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Windows Analysis Report
file.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	file.exe
Analysis ID:	882700
MD5:	daf761fb9aaa34a9c2120003694d88a3
SHA1:	47fd2695b6da26f6444799d442662b982d70f783
SHA256:	18d4850a10812f3b4d8631939d469b41c1d344a7fa9205acc31b265d0600291b
Tags:	NETexeLgoogLoaderMSILx64
Infos:

Detection

lgoogLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected lgoogLoader

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected AntiVM3

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Writes to foreign memory regions

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Sample is not signed and drops a device driver

Machine Learning detection for sample

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)

Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

HTTP GET or POST without a user agent

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Contains functionality to load drivers

PE file does not import any functions

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Enables driver privileges

Drops PE files

Creates driver files

Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges

Spawns drivers

Found evaded block containing many API calls

Creates or modifies windows services

Dropped file seen in connection with other malware

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

file.exe (PID: 6988 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe MD5: DAF761FB9AAA34A9C2120003694D88A3)

ComSvcConfig.exe (PID: 4572 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe MD5: 2778AE0EB674B74FF8028BF4E51F1DF5)

jsc.exe (PID: 3068 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe MD5: 2B40A449D6034F41771A460DADD53A60)

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
LgoogLoader	LgoogLoader is an installer that drops three files: a batch file, an AutoIt interpreter, and an AutoIt script. After downloading, it executes the batch file.	No Attribution	https://blog.polyswarm.io/nullmixer-drops-multiple-malware-families	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.lgoogloader

Yara Signatures

Dropped Files

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys	PUA_VULN_Driver_Sysinternalswwwsysinternalscom_procexpsys_ProcessExplorer_HoEP	Detects vulnerable driver mentioned in LOLDrivers project using VersionInfo values from the PE header - 97e3a44ec4ae58c8cc38eefc613e950e.bin	Florian Roth	0x6765:$: 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 63 00 72 00 69 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 73 00 20 00 45 00 78 00 70 00 6C 00 6F 00 72 00 65 ... 0x66fd:$: 00 43 00 6F 00 6D 00 70 00 61 00 6E 00 79 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 53 00 79 00 73 00 69 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 73 00 20 00 2D 00 20 00 77 00 77 00 77 00 2E ... 0x67b1:$: 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 56 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 34 00 33 0x6911:$: 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 56 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 34 00 33 0x67dd:$: 00 49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 70 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00 65 00 78 00 70 00 2E 00 73 00 79 00 73 0x68cd:$: 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 73 00 20 00 45 00 78 00 70 00 6C 00 6F 00 72 00 65 00 72 0x688d:$: 00 4F 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 69 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 6E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 70 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00 65 00 78 00 70 00 2E 00 53 00 79 00 73 0x6815:$: 00 4C 00 65 00 67 00 61 00 6C 00 43 00 6F 00 70 00 79 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 68 00 74 00 00 00 43 00 6F 00 70 00 79 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 68 00 74 00 20 00 28 00 43 00 29 00 20 00 4D 00 61 00 72 ...

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	SUSP_XORed_MSDOS_Stub_Message	Detects suspicious XORed MSDOS stub message	Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)	0xade:$xo1: \x9E\xA2\xA3\xB9\xEA\xBA\xB8\xA5\xAD\xB8\xAB\xA7\xEA\xA9\xAB\xA4\xA4\xA5\xBE\xEA\xA8\xAF\xEA\xB8\xBF\xA4\xEA\xA3\xA4\xEA\x8E\x85\x99\xEA\xA7\xA5\xAE\xAF 0x6546:$xo1: \x9E\xA2\xA3\xB9\xEA\xBA\xB8\xA5\xAD\xB8\xAB\xA7\xEA\xA9\xAB\xA4\xA4\xA5\xBE\xEA\xA8\xAF\xEA\xB8\xBF\xA4\xEA\xA3\xA4\xEA\x8E\x85\x99\xEA\xA7\xA5\xAE\xAF
00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_lGoogLoader	Yara detected lgoogLoader	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP	Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: file.exe PID: 6988	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: file.exe PID: 6988	JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP	Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP	Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP	Joe Security
0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_DisableWinDefender	Detects executables containing artifcats associated with disabling Widnows Defender	ditekSHen	0x9d0d:$e1: Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths 0x9d3c:$e2: Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath
0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM	Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object	ditekSHen	0x9cdd:$r1: Classes\Folder\shell\open\command 0x912c:$k1: DelegateExecute

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: file.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%
Source: file.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 56%			Perma Link

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: http://5.42.94.169/customer/368	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://109.206.241.33/files/Hadi.config.CfgEncFileMZ	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Source: http://5.42.94.169	Virustotal: Detection: 7%			Perma Link
Source: http://5.42.94.169/customer/368	Virustotal: Detection: 8%			Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: file.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Exploits

Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: file.exe PID: 6988, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\Purala\source\repos\Particle-Filter\obj\x86\Debug\FastSLAM.pdb source: file.exe
Source:	Binary string: c:\src\ShellRunas\Release\ShellRunas.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: <c:\src\ShellRunas\Release\ShellRunas.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: C:\agent\1\s\sys\x64\Release\ProcExpDriver.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, ?????.sys.0.dr

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /customer/368 HTTP/1.1Host: 5.42.94.169Connection: Keep-Alive

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 5.42.94.169 5.42.94.169

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 5.42.94.169

Source: jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492997621.0000000000E50000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.493023944.0000000000E66000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://109.206.241.33/files/Hadi.config.CfgEncFileMZ
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C7685000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://5.42.94.169
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C7685000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://5.42.94.169/customer/368
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C7685000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: jsc.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sysinternals.com
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sysinternals.comopen/?ICONSHELLRUNASAboutUsage/raw/netonlyRunAsInvoker__COMPAT_LAYERcmd
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, ?????.sys.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.sysinternals.com0

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /customer/368 HTTP/1.1Host: 5.42.94.169Connection: Keep-Alive

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: 0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects executables containing artifcats associated with disabling Widnows Defender Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object Author: ditekSHen

Source: 0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_DisableWinDefender author = ditekSHen, description = Detects executables containing artifcats associated with disabling Widnows Defender
Source: 0.2.file.exe.1f6c773a2a8.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM author = ditekSHen, description = Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object
Source: 00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: SUSP_XORed_MSDOS_Stub_Message date = 2019-10-28, author = Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), description = Detects suspicious XORed MSDOS stub message, score = , reference = https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/latest/writingrules.html#xor-strings
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys, type: DROPPED	Matched rule: PUA_VULN_Driver_Sysinternalswwwsysinternalscom_procexpsys_ProcessExplorer_HoEP date = 2023-05-19, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects vulnerable driver mentioned in LOLDrivers project using VersionInfo values from the PE header - 97e3a44ec4ae58c8cc38eefc613e950e.bin, score = , reference = https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLDrivers, hash = 440883cd9d6a76db5e53517d0ec7fe13d5a50d2f6a7f91ecfc863bc3490e4f5c

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFAA577
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CF90E58
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFA1208
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CF96A17
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFA3AF5
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_00404AF0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_004084B7

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_00402050 _memset,_memset,_memset,_memset,_memset,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,SetEnvironmentVariableW,_memset,_wcscpy_s,_wcscat_s,CreateProcessW,GetLastError,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,__wcsicmp,_wcscpy_s,_memset,_memset,_memset,CreateProcessWithLogonW,GetLastError,EnumWindows,Sleep,Sleep,EnumWindows,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,LoadIconW,LoadIconW,LoadIconW,LoadCursorW,RegisterClassExW,CreateDialogParamW,GetMessageW,GetMessageW,IsDialogMessageW,TranslateMessage,DispatchMessageW,GetMessageW,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFA5870 NtLoadDriver,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFA5870 NtLoadDriver,

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: No import functions for PE file found

Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameprocexp.SysB vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameShellRunasP vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameShellRunasP vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7771000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRunpeX.Stub.Framework.exeL vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493612039.000001F6C5C50000.00000004.08000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameRunpeX.Stub.Framework.exeL vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493115383.000001F6C58BA000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameeroxipe4 vs file.exe
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493218018.000001F6C5AF0000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs file.exe
Source: file.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameeroxipe4 vs file.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Process token adjusted: Load Driver

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Driver loaded: \Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\TaskKill

Source: Joe Sandbox View

Dropped File: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys 440883CD9D6A76DB5E53517D0EC7FE13D5A50D2F6A7F91ECFC863BC3490E4F5C

Source: file.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%
Source: file.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 56%

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CFA58C4 AdjustTokenPrivileges,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\file.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Jump to behavior

Source: ?????.sys.0.dr

Binary string: \DosDevices\PROCEXP152\ObjectTypes\\Device\PROCEXP152PsAcquireProcessExitSynchronizationPsReleaseProcessExitSynchronizationMmGetMaximumNonPagedPoolInBytesObGetObjectTypeMutantIoCreateDeviceSecureIoValidateDeviceIoControlAccessD:P

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.evad.winEXE@5/2@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_004029C0 _memset,_memset,SHGetMalloc,SHGetDesktopFolder,SearchPathW,GetLastError,CoInitialize,CoCreateInstance,#217,#173,CoUninitialize,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\mscorlib\ac26e2af62f23e37e645b5e44068a025\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: file.exe, ????????/?????????.cs

Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: file.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\Purala\source\repos\Particle-Filter\obj\x86\Debug\FastSLAM.pdb source: file.exe
Source:	Binary string: c:\src\ShellRunas\Release\ShellRunas.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: <c:\src\ShellRunas\Release\ShellRunas.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: C:\agent\1\s\sys\x64\Release\ProcExpDriver.pdb source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, ?????.sys.0.dr

Data Obfuscation

Yara detected lgoogLoader

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_000001F6C58B8762 push rsp; retn 0009h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFC9CF967E9 push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_00404ACD push ecx; ret

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_00402CB0 _memset,_memset,_wcscpy_s,_wcscat_s,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,GetLastError,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,_wcschr,_wcscpy_s,GetComputerNameW,CredUIParseUserNameW,CoTaskMemFree,

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Sample is not signed and drops a device driver

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Registry key created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\TaskKill

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Yara detected AntiVM3

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: file.exe PID: 6988, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe TID: 7068	Thread sleep time: -6456360425798339s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe TID: 4672	Thread sleep count: 9612 > 30

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,Sleep
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Dropped PE file which has not been started: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Window / User API: threadDelayed 9612

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Evaded block: after key decision

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

API coverage: 4.4 %

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node

Source: jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492997621.0000000000E50000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492997621.0000000000E50000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Chrome/HEADIsWow64Processkernel32X:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dllntdll.dllRtlInitUnicodeStringZwOpenFileZwCreateSectionZwMapViewOfSectionNtUnmapViewOfSectionNtQueryInformationProcess{%08X-%04X-%04x-%02X%02X-%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X}RtlRandomExntdll:y--\Driver\Device ParametersEDID(IsActive)(NotActive)BAD EDID!No EDID!--Nm:SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\DISPLAY\\.\PhysicalDrive%d---VMwareVirtualBoxVBoxQEMUDisplay AdapterNon-PnPVMwareVirtualBoxVBoxQEMUWestern Disk HARDDISK(1):(2):text/*Mozilla / 5.0 (SymbianOS / 9.1; U; [en]; SymbianOS / 91 Series60 / 3.0) AppleWebkit / 413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari / 413
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\'C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys&C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: noValueButYesKey)C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493218018.000001F6C5BD8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dllQQ

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_00405700 _memset,IsDebuggerPresent,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,GetCurrentProcess,TerminateProcess,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_004039C0 GetStartupInfoA,GetProcessHeap,GetProcessHeap,HeapAlloc,_fast_error_exit,GetVersionExA,GetProcessHeap,HeapFree,GetProcessHeap,HeapFree,_fast_error_exit,_fast_error_exit,__RTC_Initialize,__amsg_exit,GetCommandLineA,___crtGetEnvironmentStringsA,__setargv,__amsg_exit,__setenvp,__amsg_exit,__cinit,__amsg_exit,__wincmdln,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_00407219 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_00405700 _memset,IsDebuggerPresent,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,GetCurrentProcess,TerminateProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040C52A _raise,_memset,SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Writes to foreign memory regions

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 401000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 40D000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 413000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 416000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 418000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: B12008

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Source: file.exe, ????????/???????????.cs

Reference to suspicious API methods: ('???????????', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('????????', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll'), ('?????????', 'VirtualProtect@kernel32.dll'), ('????????????', 'VirtualAlloc@kernel32.dll')

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Web\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Web.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: GetLocaleInfoA,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_0040C66D cpuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Code function: 2_2_00407ACC GetSystemTimeAsFileTime,GetCurrentProcessId,GetCurrentThreadId,GetTickCount,QueryPerformanceCounter,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
1 Valid Accounts	13 Native API	1 Valid Accounts	1 Valid Accounts	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	11 Archive Collected Data	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Encrypted Channel	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	2 Windows Service	1 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	1 Valid Accounts	LSASS Memory	121 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	1 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	2 LSASS Driver	11 Access Token Manipulation	1 Disable or Modify Tools	Security Account Manager	1 Process Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	2 Windows Service	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	NTDS	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	1 Application Layer Protocol	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	211 Process Injection	11 Access Token Manipulation	LSA Secrets	1 Application Window Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	2 LSASS Driver	211 Process Injection	Cached Domain Credentials	34 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
file.exe	46%	ReversingLabs	Win64.Trojan.Pwsx
file.exe	56%	Virustotal		Browse
file.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys	0%	ReversingLabs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://www.sysinternals.comopen/?ICONSHELLRUNASAboutUsage/raw/netonlyRunAsInvoker__COMPAT_LAYERcmd	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.sysinternals.com0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://5.42.94.169	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://5.42.94.169/customer/368	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://5.42.94.169	8%	Virustotal		Browse
http://5.42.94.169/customer/368	9%	Virustotal		Browse
http://109.206.241.33/files/Hadi.config.CfgEncFileMZ	0%	Virustotal		Browse
http://109.206.241.33/files/Hadi.config.CfgEncFileMZ	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://5.42.94.169/customer/368	true	9%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.sysinternals.com	jsc.exe	false		high
http://www.sysinternals.comopen/?ICONSHELLRUNASAboutUsage/raw/netonlyRunAsInvoker__COMPAT_LAYERcmd	file.exe, 00000000.00000002.495389743.000001F6D7691000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C77A3000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492840110.0000000000400000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://109.206.241.33/files/Hadi.config.CfgEncFileMZ	jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.492997621.0000000000E50000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, jsc.exe, 00000002.00000002.493023944.0000000000E66000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown
http://5.42.94.169	file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C7685000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	8%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C7685000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
https://www.sysinternals.com0	file.exe, 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, ?????.sys.0.dr	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
5.42.94.169	unknown	Russian Federation		39493	RU-KSTVKolomnaGroupofcompaniesGuarantee-tvRU	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	37.1.0 Beryl
Analysis ID:	882700
Start date and time:	2023-06-06 17:13:55 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 0s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 104, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	3
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample file name:	file.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.evad.winEXE@5/2@0/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 28.5% (good quality ratio 26.2%) Quality average: 72.8% Quality standard deviation: 31.3%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 76% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found.
TCP Packets have been reduced to 100

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
17:14:52	API Interceptor	62x Sleep call for process: file.exe modified

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1595
Entropy (8bit):	5.378294470225564
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:MxHKn1qHGiD0HKeGiYHKGD8AoiHd+vxpNStHTG1hAHKKPz:iqnwmI0qerYqGgAoi0ZPStzG1eqKPz
MD5:	3D4F5C31B249A99B5AC79BB49D9894F3
SHA1:	C7F66B88EB5A896E235CB6C37CC752C225119173
SHA-256:	472C344E0D0AB687ED38440FCE12C0E010957CF27C4514710C0683F15DC0DEC5
SHA-512:	CF6805ACC8DAEBFB21DC467BF533D6D68BC9EF5BED519D1DF0833BFB5E982E54828702A672EBD971EFE4FC7B828818B8DB57FAC70B673AA5A884B5AB9130CA1E
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System\10a17139182a9efd561f01fada9688a5\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Drawing\49e5c0579db170be9741dccc34c1998e\System.Drawing.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Windows.Forms\6d7d43e19d7fc0006285b85b7e2c8702\System.Windows.Forms.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Core\4e05e2e48b8a6dd267a8c9e25ef129a7\System.Core.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neut

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe
File Type:	PE32+ executable (DLL) (native) x86-64, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	36208
Entropy (8bit):	6.284053631838433
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	768:tKCM0IWRhm8LiES4cT4iZ923OMqUD6Q4KICJw4:t7/Vhzb3pL4GJw4
MD5:	97E3A44EC4AE58C8CC38EEFC613E950E
SHA1:	BC47E15537FA7C32DFEFD23168D7E1741F8477ED
SHA-256:	440883CD9D6A76DB5E53517D0EC7FE13D5A50D2F6A7F91ECFC863BC3490E4F5C
SHA-512:	8EF7FC489B6FFED9EC14746E526AE87F44C39D5EAFFF0D4C3BFA0B3F0D28450F76D1066F446C766F4C9A20842A7F084FE4A9F94659D5487EA88959FCCB2A96EB
Malicious:	true
Yara Hits:	Rule: PUA_VULN_Driver_Sysinternalswwwsysinternalscom_procexpsys_ProcessExplorer_HoEP, Description: Detects vulnerable driver mentioned in LOLDrivers project using VersionInfo values from the PE header - 97e3a44ec4ae58c8cc38eefc613e950e.bin, Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys, Author: Florian Roth
Antivirus:	Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......3...w.{.w.{.w.{.~...p.{.w.z.H.{.~...t.{.~...t.{.~...t.{."...v.{."..v.{.".y.v.{.Richw.{.........PE..d...l..a.........." .....L..........X.......................................................................................................x...(............`.......l..p!......0....I..T............................................@...............................text....%.......&.................. ..h.rdata.......@.......*..............@..H.data...,....P.......:..............@....pdata.......`.......<..............@..HPAGE.........p.......@.............. ..`INIT.................\.............. ..b.rsrc................f..............@..B.reloc..0............j..............@..B................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.697202938635302
TrID:	Win64 Executable GUI (202006/5) 92.65% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 5.51% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.92% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.92% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	file.exe
File size:	30720
MD5:	daf761fb9aaa34a9c2120003694d88a3
SHA1:	47fd2695b6da26f6444799d442662b982d70f783
SHA256:	18d4850a10812f3b4d8631939d469b41c1d344a7fa9205acc31b265d0600291b
SHA512:	1ddf3c0b4dcbb4103d24b6a5bb3308dff706c9d9277d411be3f9356e9040e67b04c0c02c9c927ba60c5723a50d746287de34cff5545003a0aed3596ec13fd7b2
SSDEEP:	768:uwVMApolbUGPPMdwdunhdH15FIU/ogyejq:bVLoljn8nhj5FF1jq
TLSH:	68D20800A3F98767EAFB4BF64871124447BA7ABB7936E75D0DC460DB1A637404A01BA3
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..d...Lx}d.........."...0.Uk............... ....@...... ....................................`................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	90cececece8e8eb0

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x400000
Entrypoint Section:
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x647D784C [Mon Jun 5 05:53:16 2023 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec ebp
pop edx
nop
add byte ptr [ebx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xa000	0x8f4	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x8ad8	0x1c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2000	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x6b55	0x6c00	False	0.5057146990740741	data	5.791232238044552	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xa000	0x8f4	0xa00	False	0.2921875	data	4.376579543169947	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xa0b8	0x328	data
RT_VERSION	0xa3e0	0x328	data	English	United States
RT_MANIFEST	0xa708	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.786187887 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.835110903 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.835464001 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.860167980 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911331892 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911371946 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911385059 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911403894 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911417961 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911432028 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911446095 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911465883 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911478996 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911498070 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911545992 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.911638021 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960335970 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960397005 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960416079 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960436106 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960455894 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960474014 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960494041 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960513115 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960531950 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960550070 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960567951 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960586071 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960602999 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960619926 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960633993 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960639000 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960656881 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960675001 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960676908 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960692883 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960701942 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960711002 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960728884 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960736990 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:51.960772038 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009464979 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009502888 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009522915 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009541035 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009560108 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009574890 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009582043 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009602070 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009619951 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009625912 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009648085 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009649992 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009670973 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009673119 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009691954 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009711027 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009721994 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009732962 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009752989 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009766102 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009774923 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009789944 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009798050 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009819984 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009838104 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009859085 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009860039 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009879112 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009897947 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009902954 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009924889 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009946108 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009948969 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009964943 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009972095 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.009987116 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010001898 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010008097 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010026932 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010050058 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010062933 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010071039 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010092974 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010097980 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010113955 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010133028 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010142088 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010154963 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010174990 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010181904 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010196924 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010215998 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010221958 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010241985 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010260105 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010277033 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010282993 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010303020 CEST	80	49708	5.42.94.169	192.168.2.6
Jun 6, 2023 17:14:52.010312080 CEST	49708	80	192.168.2.6	5.42.94.169

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

5.42.94.169

Target ID:	0
Start time:	17:14:48
Start date:	06/06/2023
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\file.exe
Imagebase:	0x1f6c58b0000
File size:	30720 bytes
MD5 hash:	DAF761FB9AAA34A9C2120003694D88A3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP, Description: Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP, Source: 00000000.00000002.493841709.000001F6C76CC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: ComSvcConfig.exePID: 4572, Parent PID: 6988

General

Target ID:	1
Start time:	17:14:59
Start date:	06/06/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ComSvcConfig.exe
Imagebase:	0x13570130000
File size:	173672 bytes
MD5 hash:	2778AE0EB674B74FF8028BF4E51F1DF5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: jsc.exePID: 3068, Parent PID: 6988

General

Target ID:	2
Start time:	17:14:59
Start date:	06/06/2023
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\jsc.exe
Imagebase:	0x8b0000
File size:	46688 bytes
MD5 hash:	2B40A449D6034F41771A460DADD53A60
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: SUSP_XORed_MSDOS_Stub_Message, Description: Detects suspicious XORed MSDOS stub message, Source: 00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) Rule: JoeSecurity_lGoogLoader, Description: Yara detected lgoogLoader, Source: 00000002.00000002.492960569.0000000000E30000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	moderate

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg .
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
Tactics:	Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Application logs, Process monitoring, Windows Error Reporting
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report file.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Dropped Files

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\file.exe.log

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\?????.sys

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

Statistics

Windows Analysis Report
file.exe