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Analysis Report
kdsyitkxmS.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Glupteba
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Yara detected Glupteba
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Creates an autostart registry key pointing to binary in C:\Windows
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Found Tor onion address
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses shutdown.exe to shutdown or reboot the system
Machine Learning detection for sample
Creates files in the system32 config directory
Modifies the windows firewall
Performs DNS TXT record lookups
Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses STUN server to do NAT traversial
Drops PE files with benign system names
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Creates files inside the system directory
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
PE file does not import any functions
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
PE file contains an invalid checksum
Drops PE files
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Enables security privileges
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
PE file contains more sections than normal
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Classification
- System is w10x64native
- svchost.exe (PID: 7872 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k appmo del -p -s camsvc MD5: F586835082F632DC8D9404D83BC16316)
- kdsyitkxmS.exe (PID: 4688 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\kdsyitkx mS.exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 8304 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 8312 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - kdsyitkxmS.exe (PID: 8716 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\kdsyitkx mS.exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 8848 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 8856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - cmd.exe (PID: 9108 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Sysnative \cmd.exe / C "netsh a dvfirewall firewall add rule n ame="csrss " dir=in a ction=allo w program= "C:\Window s\rss\csrs s.exe" ena ble=yes" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 9116 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - netsh.exe (PID: 9168 cmdline:
netsh advf irewall fi rewall add rule name ="csrss" d ir=in acti on=allow p rogram="C: \Windows\r ss\csrss.e xe" enable =yes MD5: 6F1E6DD688818BC3D1391D0CC7D597EB) - powershell.exe (PID: 9200 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 9208 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - powershell.exe (PID: 8380 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 8556 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - csrss.exe (PID: 2532 cmdline:
C:\Windows \rss\csrss .exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 5432 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 4808 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - schtasks.exe (PID: 1388 cmdline:
schtasks / CREATE /SC ONLOGON / RL HIGHEST /TR "C:\W indows\rss \csrss.exe " /TN csrs s /F MD5: 796B784E98008854C27F4B18D287BA30) - conhost.exe (PID: 6720 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - schtasks.exe (PID: 5008 cmdline:
schtasks / delete /tn Scheduled Update /f MD5: 796B784E98008854C27F4B18D287BA30) - conhost.exe (PID: 5868 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - powershell.exe (PID: 2372 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6864 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - powershell.exe (PID: 2736 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 1448 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - mountvol.exe (PID: 7316 cmdline:
mountvol B : /s MD5: E0B3FFF7584298E77DFFB50796839FED) - conhost.exe (PID: 5316 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - mountvol.exe (PID: 7668 cmdline:
mountvol B : /d MD5: E0B3FFF7584298E77DFFB50796839FED) - conhost.exe (PID: 8296 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - mountvol.exe (PID: 1096 cmdline:
mountvol B : /s MD5: E0B3FFF7584298E77DFFB50796839FED) - conhost.exe (PID: 8644 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - mountvol.exe (PID: 4896 cmdline:
mountvol B : /d MD5: E0B3FFF7584298E77DFFB50796839FED) - conhost.exe (PID: 3560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - injector.exe (PID: 5412 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\csrss\i njector\in jector.exe taskmgr.e xe C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\csrs s\injector \NtQuerySy stemInform ationHook. dll MD5: D98E33B66343E7C96158444127A117F6) - conhost.exe (PID: 2900 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - shutdown.exe (PID: 5092 cmdline:
shutdown - r -t 5 MD5: FCDE5AF99B82AE6137FB90C7571D40C3) - conhost.exe (PID: 3308 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - schtasks.exe (PID: 9044 cmdline:
schtasks / CREATE /SC ONLOGON / RL HIGHEST /TR "C:\W indows\rss \csrss.exe " /TN csrs s /F MD5: 796B784E98008854C27F4B18D287BA30) - conhost.exe (PID: 9052 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - cmd.exe (PID: 7312 cmdline:
cmd.exe /C sc sdset WmiPrvSE D :(A;;CCLCS WRPWPDTLOC RRC;;;SY)( A;;CCDCLCS WRPLOCRSDR CWDWO;;;BA )(D;;WPDT; ;;BA)(A;;C CLCSWLOCRR C;;;IU)(A; ;CCLCSWLOC RRC;;;SU)S :(AU;FA;CC DCLCSWRPWP DTLOCRSDRC WDWO;;;WD) MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5480 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - sc.exe (PID: 8944 cmdline:
sc sdset W miPrvSE D: (A;;CCLCSW RPWPDTLOCR RC;;;SY)(A ;;CCDCLCSW RPLOCRSDRC WDWO;;;BA) (D;;WPDT;; ;BA)(A;;CC LCSWLOCRRC ;;;IU)(A;; CCLCSWLOCR RC;;;SU)S: (AU;FA;CCD CLCSWRPWPD TLOCRSDRCW DWO;;;WD) MD5: D9D7684B8431A0D10D0E76FE9F5FFEC8) - proxy.exe (PID: 4736 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\csrss\p roxy\proxy .exe -bind -address 1 27.0.0.1:3 1466 MD5: 61275FE567B258A897943911C450E57E) - conhost.exe (PID: 6076 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - schtasks.exe (PID: 8044 cmdline:
schtasks / CREATE /SC ONLOGON / RL HIGHEST /TR "C:\W indows\rss \csrss.exe " /TN csrs s /F MD5: 796B784E98008854C27F4B18D287BA30) - conhost.exe (PID: 4164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)
- TrustedInstaller.exe (PID: 8676 cmdline:
C:\Windows \servicing \TrustedIn staller.ex e MD5: F14D860CAE05DBD10671623C76B5DE65)
- csrss.exe (PID: 768 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\rss\csrs s.exe" MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - cmd.exe (PID: 5000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Sysnative \cmd.exe / C fodhelpe r MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 3488 cmdline:
fodhelper MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 3460 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \fodhelper .exe" MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 4112 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \fodhelper .exe" MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - csrss.exe (PID: 7048 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\rss\csrs s.exe" MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 7932 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6244 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - csrss.exe (PID: 6892 cmdline:
C:\Windows \rss\csrss .exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 6628 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6400 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)
- csrss.exe (PID: 8952 cmdline:
C:\Windows \rss\csrss .exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 8904 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 8896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - csrss.exe (PID: 8552 cmdline:
C:\Windows \rss\csrss .exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 1356 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 680 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)
- csrss.exe (PID: 9120 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\rss\csrs s.exe" MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - cmd.exe (PID: 7108 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Sysnative \cmd.exe / C fodhelpe r MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7124 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 7384 cmdline:
fodhelper MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 8408 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \fodhelper .exe" MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - fodhelper.exe (PID: 8324 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \fodhelper .exe" MD5: 85018BE1FD913656BC9FF541F017EACD) - csrss.exe (PID: 7120 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\rss\csrs s.exe" MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 5632 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6536 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - csrss.exe (PID: 4840 cmdline:
C:\Windows \rss\csrss .exe MD5: 01FE6BA28D82175D35665B3EB6ED8CEA) - powershell.exe (PID: 2332 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 3504 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68)
- tor.exe (PID: 6028 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\csrss\t or\Tor\tor .exe" --nt -service - f "C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\csrs s\tor\torr c" --Log " notice fil e C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\csrss \tor\log.t xt MD5: 055AE7C584A7B012955BF5D874F30CFA)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Glupteba | Glupteba is a trojan horse malware that is one of the top ten malware variants of 2021. After infecting a system, the Glupteba malware can be used to deliver additional malware, steal user authentication information, and enroll the infected system in a cryptomining botnet. | No Attribution |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Glupteba | Yara detected Glupteba | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Glupteba | Yara detected Glupteba | Joe Security | ||
SUSP_PE_Discord_Attachment_Oct21_1 | Detects suspicious executable with reference to a Discord attachment (often used for malware hosting on a legitimate FQDN) | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
JoeSecurity_Glupteba | Yara detected Glupteba | Joe Security | ||
SUSP_PE_Discord_Attachment_Oct21_1 | Detects suspicious executable with reference to a Discord attachment (often used for malware hosting on a legitimate FQDN) | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
Click to see the 25 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
MAL_ME_RawDisk_Agent_Jan20_2 | Detects suspicious malware using ElRawDisk | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
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MAL_ME_RawDisk_Agent_Jan20_2 | Detects suspicious malware using ElRawDisk | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
MAL_ME_RawDisk_Agent_Jan20_2 | Detects suspicious malware using ElRawDisk | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
MAL_ME_RawDisk_Agent_Jan20_2 | Detects suspicious malware using ElRawDisk | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
MAL_ME_RawDisk_Agent_Jan20_2 | Detects suspicious malware using ElRawDisk | Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) |
| |
Click to see the 22 entries |
Persistence and Installation Behavior |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.201.1.1.149827532045697 05/28/23-11:32:14.790696 |
SID: | 2045697 |
Source Port: | 49827 |
Destination Port: | 53 |
Protocol: | UDP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20185.82.216.50500074432043048 05/28/23-11:34:14.938480 |
SID: | 2043048 |
Source Port: | 50007 |
Destination Port: | 443 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.201.1.1.163997532045697 05/28/23-11:37:15.634598 |
SID: | 2045697 |
Source Port: | 63997 |
Destination Port: | 53 |
Protocol: | UDP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20185.82.216.50499934432043048 05/28/23-11:32:15.763358 |
SID: | 2043048 |
Source Port: | 49993 |
Destination Port: | 443 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20185.82.216.50499904432043048 05/28/23-11:32:14.520098 |
SID: | 2043048 |
Source Port: | 49990 |
Destination Port: | 443 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20185.82.216.50499984432043048 05/28/23-11:32:24.457669 |
SID: | 2043048 |
Source Port: | 49998 |
Destination Port: | 443 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20185.82.216.50500024432043048 05/28/23-11:33:14.485129 |
SID: | 2043048 |
Source Port: | 50002 |
Destination Port: | 443 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
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Bitcoin Miner |
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