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Windows Analysis Report
WinSockClientVault.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	WinSockClientVault.dll
Analysis ID:	831173
MD5:	e17bfe7da3ea0adcf634826f3d5ca1eb
SHA1:	b337eae3d506f22bc681b46f0177f239a9ebf0c9
SHA256:	db9e433dd3f0cf8150a8a61f46e49a6480e373eb09dc68b477f21ea934058e6b
Infos:

Detection

Score:	1
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 6004 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll" MD5: 1F562FBF37040EC6C43C8D5EF619EA39)

conhost.exe (PID: 6088 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cmd.exe (PID: 6116 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

rundll32.exe (PID: 6100 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: G:\DEV\U4_Git\PAM_U4_Base\ArconPAMNextGen\ARCON_ASM\WinSockClientVault\obj\Release\WinSockClientVault.pdb source: WinSockClientVault.dll
Source:	Binary string: G:\DEV\U4_Git\PAM_U4_Base\ArconPAMNextGen\ARCON_ASM\WinSockClientVault\obj\Release\WinSockClientVault.pdbl< source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14%

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean1.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6088:120:WilError_01

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: G:\DEV\U4_Git\PAM_U4_Base\ArconPAMNextGen\ARCON_ASM\WinSockClientVault\obj\Release\WinSockClientVault.pdb source: WinSockClientVault.dll
Source:	Binary string: G:\DEV\U4_Git\PAM_U4_Base\ArconPAMNextGen\ARCON_ASM\WinSockClientVault\obj\Release\WinSockClientVault.pdbl< source: WinSockClientVault.dll

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
WinSockClientVault.dll	0%	ReversingLabs
WinSockClientVault.dll	1%	Virustotal		Browse

Joe Sandbox Version:	37.0.0 Beryl
Analysis ID:	831173
Start date and time:	2023-03-21 07:59:06 +01:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 18s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 104, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	4
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample file name:	WinSockClientVault.dll
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean1.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fs.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:59:59	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.781445197251568
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 49.67% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.10% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.10% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	WinSockClientVault.dll
File size:	9728
MD5:	e17bfe7da3ea0adcf634826f3d5ca1eb
SHA1:	b337eae3d506f22bc681b46f0177f239a9ebf0c9
SHA256:	db9e433dd3f0cf8150a8a61f46e49a6480e373eb09dc68b477f21ea934058e6b
SHA512:	1d2db377af67ca0891f5970306bd1eec397db06d4336f73b138044d63755cad14873880e5f8094cd9c5c2e597b7dba5357768551c56552c6a4802ef16d5151e9
SSDEEP:	192:oYcZsugKcP+AW+Y78RlMuhqTvpJaqi9yhPHD5h:E1O+AW+Y7UyuhqTvxi9yx9h
TLSH:	9412E702CFE8A52ADABF1B38ACB3570145F1F62949A3D71E185C64AC7C3676C4A72731
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...i..d.........." ..0..............<... ...@....... ....................................`................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	74f0e4ecccdce0e4

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x10003c96
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x10000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x64141669 [Fri Mar 17 07:27:37 2023 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [10002000h]
dec ecx
jbe 00007FCB84DF7673h
outsb
and byte ptr [ebp+65h], cl
jbe 00007FCB84DF7678h
jbe 00007FCB84DF7614h
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x3c44	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x4000	0x3c8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x6000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x3b0c	0x1c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x1cac	0x1e00	False	0.44609375	data	5.2595806085918575	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x4000	0x3c8	0x400	False	0.3720703125	data	3.0013843866325085	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x6000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.08153941234324169	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x4058	0x36c	data

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:59:59
Start date:	21/03/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll"
Imagebase:	0x1360000
File size:	116736 bytes
MD5 hash:	1F562FBF37040EC6C43C8D5EF619EA39
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	07:59:59
Start date:	21/03/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff745070000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:59:59
Start date:	21/03/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xb0000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	07:59:59
Start date:	21/03/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\WinSockClientVault.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x1110000
File size:	61952 bytes
MD5 hash:	D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report WinSockClientVault.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Compliance

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 6004, Parent PID: 3452

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 6088, Parent PID: 6004

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6116, Parent PID: 6004

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 6100, Parent PID: 6116

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
WinSockClientVault.dll