Windows Analysis Report
UtfPLaHG.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name: UtfPLaHG.exe
Analysis ID: 1432606
MD5: 6a44a61f22c1f94581fe84ce077c8bc3
SHA1: 0af9823081a8ac7dab63fdbc1c4360508f5ed074
SHA256: 5ef1ff8185f56af614f482d00c32b2112483b0e7900b282fb28200dbe8b0cb87
Tags: exenjRat
Infos:

Detection

Njrat
Score: 100
Range: 0 - 100
Whitelisted: false
Confidence: 100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected Njrat
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Disables zone checking for all users
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the windows firewall
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication
Uses dynamic DNS services
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Uses 32bit PE files
Yara signature match

Classification

Name Description Attribution Blogpost URLs Link
NjRAT RedPacket Security describes NJRat as "a remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities to log keystrokes, access the victim's camera, steal credentials stored in browsers, open a reverse shell, upload/download files, view the victim's desktop, perform process, file, and registry manipulations, and capabilities to let the attacker update, uninstall, restart, close, disconnect the RAT and rename its campaign ID. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread through USB drives."It is supposedly popular with actors in the Middle East. Similar to other RATs, many leaked builders may be backdoored.
  • AQUATIC PANDA
  • Earth Lusca
  • Operation C-Major
  • The Gorgon Group
 https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat

AV Detection
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Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Avira: detected
Found malware configuration
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp Malware Configuration Extractor: Njrat {"Host": "asero23.ddns.net", "Port": "5552", "Version": "0.7d", "Campaign ID": "MyBot", "Install Name": "WindowsServices.exe", "Install Dir": "TEMP", "Network Seprator": "|'|'|"}
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Virustotal: Detection: 81% Perma Link
Yara detected Njrat
Source: Yara match File source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.4081592327.00000000033E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: UtfPLaHG.exe PID: 7032, type: MEMORYSTR
Machine Learning detection for sample
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Joe Sandbox ML: detected
Uses 32bit PE files
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9672_none_d08f9da24428a513\MSVCR80.dll Jump to behavior
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Networking
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C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Source: Malware configuration extractor URLs: asero23.ddns.net
Uses dynamic DNS services
Source: unknown DNS query: name: asero23.ddns.net
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Source: global traffic TCP traffic: 192.168.2.4:49730 -> 178.128.228.252:5552
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Source: Joe Sandbox View ASN Name: DIGITALOCEAN-ASNUS DIGITALOCEAN-ASNUS
Source: unknown UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: unknown UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1
Source: global traffic DNS traffic detected: DNS query: asero23.ddns.net

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing
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Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, kl.cs .Net Code: VKCodeToUnicode

E-Banking Fraud
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Yara detected Njrat
Source: Yara match File source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.4081592327.00000000033E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: UtfPLaHG.exe PID: 7032, type: MEMORYSTR

System Summary
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Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 Author: unknown
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Detects malware from disclosed CN malware set Author: Florian Roth
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Identify njRat Author: Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: detect njRAT in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Detects NjRAT / Bladabindi Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 Author: unknown
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Detects malware from disclosed CN malware set Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Identify njRat Author: Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: detect njRAT in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Detects NjRAT / Bladabindi Author: ditekSHen
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 Author: unknown
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: Identify njRat Author: Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: detect njRAT in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process Stats: CPU usage > 49%
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, 00000000.00000002.4081103091.000000000140E000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorwks.dllT vs UtfPLaHG.exe
Uses 32bit PE files
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
Yara signature match
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 reference_sample = 741a0f3954499c11f9eddc8df7c31e7c59ca41f1a7005646735b8b1d53438c1b, os = windows, severity = x86, creation_date = 2021-06-13, scan_context = file, memory, license = Elastic License v2, threat_name = Windows.Trojan.Njrat, fingerprint = d15e131bca6beddcaecb20fffaff1784ad8a33a25e7ce90f7450d1a362908cc4, id = 30f3c220-b8dc-45a1-bcf0-027c2f76fa63, last_modified = 2021-10-04
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: CN_disclosed_20180208_c date = 2018-02-08, hash1 = 17475d25d40c877284e73890a9dd55fccedc6a5a071c351a8c342c8ef7f9cea7, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects malware from disclosed CN malware set, reference = https://twitter.com/cyberintproject/status/961714165550342146, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: njrat1 date = 2015-05-27, author = Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter, description = Identify njRat, author_email = bwall@ballastsecurity.net
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: Njrat hash1 = d5f63213ce11798879520b0e9b0d1b68d55f7727758ec8c120e370699a41379d, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect njRAT in memory, rule_usage = memory scan
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_NjRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects NjRAT / Bladabindi
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 reference_sample = 741a0f3954499c11f9eddc8df7c31e7c59ca41f1a7005646735b8b1d53438c1b, os = windows, severity = x86, creation_date = 2021-06-13, scan_context = file, memory, license = Elastic License v2, threat_name = Windows.Trojan.Njrat, fingerprint = d15e131bca6beddcaecb20fffaff1784ad8a33a25e7ce90f7450d1a362908cc4, id = 30f3c220-b8dc-45a1-bcf0-027c2f76fa63, last_modified = 2021-10-04
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: CN_disclosed_20180208_c date = 2018-02-08, hash1 = 17475d25d40c877284e73890a9dd55fccedc6a5a071c351a8c342c8ef7f9cea7, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects malware from disclosed CN malware set, reference = https://twitter.com/cyberintproject/status/961714165550342146, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: njrat1 date = 2015-05-27, author = Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter, description = Identify njRat, author_email = bwall@ballastsecurity.net
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: Njrat hash1 = d5f63213ce11798879520b0e9b0d1b68d55f7727758ec8c120e370699a41379d, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect njRAT in memory, rule_usage = memory scan
Source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_NjRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects NjRAT / Bladabindi
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: Windows_Trojan_Njrat_30f3c220 reference_sample = 741a0f3954499c11f9eddc8df7c31e7c59ca41f1a7005646735b8b1d53438c1b, os = windows, severity = x86, creation_date = 2021-06-13, scan_context = file, memory, license = Elastic License v2, threat_name = Windows.Trojan.Njrat, fingerprint = d15e131bca6beddcaecb20fffaff1784ad8a33a25e7ce90f7450d1a362908cc4, id = 30f3c220-b8dc-45a1-bcf0-027c2f76fa63, last_modified = 2021-10-04
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: njrat1 date = 2015-05-27, author = Brian Wallace @botnet_hunter, description = Identify njRat, author_email = bwall@ballastsecurity.net
Source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY Matched rule: Njrat hash1 = d5f63213ce11798879520b0e9b0d1b68d55f7727758ec8c120e370699a41379d, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect njRAT in memory, rule_usage = memory scan
Source: classification engine Classification label: mal100.phis.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@4/1@4/1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Code function: 0_2_05561406 AdjustTokenPrivileges, 0_2_05561406
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Code function: 0_2_055613CF AdjustTokenPrivileges, 0_2_055613CF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6336:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\9128200b315d4a4c00056ef78bb90712
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static file information: TRID: Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.79%
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers Jump to behavior
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Virustotal: Detection: 81%
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe netsh firewall add allowedprogram "C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe" "UtfPLaHG.exe" ENABLE
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe netsh firewall add allowedprogram "C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe" "UtfPLaHG.exe" ENABLE Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: mscoree.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: apphelp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: version.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: windows.storage.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: wldp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: profapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: uxtheme.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: cryptsp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: rsaenh.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: cryptbase.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: mswsock.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: dnsapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: ifmon.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: mprapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rasmontr.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rasapi32.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rasman.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: mfc42u.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rasman.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: authfwcfg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: fwpolicyiomgr.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: firewallapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: dnsapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: fwbase.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: dhcpcmonitor.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: dot3cfg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: dot3api.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: onex.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: eappcfg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: ncrypt.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: eappprxy.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: ntasn1.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: fwcfg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: hnetmon.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: netshell.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: nlaapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: netsetupapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: netiohlp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: winnsi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: nshhttp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: httpapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: nshipsec.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: userenv.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: activeds.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: polstore.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: winipsec.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: adsldpc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: nshwfp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: cabinet.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: p2pnetsh.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: p2p.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: profapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: cryptbase.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rpcnsh.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: whhelper.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: winhttp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wlancfg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: cryptsp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wlanapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wshelper.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wevtapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: mswsock.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: peerdistsh.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: uxtheme.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wcmapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: rmclient.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: mobilenetworking.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: slc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: sppc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: gpapi.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: ktmw32.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: mprmsg.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: windows.storage.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: wldp.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Section loaded: msasn1.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorrc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9672_none_d08f9da24428a513\MSVCR80.dll Jump to behavior
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Data Obfuscation
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.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, OK.cs .Net Code: Plugin System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(byte[])
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Memory allocated: 1630000 memory reserve | memory write watch Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Memory allocated: 33E0000 memory reserve | memory write watch Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Memory allocated: 1630000 memory commit | memory reserve | memory write watch Jump to behavior
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Window / User API: threadDelayed 409 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Window / User API: threadDelayed 3499 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Window / User API: threadDelayed 5557 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 1770 Jump to behavior
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe TID: 7012 Thread sleep count: 409 > 30 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe TID: 7012 Thread sleep time: -409000s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe TID: 6044 Thread sleep count: 3499 > 30 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe TID: 7012 Thread sleep count: 5557 > 30 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe TID: 7012 Thread sleep time: -5557000s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe Last function: Thread delayed
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, 00000000.00000002.4081103091.0000000001488000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWT
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, 00000000.00000002.4081103091.0000000001488000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000001.00000003.1705466615.00000000011F1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll
Enables debug privileges
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process token adjusted: Debug Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion
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.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, kl.cs Reference to suspicious API methods: MapVirtualKey(a, 0u)
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, kl.cs Reference to suspicious API methods: GetAsyncKeyState(num2)
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, OK.cs Reference to suspicious API methods: capGetDriverDescriptionA(wDriver, ref lpszName, 100, ref lpszVer, 100)
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, 00000000.00000002.4081592327.000000000349D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: UtfPLaHG.exe, 00000000.00000002.4081592327.000000000349D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp Binary or memory string: Program Manager@9
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid Jump to behavior

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings
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Disables zone checking for all users
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Registry value created: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS Jump to behavior
Modifies the windows firewall
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe netsh firewall add allowedprogram "C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe" "UtfPLaHG.exe" ENABLE
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe netsh firewall add allowedprogram "C:\Users\user\Desktop\UtfPLaHG.exe" "UtfPLaHG.exe" ENABLE

Stealing of Sensitive Information
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Yara detected Njrat
Source: Yara match File source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.4081592327.00000000033E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: UtfPLaHG.exe PID: 7032, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality
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Yara detected Njrat
Source: Yara match File source: UtfPLaHG.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.0.UtfPLaHG.exe.c90000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000000.1616392139.0000000000C92000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.4081592327.00000000033E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: UtfPLaHG.exe PID: 7032, type: MEMORYSTR
windows-stand
Hide Legend

Legend:

  • Process
  • Signature
  • Created File
  • DNS/IP Info
  • Is Dropped
  • Is Windows Process
  • Number of created Registry Values
  • Number of created Files
  • Visual Basic
  • Delphi
  • Java
  • .Net C# or VB.NET
  • C, C++ or other language
  • Is malicious
  • Internet
behaviorgraph top1 dnsIp2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 1432606 Sample: UtfPLaHG.exe Startdate: 27/04/2024 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 16 asero23.ddns.net 2->16 20 Found malware configuration 2->20 22 Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule) 2->22 24 Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample 2->24 28 8 other signatures 2->28 8 UtfPLaHG.exe 3 4 2->8         started        signatures3 26 Uses dynamic DNS services 16->26 process4 dnsIp5 18 asero23.ddns.net 178.128.228.252, 5552 DIGITALOCEAN-ASNUS Netherlands 8->18 30 Disables zone checking for all users 8->30 32 Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings 8->32 34 Modifies the windows firewall 8->34 12 netsh.exe 2 8->12         started        signatures6 process7 process8 14 conhost.exe 12->14         started       
  • No. of IPs < 25%
  • 25% < No. of IPs < 50%
  • 50% < No. of IPs < 75%
  • 75% < No. of IPs

Contacted Public IPs

IP Domain Country Flag ASN ASN Name Malicious
178.128.228.252
 asero23.ddns.net Netherlands
14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASNUS true

Contacted Domains

Name IP Active
asero23.ddns.net 178.128.228.252 true

Contacted URLs

Name Malicious Antivirus Detection Reputation
asero23.ddns.net true
  • Avira URL Cloud: safe
 unknown