


General Information

Sample Name:Copie a bonului de plata.exe
Analysis ID:755986


FormBook, DBatLoader
Range:0 - 100


Detected FormBook malware
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected FormBook
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: Steal Google chrome login data
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Yara detected DBatLoader
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Writes to foreign memory regions
Machine Learning detection for sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Uses 32bit PE files
Yara signature match
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Detected potential crypto function
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Enables debug privileges
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Drops PE files
Tries to load missing DLLs
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)


  • System is w10x64
  • Copie a bonului de plata.exe (PID: 5152 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Copie a bonului de plata.exe MD5: EB8C68C29D6131D6B903DD268D6FF0EF)
    • colorcpl.exe (PID: 3556 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\colorcpl.exe MD5: 746F3B5E7652EA0766BA10414D317981)
      • explorer.exe (PID: 3452 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)
        • Ndvmyrkf.exe (PID: 5252 cmdline: "C:\Users\Public\Libraries\Ndvmyrkf.exe" MD5: EB8C68C29D6131D6B903DD268D6FF0EF)
          • wscript.exe (PID: 4648 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe MD5: 7075DD7B9BE8807FCA93ACD86F724884)
        • raserver.exe (PID: 3868 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\raserver.exe MD5: 2AADF65E395BFBD0D9B71D7279C8B5EC)
          • cmd.exe (PID: 3672 cmdline: /c copy "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1" /V MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)
            • conhost.exe (PID: 1808 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • msdt.exe (PID: 632 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msdt.exe MD5: 7F0C51DBA69B9DE5DDF6AA04CE3A69F4)
  • cleanup
{"C2 list": ["www.xctech.world/3nop/"], "decoy": ["slot999.site", "hagsahoy.com", "howdyart.com", "orders-marketplace.com", "ranaa.email", "masterlink.guru", "archershut.com", "weikumcommunications.com", "dphardmoney.com", "shjyutie.com", "vivaberlin.net", "mycto.today", "curvygirlugc.com", "otnmp.cfd", "alwrists.com", "propercandlecompany.com", "allindustry-bg.com", "theyoungbizacademy.com", "expand658170.com", "leslainesdumouchon.com", "suptisa.com", "picnic-in-andong.com", "wanligui.com", "cesarjunaro.com", "kuxita.xyz", "simpkecpr.com", "microsoftsecuritys.com", "responsefactor.com", "polyggroup.com", "talonxmfg.biz", "jam-nins.com", "picuar.com", "familysafehidingplaces.com", "centericehockey.com", "appleidd.info", "igctsansculottism.sbs", "guiaestilosaude.online", "happysscribe.com", "tizzbizz.com", "qcorretor.com", "baremaster.online", "liputanlima.com", "ontherighttrack.systems", "zzza002.xyz", "k-aashirwaad.com", "stillwatersagawork.com", "skindoze.com", "asdjmhfg.xyz", "refaccionariafgnogales.com", "hunn.pro", "tlland.group", "homebizen.com", "newszi.xyz", "nicetimecafe.net", "qdbs.cloud", "ebtl.wtf", "dchasss.com", "kijangjantan.tech", "elegant-story.com", "glimtmedia.com", "1dot.online", "neatneighborncclean.com", "marionarzel.com", "app-arthrex.com"]}
{"Download Url": "https://onedrive.live.com/download?cid=E0CF7F9E6AAF27EF&resid=E0CF7F9E6AAF27EF%21845&authkey=AIl8u0Az19Gihis"}
C:\Users\Public\Libraries\fkrymvdN.urlMethodology_Shortcut_HotKeyDetects possible shortcut usage for .URL persistence@itsreallynick (Nick Carr)
  • 0x58:$hotkey: \x0AHotKey=3
  • 0x0:$url_explicit: [InternetShortcut]
C:\Users\Public\Libraries\fkrymvdN.urlMethodology_Contains_Shortcut_OtherURIhandlersDetects possible shortcut usage for .URL persistence@itsreallynick (Nick Carr)
  • 0x14:$file: URL=
  • 0x0:$url_explicit: [InternetShortcut]
00000001.00000002.368934423.0000000010410000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_FormBookYara detected FormBookJoe Security
    • 0x6251:$a1: 3C 30 50 4F 53 54 74 09 40
    • 0x1cb90:$a2: 74 0A 4E 0F B6 08 8D 44 08 01 75 F6 8D 70 01 0F B6 00 8D 55
    • 0xa9bf:$a3: 1A D2 80 E2 AF 80 C2 7E EB 2A 80 FA 2F 75 11 8A D0 80 E2 01
    • 0x158a7:$a4: 04 83 C4 0C 83 06 07 5B 5F 5E 8B E5 5D C3 8B 17 03 55 0C 6A 01 83
    00000001.00000002.368934423.0000000010410000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpFormbook_1autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signatorFelix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
    • 0x9908:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC
    • 0x9b72:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC
    • 0x156a5:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94
    • 0x15191:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91
    • 0x157a7:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F
    • 0x1591f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07
    • 0xa58a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06
    • 0x1440c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8
    • 0xb283:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D
    • 0x1b8e7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4
    • 0x1c8fa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
    00000001.00000002.368934423.0000000010410000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpFormbookdetect Formbook in memoryJPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
    • 0x18809:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1
    • 0x1891c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1
    • 0x18838:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5
    • 0x1895d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5
    • 0x1884b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
    • 0x18973:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
    00000006.00000000.300982694.0000000010410000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_FormBookYara detected FormBookJoe Security